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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Fisheries management has a long tradition in the European Union. The
ﬁrst European Common Fisheries Policy came into force in 1983. Its main
intention was to secure and allocate ﬁshing rights of member states. It also
introduced conservation measures in order to protect the European ﬁsh stocks
(European Council (1983), Art. 1 and 2). Over time, the Common Fisheries
Policy focused more and more on the implementation of a sustainable ﬁsheries
management (European Council, 1992, 2002; European Union, 2013). The
Common Fisheries Policy comprises a number of diﬀerent tools to reach that
aim, the most important one being the total allowable catch (TAC). It deﬁnes
the amount of ﬁsh that is allowed to be taken from a speciﬁc stock in a year.
While TACs have a huge potential to restrict ﬁshing activities, the TAC
management of the European Union failed (European Commission, 2001,
2009b). Over many years and for many stocks TACs were set on ineﬀectively
high levels such that their restrictive impact was either very small or even
non-existent (Khalilian et al., 2010; Froese, 2011). TACs are set by majority
voting of the European Council of Ministers. Once a TAC is set it is allocated
to the European member states according to the principle of relative stability.
This principle ensures that each country always receives the same relative
share of a TAC.
Although several reforms modiﬁed the tools and management goals of the
Common Fisheries Policy, the process of TAC setting and the allocation of
TACs to the European member states have always been the same (Churchill
and Owen, 2010). This dissertation addresses the political economy of the
Common Fisheries Policy and investigates how traditional concepts can hin-
der the success of the European ﬁsheries management. The ﬁrst two papers
focus on the decision-making process of TAC setting. Papers three and four
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examine aspects of the Common Fisheries Policy where the principle of rela-
tive stability limits the management's potential. This dissertation has been
written within the project `The Political Economy of the European Common
Fisheries Policy' in the research area Ocean Governance of the Cluster of Ex-
cellence `Future Ocean' at Kiel University. The Cluster of Excellence funded
this project for three years.
The ﬁrst paper `Common Pool Politics and Ineﬃciency of Fisheries Man-
agement' deals with the question as to why TACs are set on too high levels.
The focus here is on the institutional set-up of the decision-making process.
This process is modeled as a dynamic non-cooperative game in discrete time.
It is a general model which can be applied to the situation in the Euro-
pean Union. TACs are ﬁxed by majority decision in a council consisting of
decision-makers who are heterogeneous with respect to their discount rates.
Decision-makers with a higher discount rate are assumed to be patient and
prefer more restrictive TACs while decision-makers with a lower discount rate
are assumed to be impatient and prefer higher, i.e. less restrictive, TACs.
It is shown that due to the uncertainty in the annual TAC setting the opti-
mal feedback strategy for the impatient decision-makers is to set ineﬃciently
high TACs in Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. According to this theoret-
ical analysis, the institutional set-up of the decision-making process itself
promotes ineﬃcient TACs. A binding commitment between the two groups
of decision-makers to a long-term management plan could help solving this
problem and lead to a more sustainable ﬁsheries management. This paper is
joint work with my ﬁrst advisor Martin Quaas. I contributed to the model
analysis, calculations and the writing. The paper is published online in Envi-
ronmental and Resource Economics (2015, DOI 10.1007/s10640-014-9842-4)
(B-journal (Handelsblatt, 2015), impact factor: 1.703).
Another problem in TAC setting is that often the interests of the diﬀer-
ent stakeholders are unequally represented in the decision-making process,
leading to economic interests being in a better bargaining position than con-
servation interests (Okey, 2003). This imbalance can also lead to ineﬀective
TAC management. The second paper `Bargaining over Resource Regulation:
Total Allowable Catch Setting in the European Common Fisheries Policy' is
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concerned with an empirical analysis of the distribution of bargaining power
between diﬀerent interests groups in the TAC decision-making of the Euro-
pean Union. For this purpose, the concept of Nash bargaining (Nash, 1953)
has been modiﬁed to ﬁt the bargaining process over TACs. The process is
modeled as a cooperative game between two players with diﬀerent interests
regarding TACs. Nash's bargaining solution of this game is used to derive
an equation to estimate the bargaining powers of the two players. Panel
data of TACs for European stocks is used for the estimation. The estimation
results show that the player representing interests of the ﬁshermen and the
ﬁshing industry has the stronger bargaining position compared to the player
representing conservation interests. The only exception are stocks that are
ﬁshed by European Union member states but not managed by the Common
Fisheries Policy (e.g. stocks in Norwegian or Icelandic waters). For those
stocks, it is estimated that the player representing conservation interests has
the stronger bargaining position leading to a more eﬀective TAC manage-
ment (as e.g. in Iceland (Hilborn, 2007)). The analysis also shows that
scientiﬁc recommendations have a greater inﬂuence in the bargaining when
the underlying data is of good quality. The conclusion is that eﬀective TAC
management requires both, a sound scientiﬁc assessment and a stronger in-
clusion of scientiﬁc advice. This is a single-author paper. It has not been
submitted to a journal yet.
For most of the stocks TACs are set according to single-species manage-
ment meaning that a management goal, e.g. a minimum level of biomass, is
set without considering the eﬀects on other species or the ecosystem. In con-
trast, the multi-species management approach does consider such biological
and ecological interactions. If multi-species management is applied the man-
agement eﬀects will diﬀer depending on how the focus of the management is
set. Especially if several countries ﬁsh for diﬀerent species of the same ecosys-
tem, management eﬀects on proﬁts will be heterogeneous between countries.
The third paper `Regional Trade-Oﬀs from Multi-Species Maximum Sustain-
able Yield (MMSY) Management Options' investigates the regional trade-oﬀs
of diﬀerent management options of a multi-species management in the Baltic
Sea. The three species interacting are the Baltic cod (Gadhus morhua), her-
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ring (Clupea harengus) and sprat (Sprattus sprattus) with cod preying on
herring and sprat (Köster and Möllmann, 2000). An ecological-economic
model of the Baltic Sea is developed simulating the stock dynamics of inter-
acting population of the three species in order to investigate a set of diﬀerent
strategic management options. Proﬁts of each option are calculated. The
proﬁts for each country participating in the Baltic ﬁshery diﬀer between the
management options. A country's share of proﬁts depends on its share of
TAC. Because of the principle of relative stability a country's TAC share
is always the same. Thus, a management option building up the cod stock
and by that reducing the sprat stock leads to beneﬁts (losses) for countries
holding a TAC share for cod (sprat). The inﬂexibility of TAC distribution
according to the principle of relative stability can therefore lead to regional
inequality in future proﬁts. A reallocation of proﬁts is required to achieve
a concordant agreement on strategic multi-species management goals. This
paper is joint work with Rudi Voss, Martin Quaas and Jörn Schmidt. Rudi
Voss and Jörn Schmidt are ﬁsheries biologists working in the research group
of Martin Quaas at Kiel University. I contributed data and materials, par-
ticipated in the design of the analysis and co-wrote the paper. The paper
is published as a featured article in Marine Ecology Progress Series (2014),
Vol. 498, pp. 112. This journal covers all aspects of marine ecology (impact
factor: 2.640).
Countries allocate their TAC share to their national vessels by country-
speciﬁc distribution schemes. Each vessel receives a quota which it is allowed
to ﬁsh. Usually there are several countries holding a TAC share for a speciﬁc
stock. Hence, their vessels compete with each other. If now the eﬃciency
of vessels diﬀer between countries it could be reasonable to allow for quota
trade between vessels of diﬀerent countries. The more eﬃcient vessels could
buy quota from less eﬃcient vessels. By that, the overall ﬂeet eﬃciency
could be increased. The fourth paper `Input-Eﬃciency of Fishing Cod in the
Baltic Sea  Comparing Major European Union Trawler Fleets' examines the
eﬃciency of diﬀerent segments of the Baltic trawler ﬂeet in order to evalu-
ate whether quota trade between vessels of diﬀerent countries could improve
the situation. The distance function approach (Färe and Grosskopf, 1990)
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is used to derive an equation to estimate the eﬃciencies of diﬀerent ﬂeet
segments. Data for diﬀerent vessel length categories for diﬀerent countries
is used. The estimation reveals signiﬁcant asymmetries in the eﬃciencies
between countries. The asymmetry is bigger for small vessels because they
are not as mobile and depend heavily on the circumstances surrounding them
including the ﬁshing ground quality. Bigger vessels are more mobile and tend
to concentrate their ﬁshing activity in similar areas (most productive ﬁshing
grounds). Therefore, diﬀerences in eﬃciencies do not mainly result from the
choice of ﬁshing ground but rather from diﬀerences in the national ﬂeet man-
agement and the current state of the ﬂeet segment. Allowing for quota trade
in the Baltic ﬂeet could improve the overall eﬃciency. Such a transnational
quota trading system would enable the ﬂeet to coordinate its ﬁshing activ-
ities far more ﬂexible than under the ﬁxed allocation of TACs according to
the principle of relative stability. This paper is joint work with Barbara Hut-
niczak (University of Maryland Chesapeake Biological Laboratory, USA),
Emmi Nieminen (Department of Economics and Management, University
of Helsinki, Finland) and Johanna Yletyinen (Stockholm Resilience Center,
Sweden). I wrote the sections on European and national ﬁsheries manage-
ment and co-wrote the sections on results and concluding remarks. This
paper is published online as a discussion paper by the University of Helsinki,
Finland (2015, http://www.helsinki.fi/taloustiede/Abs/DP68.pdf).
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2.1 Introduction
According to the FAO's latest report on the state of world ﬁsheries and
aquaculture, the fraction of overexploited stocks among all ﬁshed stocks
world-wide has continuously increased in the past decades and was roughly
30% in 2009 (FAO, 2012). In the past, overﬁshing has resulted from situations
where individual ﬁshermen or ﬁshing nations are competing for ﬁsh stocks
under open-access or limited-entry conditions  situations widely analyzed
in resource economics (Gordon, 1954; Munro, 1979; Levhari and Mirman,
1980; Bailey et al., 2010). The establishment of exclusive economic zones in
1982 gave coastal states the exclusive use rights for the ﬁsh stocks within
200 nautical miles from their coastline (UNCLOS, 1982), thus limiting the
access to these resources. Since then, most ﬁshing nations have introduced
ﬁsheries management strategies to increase sustainability and economic eﬃ-
ciency. The on-going overﬁshing indicates, however, that these management
strategies have not always been eﬀective. In this paper we study a partic-
ular institutional set-up of the decision-making process and show that in
this setting the politics of managing the common-pool resource may lead to
ineﬃcient ﬁshery management.
The most important instrument in ﬁsheries management is to set total al-
lowable catches (TACs), limiting the amount of ﬁsh that can be caught legally
from a certain stock in a year.3 Evidence shows that some countries have
implemented a quite successful TAC management, for example Iceland and
New Zealand (Hilborn, 2007), where ﬁsh stocks have increased and ﬁsheries
have become highly proﬁtable after the implementation of the management
schemes. In other countries or regions with TAC management ﬁsh stocks
continue to be overﬁshed. That is the case for example for Chile (Leal et al.,
2010), the European Union (European Commission, 2009b; Khalilian et al.,
3 The TAC is then divided in form of quotas among the diﬀerent members of the ﬁsheries
sector. Management systems diﬀer in the allocation mechanisms. Under a system of
individual transferable quotas (ITQs), ﬁshing quotas belong to individual ﬁshermen and
are freely transferable. Other systems include individual vessel quotas (IVQ), or forms of
non-transferable quotas. The common denominator of TAC/quota management systems
is that they eﬀectively prevent overﬁshing only if the TACs are set at suﬃciently restrictive
levels.
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2010; Quaas et al., 2012) or the United States (Rosenberg et al., 2006).
Failure of ﬁsheries management is often traced back to overly high TAC
levels that fail to suﬃciently restrict ﬁshing activities. To explain this failure
it is widely assumed that decision-makers (mostly politicians) act in favor of
their personal short-term interests (Froese, 2011; Mardle and Pascoe, 2002).
Accordingly, they would push towards high TAC levels to increase ﬁshing
beneﬁts in the short run, at the costs of continued overﬁshing. For the Euro-
pean Common Fisheries Policy, Franchino and Rahming (2003) examine the
internal structure of the European Council of Ministers for Agriculture and
Fisheries and show that the ministers, despite their obligation to implement
sustainable ﬁshery, are more concerned with short-run beneﬁts for the ﬁsh-
ery than with environmental issues. The same holds for the Chilean ﬁsheries
management (Leal et al., 2010). Another often mentioned aspect of ineﬀec-
tive ﬁsheries management is the discrepancy between scientiﬁc and political
positions (Delaney and Hastie, 2007). Okey (2003) argues that commercial
interests might be over-represented in the decision-making body using the
United States' ﬁsheries management councils as an example. As a conse-
quence less sustainable regulations are adopted. Daw and Gray (2005) argue
for the European Common Fisheries Policy that a lack of acceptance of ﬁsh-
eries science and its recommendations by the ministers contributes to the
choice of high TAC levels.
However, none of these contributions gives a clear-cut explanation why in
some countries the politicians fail to take into account the long-term beneﬁts
of suﬃciently restrictive TACs while in other countries they do. Comparing
the institutional set-up of the decision-making processes in countries with
successful and failed ﬁsheries management an important diﬀerence can be
found. While in New Zealand and Iceland TACs are set by a single person,
the minister of ﬁsheries (Lock and Leslie, 2007; Arnason, 1996), TACs mostly
are negotiated on a yearly basis in councils in the European Union (Churchill
and Owen, 2010), Chile (Leal et al., 2010), and the United States (Okey,
2003), i.e. in groups of several decision-makers. The examples considered
here suggest that TAC decisions made by a group of decision-makers on a
yearly basis (as in Europe, the United States, and Chile) tend to be less
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eﬃcient than those made by single decision-makers (as in New Zealand and
Iceland).4
In this paper we study how the political set-up of ﬁxing the TAC for the
common pool resource ﬁsh inﬂuences the eﬃciency of the resulting ﬁshery
management. Thereby we contribute to the small literature that is ﬁlling a
gap in resource economics identiﬁed by Homans and Wilen (1997), namely
that economists have essentially ignored the fact that regulations are en-
dogenous in modern ﬁsheries. We use a game-theoretic approach to model
TAC setting by heterogeneous decision-makers, who diﬀer in the discount
factors they apply. We consider two institutional settings. In one setting,
TAC decisions are made on an annual basis by majority voting in a council
of decision-makers. Since the majority in the council can change, each group
has to consider the possibility that in the next period the TAC level is set
by another group. We solve this problem applying the concept of Markov-
perfect Nash equilibrium in feedback strategies. In an alternative setting,
we consider the case where the decision-makers decide once and for all on
a management plan, implemented as a feedback harvest-control rule for the
ﬁshery.
Our analysis is related to the general economic literature on policy-making
in a dynamic setting, which has shown that optimal policies are either time
inconsistent or sub-optimal from the current policy-maker's point of view
(Kydland and Prescott, 1977), and that a particular institutional set-up can
help improving the outcome (Riboni, 2010). In contrast to this literature,
which studies the strategic interaction between a policy-maker and individual
economic agents, however, we focus on heterogeneous decision-makers which
all have an interest in the long-term eﬀects of the policy. Also, we assume
that the TAC, once decided upon, will be implemented eﬀectively at no cost.
This neglects strategic incentives to limit enforcement eﬀort for members in
a coalition jointly managing a ﬁsh stock (Kronbak and Lindroos, 2006).
We show that the resulting TAC levels can be higher than those preferred
4 Another diﬀerence that undoubtedly has an inﬂuence on the diﬀerence in eﬃciency
of ﬁsheries management programs between the two sets of countries is that New Zealand
and Iceland have ITQ-based catch share programs, which are less common in Europe, the
United States, and Chile. We come back to this issue in the discussion in section 2.6.
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by the least patient group of decision-makers. Thus, our theory provides an
explanation why TACs are particularly ineﬀective in restricting overﬁshing
when they are set on an annual basis by a council of heterogeneous decision-
makers. Moreover, we show that the TAC set by the less patient decision-
makers will increase with the discount factor of the more patient, i.e. when
the more patient would actually prefer a more restrictive TAC. Not surpris-
ingly, we ﬁnd that a set-up where all decision-makers agree on a management
plan once and for all leads to more restrictive TAC levels. This paper thus
provides a rigorous theoretical foundation for the policy recommendation to
change the institutional set up to allow for binding long-term management
plans, especially in regions like Europe or Chile where TACs are set in an
annual voting procedure.
The paper is structured as follows. The model is set up in section 2.2.
We then characterize ﬁrst-best ﬁshery management (section 2.3), common
pool politics with annual voting on TACs in a council (section 2.4), and the
harvest-control rule on which the council would agree if it could commit to a
binding plan (section 2.5). The ﬁnal section discusses our ﬁndings and draws
a short conclusion.
2.2 The Model: Stochastic Resource Dynamics and
Management Objectives
In the following we set up the model of resource dynamics and decision-
making in the council.
For the ﬁsh stock dynamics we consider the standard biomass model in
discrete time (Reed, 1979; Clark, 1990). The stochastic growth dynamics of
the ﬁsh stock biomass xt from time step t to t+1 is described by the equation
xt+1 = zt g(st), (2.1)
where st = xt − ht is escapement, i.e. the stock that remains in the sea after
harvesting a quantity ht. Uncertainty is captured by a series zt of independent
and identically distributed random variables with expected value E(zt) = 1
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and support [z, z] ⊂ [0,∞). In our model, the harvest ht corresponds to the
TAC level in period t. Given the stock size xt before ﬁshing, the optimal
escapement level determines the optimal TAC as ht = xt − st. The biomass
growth function is assumed to be increasing for suﬃciently small escapement
levels, with g′(0) > 1, and concave, g′′(s) < 0. Furthermore, there is some
s such that all escapement levels st ∈ (0, s) are `self-sustaining', i.e. xt+1 =
z g(st) > st with probability one (Reed, 1979).
We assume that the decision-makers' interest is focused on economic bene-
ﬁts (proﬁts) from ﬁshing. In the discrete time-setting, marginal proﬁts during
the harvesting season are given by the diﬀerence between the output price
p of ﬁsh and marginal harvesting costs c(x), which are assumed to decrease
with the current stock size x, i.e. c′(x) < 0. This stock size decreases due to
harvesting in the course of the ﬁshing season. Proﬁts from an entire ﬁshing
season are given by the integral over marginal proﬁts on the interval between
the stock at the beginning of the harvesting season, xT , and at its end, which
is the `escapement' st, (details on the derivation can be found in Clark, 1990),∫ xT
st
(p− c(x)) dx ≡ pi(xt)− pi(st), (2.2)
where pi(s) is deﬁned by the condition pi′(s) = p− c(s). We impose the stan-
dard assumption that pi′(zg(s)) zg′(s)/pi′(s) is non-negative and decreasing
in s (Reed, 1979).
To keep the analysis of heterogeneous decision-makers simple, we assume
that there are only two types of decision-makers, and the only dimension in
which they diﬀer are their discount factors ρ.5 Impatient decision-makers
(indicated by i) have a lower discount factor than patient decision-makers
(indicated by p), ρi < ρp. Decision-makers with the same discount factor
build a homogeneous group, i.e. have identical objective functions.
We consider two diﬀerent set-ups for the decision-making process. One is
annual voting and majority decision on TAC levels, analyzed in section 2.4.
5 Note that this refers to the discount factors of decision-makers. The discount rates
of individual ﬁshermen, in turn, may be inﬂuenced by the management system resulting
from the decision-making process (Asche, 2001; Teh et al., 2013; Newell et al., 2005).
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In the other one, the two groups of decision-makers decide once and for all
on a binding long-term management plan. This setting is introduced and
analyzed in section 2.5. As the benchmark-case we ﬁrst study the optimal
ﬁshery management for either group in the next section.
2.3 Optimal Fishery Management
In this section we characterize the two Pareto-optimal ﬁshery manage-
ment scenarios where the pay-oﬀ of either group of decision-makers j ∈ {i, p}
is maximized. The corresponding ﬁshery management strategy is found by
assuming that group j has full control over the ﬁshery and chooses escape-
ment levels such as to maximize the expected present value of their pay-oﬀs,
i.e.
max
{sj}
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
δt−1j (pi(xt)− pi(st))
]
subject to (2.1). (2.3)
We ﬁrst re-state a well-known result as the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The optimal feedback policy s?j(x) for group j ∈ {i, p} is a most
rapid approach to a constant escapement level s?j , i.e.
s?j(x) = min
{
x, s?j
}
, (2.4)
where s?j is implicitly given as the solution of
pi′(s∗j) = ρj E
[
z g′(s∗j) pi
′(z g(s∗j))
]
. (2.5)
A proof for this lemma can be found in Reed (1979) or Clark (1990).
The technical reason for this result is that the optimal feedback solution
is independent of the current state of the ﬁshery, because of the additive
separability of the objective function in xt and st, and because the next
period's stock depends only on the control variable st.
The assumptions on pi(s) and g(s) imposed above imply that s?j is increas-
ing in the discount factor ρj (Reed, 1979), which is a very intuitive result:
the higher the discount factor, the more important are the future beneﬁts of
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stock conservation for the decision-maker. Hence, the optimal escapement
level for the impatient decision-makers is strictly smaller than the optimal
escapement level for the patient decision-makers, s∗i < s
∗
p.
Here we consider the case that the group under consideration can imple-
ment their preferred TAC levels in all periods. For either group, the devel-
opment of the ﬁsh stocks will be as illustrated in ﬁg. 2.1. Here, the numbers
Fig. 2.1: Expected development of the stock size over time without
change of majority.
t = 1, 2, 3 on the horizontal axis denote the end of the respective harvesting
periods, when the stock has been ﬁshed down from the initial stock size x to
the respective optimal escapement levels s?j . Then, ﬁshing will stop and the
stock grows again. The expected stock of the next period is then given by
E[xt+1] = g(s
?
j).
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2.4 Common Pool Politics: Annual TAC Voting
Now we turn to the institutional set-up we are most interested in for this
paper: annual voting and decision on TAC levels by majority rule. In this
setting the group that is in majority will choose an optimal harvest strategy
(i.e. a feedback-control rule) that maximizes the expected present value of
proﬁts. We assume that there is no cooperation between the groups. The
actual escapement level set in a particular period does not only depend on
the size of the ﬁsh stock, but also on the current majority in the council.
This makes the dynamic decision problem depend on two state variables, the
stock size x and the majority m, which can take two values, according to the
two groups of decision-makers. We denote the state of the currently ruling
majority as follows:
m =
{
i if impatient decision-makers are in majority.
p if patient decision-makers are in majority.
(2.6)
Due to elections or other political processes a majority of impatient can
be replaced by a majority of patient decision-makers (and vice versa) from
period to period. We simplify the analysis by assuming that the exchange of
decision-makers in the council is independent of the outcome of the decisions.
This is a reasonable assumptions for regions or countries where ﬁsheries policy
plays only a minor role for the outcome of elections. Given this assumption,
we model the change in majority as a random process, and use q to denote
the probability that impatient decision-makers will rule in period t+ 1, and
1−q for the probability that patient decision-makers will rule, independently
of what the current state of majority is. Another simplifying assumption here
is that these probabilities are constant over time and do not depend on the
timing of legislative periods or other political cycles.
We now turn to the analysis of management decisions in the council where
majorities can change between periods. We model this setting as a dynamic
game and derive the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium in feedback strate-
gies. To derive the equilibrium feedback strategies, we set up the Bellman
equations and derive the proﬁt maximizing escapement level for each group
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of decision-makers taking into account the strategic interaction by including
the other group's feedback policy. We formulate two Bellman equations for
each group of decision-makers, depending on whether they are currently in
the majority or not. For the impatient decision-makers we use v(x,m) and
for the patient decision-makers we use V (x,m) to denote the value functions
at a ﬁsh stock size x and a current majority m. We further use sˆj(x) to
denote the equilibrium feedback strategies that specify the escapement level
chosen by group j ∈ {i, p} if this group has the majority in the council.
If the impatient decision-makers are in the majority (i.e. m = i), they
choose the escapement level such as to maximize the present value of proﬁts,
and the Bellman equation is:
v(x, i) = max
s
{pi(x)− pi(s) + ρiE [q v(zg(s), i) + (1− q) v(zg(s), p)]}
≡ pi(x)− pi(sˆi(x)) + ρiE [q v(zg(sˆi(x)), i) + (1− q) v(zg(sˆi(x)), p)] ,
(2.7)
where E[·] denotes the expectation with respect to z, and sˆi(x) is the feedback
policy chosen by the impatient decision-makers in Nash equilibrium. The ﬁrst
two terms on the right-hand side describe the proﬁts of the current period.
The term in brackets gives the future proﬁts discounted with the impatient
decision-makers discount factor ρi, and weighted with the probabilities q for
an impatient and 1 − q for a patient majority in the next period, enter the
future values for the respective state of majority. In both cases the future
stock is determined by the optimal escapement of the impatient, sˆi(x) via
equation (2.1). If the impatient decision-makers do not rule (i.e.m = p), they
face the decision on escapement by the patient decision-makers, sˆp(x), which
is the analogously deﬁned optimal feedback policy for the patient decision-
makers. The corresponding Bellman equation is:
v(x, p) = pi(x)− pi(sˆp(x)) + ρiE [q v(zg(sˆp(x)), i) + (1− q) v(zg(sˆp(x)), p)] .
(2.8)
Again, the right-hand side consists of the sum of current proﬁt and dis-
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counted future proﬁts weighted with probabilities for the diﬀerent majority
scenarios. Here, the future stock depends on sˆp, because in the current period
the patient decision-makers choose the escapement level. Similarly, the two
Bellman equations determining the value function for the patient decision-
makers are:
V (x, i) = pi(x)− pi(sˆi(x)) + ρpE [q V (zg(sˆi(x)), i) + (1− q)V (zg(sˆi(x)), p)]
(2.9)
V (x, p) = pi(x)− pi(sˆp(x)) + ρpE [q V (zg(sˆp(x)), i) + (1− q)V (zg(sˆp(x)), p)] .
(2.10)
The corresponding total allowable catches are then given by TACi = hi =
x − sˆi(x) if the impatient decision-makers rule and TACp = hp = x − sˆp(x)
if the patient decision-makers rule.
Our ﬁrst result is that the management decision by the patient decision-
makers is not aﬀected by the non-cooperative setting in the council. If they
have the majority, they will choose their optimal feedback policy.
Proposition 1. In the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium the patient decision-
makers always choose their optimal feedback policy, i.e. their dominant strat-
egy is sˆp(x) = s
?
p(x).
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.1.
The intuitive reason for this result is that for the patient decision-makers
the marginal opportunity costs of current harvest in terms of foregone future
harvest are the same irrespective of which group will set TACs in the next
period.
For the impatient decision-makers, this result does not hold. Our central
result for the setting with annual majority decisions on TAC levels is that
the impatient decision-makers would choose a lower escapement level than
optimal for them individually if the discount factors are suﬃciently hetero-
geneous.
Proposition 2. The optimal feedback policy for impatient decision-makers
is a constant escapement strategy Sˆi(x) = min{x, sˆi}.
16
If and only if s∗p > z g(s
∗
i ), the impatient decision-makers will choose a
strictly lower escapement level than their individually optimal one, sˆi < s
∗
i .
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.1.
Note that the condition s∗p > z g(s
∗
i ) is on the individually optimal es-
capement levels that either group would choose if they would remain in the
majority position forever. Thus, it can be veriﬁed without knowing the so-
lution of the game in advance.
The underlying reason why the impatient decision-makers might choose
an ineﬃciently low escapement level is the following: for them, the marginal
opportunity costs of current harvest in terms of foregone future harvest may
be zero if the patient decision-makers rule in the next period and choose
a TAC of zero, which they do if the initial stock size in t + 1 is low and
their discount factor is relatively large. The following corollary relates the
condition in proposition 1 to the discount factors:
Corollary 1. There exists a threshold diﬀerence ρ¯ in discount factors such
that the impatient decision-makers' Markov-perfect escapement level is strictly
below their optimal escapement level, sˆi < s
∗
i , if ρp − ρi > ρ¯.
A change from an impatient to a patient majority implies stronger ﬁshing
restrictions in the next period. Because of ρi < ρp the patient decision-
makers' optimal escapement is larger than the impatients'. Hence, in the
next period the impatient decision-makers are not able to ﬁsh as much ﬁsh
as would be optimal for them, but less. The change in majority translates
into harvest shortfalls in the next period for the impatient decision-makers.
As long as ρp − ρi ≤ ρ¯ those losses are not big enough to have any impact
on the impatient decision-makers choice of escapement. Yet, given that the
diﬀerence of the discount factors is suﬃciently large, i.e. ρp − ρi > ρ¯, the
optimal escapement level of the impatients s∗i is so low that the stock size
in the next period, zg(s∗i ), is below the optimal escapement of the patient
decision-makers s∗p. In that case, the patient decision-makers will enforce a
ﬁshing stop if they get the majority in the next period. This has an important
implication. To compensate the risk of harvest shortfalls that will happen
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due to the change in majority the impatient decision-makers will deviate
from their individually optimal choice and choose an even lower escapement
sˆi in the current period. This is equivalent to an increase in the harvest or
TAC level.
In other words, given that the discount factors are heterogeneous enough,
the uncertainty regarding the majority and its choice of escapement in the
next period motivates the impatient decision-makers to choose higher current
ﬁshing income (which is safe) rather than uncertain future ﬁshing income.
This type of `common pool politics' may help explaining the ongoing over-
ﬁshing in regions like Europe and Chile for ﬁsh stocks where TAC levels are
set in annual voting procedures.
Fig. 2.2 illustrates this outcome. Considering a ﬁshing stop due to a
potential change in majority the impatient decision-makers deviate from their
optimal escapement level s?i and choose the lower sˆi. After the ﬁshing season
the stock grows, but is not going to exceed the patients' optimal escapement
level s∗p. Hence, in the next period there will be either a ﬁshing stop if the
patients get the majority with probability 1 − q or on-going ﬁshing to the
impatients' escapement level with probability q.
Given that ρp − ρi > ρ¯, the optimal escapement level for the impatient
decision-makers is also inﬂuenced by the probability of a change in the state
of majority, q. If the impatient decision-makers can be (relatively) sure that
they will keep the majority in the next period, i.e. q is suﬃciently large,
the escapement level will be not as low compared to the case that a patient
majority is more likely, i.e. q is rather low. We have the following result.
Proposition 3. If ρp − ρi > ρ¯, the optimal escapement level for the impa-
tient decision-makers increases with the probability that there is a majority
of impatient decision-makers,
dsˆi
dq
> 0. (2.11)
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.2.
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Fig. 2.2: Illustration of stock dynamics under common pool politics:
development of the escapement level over time with poten-
tial change of majority in t ≥ 2.
It is straightforward to verify that also in this setting with strategic in-
teractions the escapement level chosen by the impatient decision-makers is
increasing in their discount factor, dsˆi/dρi > 0. A change in the discount
factor of the group of patient decision-makers has the opposite eﬀect on sˆi,
as formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. If ρp−ρi > ρ¯, the optimal escapement level for the impatient
decision-makers decreases with the discount factor of the patient decision-
makers,
dsˆi
dρp
< 0. (2.12)
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.1.
Thus, the more conservative the patient decision-makers behave, the
worse the overall outcome tends to be  a result that is similar in ﬂavor
to the `green paradox' in climate economics (Sinn, 2008).
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We have seen that the set-up of the decision-making process upon TACs,
i.e. the annual updating, leads to ineﬃciently high TACs if (a) the impatient
decision-makers form the current majority and (b) the diﬀerence of the dis-
count factors of the two groups of decision-makers is suﬃciently large. Then,
the uncertainty about future regulations decreases the escapement level and
thereby increases the TAC level in order to outweigh more restrictive ﬁshing
regulations due to a possible change in majority. This problem will not only
hold for the setting of TACs. The crucial point in our model is that the set-up
of the decision-making fosters short-term thinking of the impatient majority.
Every ﬁshing activity limiting management tool, e.g. TACs or TAE (total
allowable eﬀort), will be set ineﬃciently high to oﬀset future forgone prof-
its. This problem could be avoided if both groups of decision-makers can
commit to a binding agreement on a management plan that is decided upon
once and for all, as this would reduce the uncertainty about future ﬁshing
opportunities. In the next section we examine such a setting.
2.5 Binding Long-Term Management Plan
In this section we consider an institutional setting for ﬁsheries manage-
ment where the council can commit to a binding long-term management plan.
This means that the council decides upon a feedback strategy s¯(x), in ﬁsh-
eries sometimes referred to as harvest-control rule (Froese et al., 2011), that
would be applied to determine all future TACs. We consider two cases how
the agreement is made: one without the possibility of transfer payments; the
other one with the possibility of a transfer payment between the two groups
of decision-makers.
2.5.1 Agreement without Transfer Payments
We now consider a setting where decision-makers agree once and for all
on a long-term management plan without having the possibility of transfer
payments between the two groups. We use V¯ (x) to denote the value function
for the group of patient decision-makers and v¯(x) to denote the value function
for the group of impatient decision-makers in this setting. Following Breton
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and Keoula (2014), we assume that the harvest-control rule s¯(x) is chosen to
maximize a weighted sum of the present values for the two groups,
max
s¯(x)
E
[
α V¯ (x) + (1− α) v¯(x)] , (2.13)
where the parameter α measures the bargaining power of the impatient
decision-makers, which we assume to be ﬁxed. Among other aspects, this
bargaining power reﬂects the actual majority in the council. Note that a
time-consistent management plan is found only in the closed-loop solution to
the optimization problem (2.13). In open-loop, the aggregation of discount
factors would lead to a time inconsistent solution (Breton and Keoula, 2014).
We ﬁnd that the resulting harvest-control rule is again characterized by
a constant-escapement strategy, with an escapement level in between the
optimal escapement levels for either group:
Proposition 5. In the setting with agreement on a binding long-term man-
agement plan without transfer payment, the optimal harvest-control rule is
characterized by a constant escapement strategy
s¯(x) = max {s¯?, x} with s?i ≤ s¯? ≤ s?p. (2.14)
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.3.
Thus, a binding management plan would circumvent the problems of
`common pool politics' associated with the annual voting on TAC levels in
the council.
2.5.2 Agreement with Transfer Payments
Finally we brieﬂy turn to the setting with a binding long-term man-
agement plan, but we assume that it is possible to pay transfer payments
between the groups. As the two groups' objective functions (2.3) are ex-
pressed in present values of proﬁts, they can directly be compared to each
other. Applying the envelope theorem, we ﬁnd that this present value is
monotonically increasing with the discount factor. It follows that the pa-
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tient decision-makers attach a higher value to the ﬁshery than the impatient
decision-makers, as
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
δt−1p
(
pi(xt)− pi(s∗p(xt))
)]
> E
[ ∞∑
t=1
δt−1i (pi(xt)− pi(s∗i (xt)))
]
.
(2.15)
If the decision-makers have the opportunity to agree on a binding long-term
management plan, the solution would probably be that the optimal feed-
back strategy of the patient decision-makers would be implemented, and
that this group would compensate the impatient decision-makers. The rea-
son is that the patient decision-makers will most likely gain more from the
change to the binding agreement than the impatient decision-makers, who
would implement their optimal policy at least when they are in majority (cf.
Proposition 1). In a real decision context, such a compensation could take
place in form of a direct transfer payment, or by means of some other kind
of log-rolling.
Thus, with a binding long-term management plan and the possibility of
transfer payments, the resulting harvest-control rule would likely be the most
conservative one, and obviously the problem of `common pool politics' could
be solved.
2.6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we presented a theory that explains why annual majority
voting on total allowable catches (TACs) can lead to ineﬃciently high TACs 
in particular in a setting where heterogeneous decision-makers vote on TACs
on an annual basis. According to our theory the underlying reason for setting
ineﬃciently high TACs is the uncertainty of the next period's majority and
its choice of TAC if the current majority is impatient. This shows that under
the annual voting, the common pool problem on the oceans is translated in
some sense into a common pool problem in the council of decision-makers.
This is what we refer to as `common pool politics'.
We have further shown that the TAC set by the impatient decision-makers
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will increase with the discount factor of the more patient decision-makers,
i.e. when the latter would actually prefer a more restrictive TAC. This is a
result in the same vein as the green paradox in climate economics: an envi-
ronmentally friendly intention may actually lead to a result that is harmful
for the environment.
We have derived these results by assuming that there are only two groups
of decision-makers who diﬀer only in their discount factors. One could gen-
eralize the model taking into account heterogeneity in other dimensions (as
Munro, 1979 does in a cooperative setting). For example, if some decision-
makers would attach a higher utility to the catches than another group, the
ﬁrst one would behave similarly as the one with the lower discount factor
considered here. More generally, each decision-maker may be inﬂuenced by
political pressures and the traditions of her or his national political system,
which would be taken into account by changing the decision-maker's objec-
tive function. Speciﬁcally, one could include stakeholder interests that may
inﬂuence the decision-makers objective functions, such as the interests of
artisanal ﬁshermen who may require redistributions in their favor. Such ex-
tensions may help explaining why ﬁsh stocks managed by ITQ systems (as
in Iceland and New Zealand) tend to be less prone to overﬁshing (Costello
et al., 2008). The management under such systems seems therefore to be
more eﬃcient. Thus, the way how TACs are distributed on national level
might also inﬂuence the level of eﬃciency of TACs as a ﬁshery management
tool.
Finally, there may be more actors involved in the process of TAC setting
than just the decision-makers. In particular, similar mechanisms as we stud-
ied for the TAC setting may play a role in group decisions as part of scientiﬁc
advice giving, for example in committees of the International Council for the
Exploration of the Seas (ICES), which are responsible for stock assessment
and scientiﬁc advice for the TAC setting in many Atlantic ﬁsheries.
We have studied a model set-up where constant escapement strategies
are optimal. This is a consequence of assuming linear objective functions
(Reed, 1979), a model set-up commonly used in resource economics. Another
model set-up that allows for analytical solutions supposes iso-elastic, no-
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linear objective functions and a speciﬁc class of resource growth functions,
which leads to optimal harvesting policies that are linear in the stock sizes
(Antoniadou et al., 2013; Kapaun and Quaas, 2013). Preliminary calculations
for such a type of model indicate that our main results are robust as long as
the non-linearity is not too large. A comprehensive analysis of this issue is
left for future research, however.
There is evidence that long-term management plans can lead to more eﬃ-
cient ﬁshery management (European Commission, 2009b). To study the TAC
setting under a binding long-term management plan we have also considered
the setting where the council decides once and for all on a harvest-control rule
for the ﬁshery. We have shown the resulting TAC will be set at more eﬃcient
levels. Without the possibility of transfer payments between the groups, the
resulting TAC will be in between the levels preferred by the more and less
patient decision-makers. With the possibility of a transfer payment between
the groups, the TAC will be equal to the level preferred by the most patient
decision-makers, i.e. the management will be particularly conservative. This
paper thus provides a rigorous theoretical foundation for the policy recom-
mendation to change the institutional set-up to allow for binding long-term
management plans, especially in regions like Europe or Chile where TACs
are set in an annual voting procedure.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Proof of Propositions 1,2 and 4
Assume a ﬁnite time horizon of T periods. In the last period T , the
optimal escapement levels are determined by the condition pi′(s∗T ) = 0, for
both types of decision-makers. In period T − 1, the Bellman equations thus
read, using subscripts T − 1 for the corresponding value functions,
vT−1(x, i) = max
0≤s≤x
[pi(x)− pi(s) + ρiEz [pi(z g(s))− pi(s∗T )]]
= pi(x)− pi(S∗i (x)) + ρiEz [pi(z g(S∗i (x)))− pi(s∗T )]
VT−1(x, p) = max
0≤s≤x
{pi(x)− pi(s) + ρpE [pi(z g(s))− pi(s∗T )]}
= pi(x)− pi(S∗p(x)) + ρpEz
[
pi(z g(S∗p(x)))− pi(s∗T )
]
vT−1(x, p) = pi(x)− pi(S∗p(x)) + ρiEz
[
pi(z g(S∗p(x)))− pi(s∗T )
]
VT−1(x, i) = pi(x)− pi(S∗i (x)) + ρpE [pi(z g(S∗i (x)))− pi(s∗T )]
where we have used the guess (which is to be veriﬁed) that S∗j (x) = min{x, s∗j}
is the optimal feedback policy for type j ∈ {i, p}.
In T − 2, and in all periods before T − 2, the Bellman equation for the
case where type p rules reads
VT−2(x, p) = max
0≤s≤x
{
pi(x)− pi(s) + ρpEz
[
q VT−1(z g(s), i)
+ (1− q)VT−1(z g(s), p)
]}
= max
0≤s≤x
{
pi(x)− pi(s) + ρpEz
[
pi(z g(s)) + q
(− pi(S∗i (z g(s)))
+ ρpEz′
[
pi(z′ g(S∗i (z g(s))))
])
+ (1− q) (− pi(S∗p(z g(s))) + ρpEz′[pi(z′ g(S∗p(z g(s))))])]− ρi pi(s∗T )}
Using that s∗p is self-sustaining, i.e. that g(s
∗
p) > s
∗
p with probability one, it
follows for an interior solution for the optimization problem that S∗p(sˆp) = s
∗
p.
Since s∗i < s
∗
p this also implies S
∗
i (sˆp) = s
∗
i . Thus, the ﬁrst-order condition
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for the optimization problem is
pi′(s) = ρpEz
[
pi′(z g(s)) z g′(z)
]
,
which is identical to the ﬁrst-order condition (2.5) for the optimal escapement
level for type p. This proves proposition 1. In T − 2, the Bellman equation
for the case where type i rules reads
vT−2(x, i) = max
0≤s≤x
{
pi(x)− pi(s) + ρiEz
[
q vT−1(z g(s), i)
+ (1− q) vT−1(z g(s), p)
]}
= max
0≤s≤x
{
pi(x)− pi(s) + ρiEz
[
pi(z g(s)) + q
(− pi(S∗i (z g(s)))
+ ρiEz′
[
pi(z′ g(S∗i (z g(s))))
])
+ (1− q) (− pi(S∗p(z g(s))) + ρiEz′[pi(z′ g(S∗p(z g(s))))])]− ρi pi(s∗T )}
We start with the guess that the solution sˆi to the optimization problem is
self-sustaining, i.e. z g(sˆi) > s∗i with probability one, or equivalently z g(sˆi) >
s∗i . This guess will be veriﬁed by the result that sˆi ≤ s∗i < s. Further, we use
that S∗p(z g(s)) = max{z g(s), s∗p}. Thus, S∗p(z g(s)) = z g(s) for z < s∗p/g(s)
and S∗p(z g(s)) = s
∗
p else. Using these results, and using ϕ(z) to denote the
probability density function of z, we obtain the following Bellman equation
vT−2(x, i) = max
0≤s≤x
{
pi(x)− pi(s) + ρiEz
[
pi(z g(s))
+ q (−pi(s∗i ) + ρiEz′ [pi(z′ g(s∗i ))])
+ (1− q)
∫ s∗p/g(s)
z
(−pi(z g(s)) + ρiEz′ [pi(z′ g(z g(s)))]) ϕ(z) dz
]
+ (1− q)
(∫ z
s∗p/g(s)
ϕ(z) dz
) (−pi(s∗p) + ρiEz′ [pi(z′ g(s∗p))]) ]− ρi pi(s∗T )}
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The ﬁrst-order condition for the maximization problem reads
pi′(s) = ρiEz
[
z pi′(z g(s)) g′(s)
]
−(1−q)
∫ s∗p
g(s)
z
(pi′(z g(s))− ρiEz′ [pi′(z′ g(z g(s))) z′ g′(z g(s))]) z g′(s)ϕ(z) dz
(2.16)
This equation is solved by some sˆi which is independent of x. Thus, the
optimal policy for type i is a constant escapement policy as well.
Comparing (2.16) to the ﬁrst-order condition (2.5) for the optimal escape-
ment level for type i, we ﬁnd that the right-hand side of (2.16) is smaller
than the right-hand side of (2.5), as the second term is negative. The term
in brackets is monotone in s (as pi and g are concave). It is negative both at
the lower and upper bound of integration. At the lower bound it is negative
because z g(s) > s∗i , and
pi′(z g(s))− ρiEz′ [pi′(z′ g(z g(s))) z′ g′(z g(s))]
> pi′(s∗i )− ρiEz′ [pi′(z′ g(s∗i )) z′ g′(s∗i )] = 0.
At the upper bound it is negative because
pi′(s∗p)−ρiEz′
[
pi′(z′ g(s∗p)) z
′ g′(s∗p)
]
> pi′(s∗p)−ρpEz′
[
pi′(z′ g(s∗p)) z
′ g′(s∗p)
]
= 0.
This holds provided the upper bound of the integral is larger than the lower
bound, i.e. if s∗p > z g(sˆi). As sˆi ≥ s∗i , a suﬃcient condition for this to hold
is s∗p > z g(s
∗
i ).
Proposition 4 follows directly, as the (negative) second term on the right-
hand side of condition (2.16) is decreasing in s?p, which, in turn, is monoton-
ically increasing in ρp.
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2.7.2 Proof of Proposition 3
From proposition 2:
v(x, 1) = pi(x)− pi(g(sˆi)) + ρi(q(pi(g(sˆi)) + (1− q)C3))
pi′(sˆi) = q ρig′(sˆi)pi′(g(sˆi))
q ρi =
pi′(sˆi)
g′(sˆi)pi′(g(sˆi))
The right-hand side is increasing in s (Reed, 1979). Thus, if q increases,
s has to increase, too.
2.7.3 Proof of Proposition 5
The optimal feedback-control rule s¯(x) is characterized by the Bellman
equation
α V¯ (x) + (1− α) v¯(x)
= max
s
{
pi(x)− pi(s) + E [α ρp V¯ (z g(x)) + (1− α) ρi v¯(z g(s))]} (2.17)
We guess the following value functions:
V¯ (x) = pi(x) + C¯ (2.18)
v¯(x) = pi(x) + c¯ (2.19)
with constants C¯ and c¯. With this guess, the ﬁrst-order condition for the
right-hand side of (2.17) becomes
pi′(s) = (α ρp + (1− α) ρi) E[pi(z g(s)) z g′(s)] (2.20)
This ﬁrst-order condition is solved by a constant escapement level. This
veriﬁes the guess of the value function. Furthermore, the optimal escapement
level that solves (2.20) is the same as the optimal escapement level for a
hypothetical decision maker with discount factor α ρp + (1 − α) ρi, which is
a convex mixture of the discount factors of the two groups, and hence in
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between the two.
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3. BARGAINING OVER RESOURCE REGULATION:
TOTAL ALLOWABLE CATCH SETTING IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMON FISHERIES POLICY
Julia Hoﬀmann1
Unpublished manuscript.
Abstract. A problem in TAC setting is that often the interests of the dif-
ferent stakeholders are unequally represented in the decision-making process
putting economic interests in a better bargaining position than conservation
interests. This imbalance can lead to ineﬀective TAC management. In order
to analyze the distribution of bargaining power between diﬀerent interests
groups the TAC decision-making is modeled as a cooperative two-player-
game with one player representing ﬁshermen and ﬁshing industry's interests
and the other player representing conservation interests. Nash's bargaining
solution of this game is used to derive an equation to estimate the bargaining
powers. Panel data of TACs for European stocks are used for the estima-
tion. The results show that the player representing interests of the ﬁshermen
and the ﬁshing industry has the stronger bargaining position compared to
the player representing conservation interests. The only exception are stocks
that are ﬁshed by European Union member states but not managed by the
Common Fisheries Policy. For those stocks, the player representing conserva-
tion interests has the stronger bargaining position leading to a more eﬀective
TAC management. The analysis also shows that scientiﬁc recommendations
1 Department of Economics, University of Kiel, Wilhelm-Seelig-Platz 1, 24118 Kiel,
Germany. Telephone +49 341 880 4978; email: j.hoﬀmann@economics.uni-kiel.de
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have a greater inﬂuence in the bargaining when the underlying data is of good
quality. The conclusion is that eﬀective TAC management requires both, a
sound scientiﬁc assessment and a stronger inclusion of scientiﬁc advice.
Keywords: ﬁsheries; ﬁshery economics; bargaining power; political econ-
omy; cooperative game theory
JEL-Classiﬁcation: Q22; Q71; D78
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3.1 Introduction
Exploiting a renewable common pool resource such as ﬁsheries in a non-
cooperative way often leads to overexploitation or even distinction of the
resource (Gordon, 1954; Clark, 1990). Cooperation between the groups of
interests is the most promoted tool to overcome that problem (Kaitala and
Lindroos, 2007; Bailey et al., 2010). The European Union uses such a co-
operative management for the European ﬁsheries. The most important in-
strument is the total allowable catch (TAC) which deﬁnes the amount of ﬁsh
that is allowed to be caught from a speciﬁc stock in a year. TACs are set for
a wide range of stocks to restrict the ﬁshing activities by setting catch limits.
However, according to past evaluations of the European Common Fisheries
Policy TACs have not been used to their potential (European Commission,
2001, 2009b). They often are set at too high levels leading to the failure of
the ﬁsheries management (Khalilian et al., 2010). This is not only a problem
in the European Union but also apparent in other nations' ﬁsheries policies
(see e.g. Leal et al. (2010); Okey (2003)). A TAC does not restrict ﬁshing at
all if it exceeds the landings of the corresponding period. In that case TACs
are not restrictive and ﬁsheries are eﬀectively unregulated, i.e. de-facto open
access (Quaas et al., 2012). For 57% of the stocks examined in this paper
landings reach 95% or less of the TAC. On average, TACs exceed landings by
roughly 60%. TACs are set at binding levels for only 16% of all cases.2 So,
even if the decision on TACs is made in a cooperative framework, the solution
does not necessarily guarantee a sustainable use of the resource. It is often ar-
gued that during the TAC bargaining process decision-makers have a rather
short-term perspective (Franchino and Rahming, 2003) or ignore scientiﬁc
advice (Froese, 2011). But this does not need to hold for all decision-makers
participating in the bargaining. There might also be decision-makers with a
perspective on conservation that rely on the scientiﬁc recommendation. The
problem then may be that the decision-makers of the second kind are under-
represented what can cause ineﬀective management (Okey, 2003; Hilborn,
2 In the remaining 26% the landings exceed the TAC by more than 5%. In these cases
the enforcement of the TAC regulation has probably not been strict enough. A prominent
example of overﬁshing the TAC is the Polish cod ﬁshery (ORCA-EU, 2009).
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2007).
This paper examines the bargaining position of diﬀerent interests groups
in the TAC bargaining process theoretically and in an empirical application
to the European Union's TAC management. For the purpose of this anal-
ysis decision-makers, stakeholders and further interest groups are assumed
to prefer a speciﬁc status quo TAC. For simplicity, I further assume that
these status quo preferences can be classiﬁed into the two groups `high TAC
preference' and `low TAC preference'. Using this kind of classiﬁcation, the
bargaining now takes place between two groups, i.e. two players, with op-
posing interests. I apply Nash's bargaining solution (Nash, 1953) on this
cooperative two-player-game in order to derive an equation that allows to es-
timate the bargaining power for each player using data on European stocks
and their TACs. The analysis considers the distribution of bargaining power
between the two players for the whole data set. It is also examined if this
distribution changes in diﬀerent ﬁshing areas using subsets of the data.
In the following the set-up of the decision-making process for TACs in the
European Union is described (section 3.2.1) and the game-theoretic back-
ground is explained (section 3.2.2). Section 3.3 describes the data that is
used. Results are presented in section 3.4. The paper closes with a discus-
sion of the ﬁndings in section 3.5.
3.2 Theoretical Model of Bargaining over TACs
3.2.1 Background: Decision-Making Process of TAC Setting in Europe
The formal decision-making process for the TAC setting is clearly deﬁned
(Churchill and Owen, 2010). The European Commission prepares a proposal
on TACs based on scientiﬁc input from research groups such as the Scientiﬁc,
Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) and the Interna-
tional Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES). The proposal is handed
to the European Council of Ministers. This Council currently consists of 28
national representatives, usually the ministers of agriculture and ﬁsheries.3
3 The number of members changed over time depending on the number of European
Union member states.
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The ministers have to discuss the Commission's proposal and decide on the
TAC levels. Until the latest reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, it has
not been possible for other institutions, e.g. the European Parliament, to
intervene or veto the Council's decision on TACs (e.g. European Council
(2002), Art. 20). Hence, the ministers had the ﬁnal say in this matter. How-
ever, since the adoption of the new Common Fisheries Policy in 2014 the
European Parliament can intervene in the decision-making process of multi-
annual plans where TACs are also included (European Union, 2013). The
observation period of the data used in this paper ends in 2013. Therefore,
intervention of the European Parliament is not considered. It is important
to note that there is a deadline for the ministers to ﬁx the TACs (e.g. mid
of January for stocks in European Union- and Non-European Union waters
(European Council, 2014a). Hence, the period of bargaining is limited. The
ministers are obliged to ﬁnd an agreement, either by unanimity or by voting
with qualiﬁed majority.4 Given the minutes of the Council meetings dis-
cussing TACs, it seems that most of the TAC decisions are made by voting
with at most three dissenting votes and/or abstentions (European Council,
2014b). According to the formal decision-making process only the ministers
are participating in this bargaining process. However, there are stakehold-
ers on national and European Union level, such as producer and consumer
organisations or NGOs, that aﬀect this procedure and the ministers in an
informal way. For simpliﬁcation, I assume that the actors participating di-
rectly or indirectly in the TAC setting can be classiﬁed into two groups. One
group comprises those actors who favor and support the conservation of ﬁsh
stocks and a sustainable ﬁsheries management. Members are e.g. scientists
or environmental NGOs, such as Greenpeace or WWF, who clearly call for
restrictive TACs. The second group comprises those actors who focus on
proﬁts (and hence catches) from ﬁshing. Fishermen, the ﬁshing and process-
ing industry and producer organisations belong to this group. They call for
TACs that do not restrict their ﬁshing activities. Ministers can be part of
4 In general, a qualiﬁed majority requires at least 255 out of 345 votes. Since 2014, a
qualiﬁed majority corresponds to at least 55% of the members, comprising at least 15 of
them and representing at least 65% of the European population. A blocking minority may
be formed comprising at least four members of the Council (European Union, 2015).
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either group. However, given the unsuccessful performance of the European
TAC management in the past (European Commission, 2001, 2009b), and
the fact that ministers had the ﬁnal say regarding TACs it can be assumed
that most of the ministers can be assigned to the second group. I further
assume that the preferences regarding status quo TAC levels are diﬀerent
for each minister or stakeholder. Still, the status quo TAC preferences of
actors of the same group are in the same range because members of the same
group have similar interests. Hence, the preferred TAC level of each member
of the ﬁrst group will be lower than the preferred TAC level of each mem-
ber of the second group. Assuming now that the members of each group
are homogeneous, each group can be seen as a player preferring a speciﬁc
status quo TAC. Then, the bargaining process simpliﬁes to a cooperative
two-player-game with one player having a lower preferred status quo TAC
than the other. The interesting question then is which player dominates the
bargaining process.
3.2.2 Game Theoretic Approach
In the cooperative two-player-game it is each player's aim to set a TAC
close to her preferred TAC level. However, the two players have to bargain
since their preferences diﬀer. This kind of game can be solved by applying
the concept of the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) (Nash, 1953; Binmore
et al., 1986). The NBS is usually derived by maximizing the product of each
player's diﬀerence in utilities of an agreement versus a disagreement, i.e. the
Nash product. However, in the TAC bargaining process disagreement is not
an option. Therefore, each player's aim is to minimize the deviation between
their preferred option (disagreement) and the agreed-on TAC (agreement).
Following the NBS notation the objective function then is:
min
TACt
(ul(REFt) − ul(TACt))α(uh(REFt) − uh(TACt))β (3.1)
with ul(·) denoting the utility function of the player favoring low TACs, i.e.
player l, and uh(·) denoting the utility function of the player favoring high
TACs, i.e. player h. The utility functions depend on the player's individual
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preferred status quo TAC, which is the reference value REF (in the case
of disagreement), and the agreed-on TAC (in the case of agreement). In
the NBS framework the exponents α and β can be interpreted as bargaining
power parameter of each player if they sum up to one. It is therefore assumed
that α + β = 1. Also, players may diﬀer in their bargaining power, i.e.
α 6= β. The higher the bargaining power parameter the smaller the deviation
between agreed-on TAC and the player's preferred TAC and the higher the
assertiveness of this player in equilibrium. In addition, it is assumed that
α, β ∈ (0; 1).
The utility functions for players l and h are assumed to be:
ul = log(H
−δ
l ) and uh = log(H
µ
h ) (3.2)
with H indicating the amount of harvested ﬁsh and δ, µ > 0. Player l's
utility decreases with the amount of harvested ﬁsh. The marginal utility loss
is increasing the more ﬁsh has been harvested. This is because a stock's
rebuilding capacity decreases if too much of the stock has been removed.
Overexploitation or even extinction might be the consequence. Both have a
negative impact on player l's utility. In contrast, player h's utility increases
the higher the amount of harvested ﬁsh. However, the marginal utility is
decreasing because of capacity and eﬀort limits and decreasing ﬁsh prices.
For estimating the bargaining power of each player the following reference
values, i.e. preferred status quo TACs, are assumed. The reference value of
player l is the scientiﬁc advice of the current period t (ADVt) to the decision-
makers based on stock assessment and further research. The intention of the
advice is to facilitate TACs that allow the recovery of a stock and - if the
stock biomass is on a suﬃciently high level - a sustainable use of the stock.
The preferred status quo TAC of player l is therefore rather conservative.
Player h orientates her reference value at the landings of the previous period
(Lt−1). She would like to keep at least that level of landings in period t.
In addition, she would like to reduce current ﬁshing restrictions which is
why she demands a TAC which exceeds the previous landings by a certain
percentage γ > 0. γ is stock speciﬁc and depends on characteristics such
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as growth rate or market price for a stock. The reference value of player h
is therefore (1 + γ)Lt−1. A TAC equal to (1 + γ)Lt−1 ensures that ﬁshing
activities can be kept at least at the previous level. Restrictions in the future
ﬁshing activities are avoided.
Given that, equation (3.1) can be modiﬁed to:
min
TACt
(log(ADV −δt ) − log(TAC−δt ))α (log(((1 + γ)Lt−1)µ) − log(TACµt ))β.
(3.3)
The terms in brackets denote the deviation in utility.
The TAC solving (3.3) is given by:5
TACt = (1 + γ)
αLαt−1ADV
1−α
t . (3.4)
Equation (3.4) states that the ﬁnal TAC in the current period t depends
on the advice of the current period and the landings of the previous period.
The advice captures the interests of player l while player h's interests are
represented by the landings. The exponents α and β describe the bargaining
power of player h and l, respectively. The higher the parameter the more
the player's interests are aﬀecting the ﬁnal TAC. The assumption α, β >
0 in equation (3.4) is veriﬁed. If there have been higher landings in the
previous period player h will like to keep that level which puts pressure
on the decision-makers to increase the TAC or at least does not motivate
a decrease. Therefore, α has to be positive. Regarding the advice, it can
be assumed that decision-makers will follow a recommended increase of the
TAC. However, a recommended decrease is probably not implemented as
willingly. The motivation for this is as follows. Assuming that player h
has the stronger bargaining position (given the too high TACs in the past
(European Commission, 2001, 2009b)) the decision-makers will rather follow
player h's preferences which support an increase in TACs and disapprove a
decrease in TACs. Either way, β has to be positive. Since α, β > 0 and
α + β = 1 hold, the assumption α, β ∈ (0; 1) is also veriﬁed.
In order to quantify the bargaining power of the players l and h equation
5 See Appendix 3.6.1 for calculations.
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(3.4) is estimated.
3.3 Data
I use panel data for 73 ﬁsh stocks from European and Non-European wa-
ters in the Baltic Sea (12 stocks), North Sea (20 stocks), Celtic Sea and West
of Scotland (21 stocks), Bay of Biscay and Atlantic Iberian waters (6 stocks)
and Norwegian, Icelandic, Greenland, Faroer and Russian waters (10 stocks)
and 4 widely distributed stocks that can not be assigned to a single area.
These 73 stocks represent 15 species: cod, haddock, herring, plaice, sole,
whiting, anchovy, capelin, hake, horse mackerel, mackerel, megrim, Norway
pout, saithe, sandeel and sprat (see Appendix 3.6.2). For each stock a TAC is
set each year. The time series of observations run from 1987 to 2013.6 Data
is available for the TAC (in tons), landings7 (in tons), advice8 (in tons) and
information on the ﬁshing area and the quality of the data underlying the
assessment.9 The data stem from the ICES advice sheets from 2014 (ICES,
2014). If available, ICES estimates of landings are used. If these were not
available oﬃcial landing numbers reported by the countries are used. The ad-
vice sheets are used in the preparation of TAC proposals from the European
Commission to the European Council of Ministers. Summarizing statistics
of the data in total and by stock are given in section 3.6.3.
3.4 Estimation and Results
To consider the cross-sectional dimension of panel data, a one-way er-
ror component model is used for the estimation. One-way error component
models assume that the error term uit is composed of two parts:
uit = τi + it (3.5)
6 For the majority of the stocks data is available for the whole period. However, in some
cases the time series starts later, e.g. because the TAC management was not introduced
for all stocks at the same time.
7 If not available, catch (in tons) is used. The catch includes landings and discard.
8 Landings (or catches) according to the TAC recommended by the ICES.
9 Ecoregion and more detailed area code is deﬁned by the ICES.
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where t denotes the time and i denotes the individual dimension of the data.
τi is an unobservable, time-invariant individual-speciﬁc component and it is
the error term (see for example Baltagi (2005)). Depending on the speci-
ﬁcations of τi diﬀerent model types are appropriate. If the individuals are
drawn randomly from a large population it can be assumed that τi is random
and independent of the explaining variables. In that case, the random-eﬀects
model is appropriate. In contrast, if the individuals belong to a speciﬁc set,
τi can be assumed to be ﬁxed for each individual. Then, the ﬁxed-eﬀects
model is the appropriate choice. The stocks in the data set used in this pa-
per are not drawn randomly but are chosen according to the speciﬁc criteria
that they are ﬁshed by European Union member states and managed by the
European Common Fisheries Policy's TAC system. Therefore, τi can be as-
sumed to be ﬁxed for each stock which is why a ﬁxed-eﬀects model is used
for the estimation. In addition, a performed Hausman test also suggests that
the ﬁxed-eﬀects model is a better ﬁt to the data than the random-eﬀects
model (Hausman, 1978).10
For the estimation, I take the logarithms of equation (3.4), and assume
that the parameter γ depends on stock characteristics. The resulting ﬁxed-
eﬀects model is:
log(TACit) = c + α log(Li,t−1) + β log(ADVit) +
73∑
i=2
τidummyi + it
(3.6)
with c = α(1 + γ), t = 1987, ..., 2013 representing the year and i = 1, ..., 73
representing the stocks. There are 73 stocks from diﬀerent areas ﬁshed by
diﬀerent countries which is why stock dummies are included. The stock
dummies capture any individual-speciﬁc characteristic of the stocks that are
not covered by the variables of landings and advice. Such characteristics can
be the ﬁshing area or biological and ecological speciﬁcations (e.g. stock size
or reproduction behavior) that vary between stocks.11 The stock-speciﬁc
10 The null hypothesis of using a random-eﬀects model can be rejected in favor of a
ﬁxed-eﬀects model (p-value = 0.000).
11 A t-test testing the null hypothesis of all stock dummies being jointly equal to 0
suggests to include stock dummies (Prob > F = 0.0000).
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characteristics are time invariant. To avoid perfect multicollinearity, the
dummy for Anchovy from the Bay of Biscay (stock id: 1) is removed. That
means Anchovy from Bay of Biscay is the reference stock against which
all other stock dummies are compared. Equation (3.6) has been estimated
with the constraint that α+ β = 1. This is required by the Nash Bargaining
Solution framework. It is assumed that observations are independent between
the groups, however, it is controlled for intra-group correlation.12
The results for α, β and c of estimating equation (3.6) are presented in
table 3.1 (for the whole estimation output including dummy coeﬃcients see
Appendix 3.6.4).
coeﬃcient SE p-value 95% conf. interval
logLt−1 α 0.5605 0.0735 0.000 0.4163 0.7047
logADVt β 0.4395 0.0735 0.000 0.2953 0.5837
c 0.2431 0.0054 0.000 0.2326 0.2536
No. of obs. = 1190 Prob. > F = 0.000 Root MSE = 0.1376
Tab. 3.1: Estimation results of equation (3.6) for the whole data set
under the constraint α + β = 1. The reference stock is
Anchovy in Bay of Biscay (stock id: 1).
Both coeﬃcients, α and β, have a positive inﬂuence on the TAC level as
expected. If the advice increases by 1% the TAC increases by 0.4395%. The
landings' impact is higher. A 1% increase of landings leads to a 0.5605%
increase of TAC. This implies that player h seems to have more bargaining
power than player l. The results suggest that the interests of ﬁshermen and
the ﬁshing industry have a stronger impact on the TACs than the interests
of scientists and supporters of conservation. Most of the stock dummy coef-
ﬁcients have signiﬁcant values indicating that there are stock-speciﬁc eﬀects
that have to be taken into account (see Appendix 3.6.4). The constant c here
is the intercept referring to the reference stock Anchovy in Bay of Biscay (the
stock that is left out in the dummies). The intercepts of the other stocks can
be calculated relative to the Anchovy in Bay of Biscay using the estimated
12 The calculations are done with STATA using the command cnsreg.
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stock eﬀects (i.e. dummy coeﬃcients in table 3.6.4). For example, the stock
eﬀect of the Western Baltic Cod (stock id: 5) is 0.1181 leading to an inter-
cept of 0.3612. So, relative to Anchovy in the Bay of Biscay the Western
Baltic Cod has a higher TAC level if the eﬀect of landings and advice are not
considered. In contrast, Capelin in Icelandic and Greenland waters (stock
id: 4) has an intercept of 0.0387 indicating a lower TAC level compared to
the Anchovy in the Bay of Biscay if the eﬀects of landings and advice are
not considered. Based on the individual intercepts the mark-up parameters
γi with i = 1, ..., 73 can also be determined for each stock. Using the ex-
amples from above, player h calls for an increase in TAC of 171% from year
to year for Anchovy in Bay of Biscay. For the Western Baltic Cod and the
Capelin in Icelandic and Greenland waters the demanded increase in TAC is
341% and 17%, respectively. For some stocks the intercept is negative which
indicates a strong downward deviation in the predicted TAC levels compared
to Anchovy in Bay of Biscay. A negative intercept also translates into a neg-
ative γ implying that player h is willing to accept a TAC that is below the
previous level of landings.
The estimation results may be inﬂuenced by the quality of the scientiﬁc
advice available. Although player h does not rely directly on the scientiﬁc
advice, it can be assumed that she considers recommendations for TACs for
orientation, e.g. for choosing the γ to set her preferred TAC value. The
extent to which player h relies on the scientiﬁc advice might depend on the
quality of the underlying data. A sound scientiﬁc assessment of a stock's
situation allows to derive reliable advised TAC based on the assessment.
The assessment of a stock for which only poor data is available is likely to be
highly uncertain, which also implies that TAC advices based on the uncertain
assessment might not be very reliable. As a consequence, the relevance of the
scientiﬁc advice for stocks with poor data is decreasing which would weaken
player l's bargaining position since her reference value equals the advised
TAC. That in turn, would strengthen player h's bargaining position.
In each ICES advice sheet it is indicated whether the data is suﬃcient for
an assessment or not. If the data is not suﬃcient, the ICES uses an approach
for data-limited stocks for the assessment. To determine the inﬂuence of data
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quality, I classiﬁed the stocks according to the quality of data used for their
assessment indicated in the ICES advice sheets of 2014 into the two groups
`good data' if data has been at least suﬃcient for the assessment and `poor
data' if the data-limited approach has been used. Then, I estimated equation
(3.6) for both groups. Results regarding α, β and c are given in table 3.2 (for
the whole estimation output including stock eﬀects see Appendix 3.6.5).
coeﬃcient SE p-value 95% conf. interval
Group `Good Data'
logLt−1 α 0.5392 0.0826 0.000 0.3771 0.7014
logADVt β 0.4608 0.0826 0.000 0.2986 0.6229
c 0.2446 0.0060 0.000 0.2328 0.2565
No. of obs. = 1033 Prob. > F = 0.000 Root MSE = 0.1342
Group `Poor Data'
logLt−1 α 0.7099 0.0908 0.000 0.5304 0.8894
logADVt β 0.2901 0.0908 0.002 0.1106 0.4696
c 0.1259 0.01169 0.000 0.1029 0.1491
No. of obs. = 157 Prob. > F = 0.000 Root MSE = 0.1549
Tab. 3.2: Estimation results of equation (3.6) for the subsets accord-
ing to data quality under the constraint α + β = 1. The
reference stock for group `Good Data' is Anchovy of Bay
of Biscay (stock id: 1) and for group `Poor Data' Eastern
Baltic Cod (stock id: 6).
Player h has the better bargaining position in both subsets. However, in
the subset of poor data her position is much stronger relative to player l's
than in the subset of good data. Note that the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent between the two groups. Thus, the quality of data matters in the
bargaining process. If TACs for a stock with poor data for assessment are
negotiated, player l's position is relatively weak, which might result in too
high TACs since there is no sound scientiﬁc argument against it. On the other
hand, if the data is good the scientiﬁc advice seems to have more inﬂuence
in the decision-making.
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3.4.1 Analysis by Fishing Area
In the previous section the whole data set was examined in order to get
information on how the bargaining power in the TAC setting is distributed
between player l favoring low TACs and player h favoring high TACs. This
section examines to what extent the bargaining power of the two players
diﬀers between ﬁshing areas. The motivation is as follows. Due to the regu-
lation of ﬁshing opportunities the countries are only allowed to ﬁsh for stocks
for which they have a TAC (e.g. European Council (2002); European Union
(2013)). Since most of the stocks can be assigned to a spatially limited
habitat the ﬁshing activities of countries is also spatially limited to speciﬁc
ﬁshing areas. In the TAC setting, all countries have a say even if they decide
on TACs that are not relevant for them. Hence, the composition of actors
(representing the interests of their home country) preferring a low status
quo TAC or a high status quo TAC is likely to diﬀer between ﬁshing areas
depending on whether the actors have an interest in stocks of this speciﬁc
ﬁshing area or not. That implies that the bargaining positions of players l
and h also diﬀer between ﬁshing areas.
For the estimation by ﬁshing area each stock is assigned to one of the
following ﬁshing areas:13 Baltic Sea, North Sea, Celtic Sea and West of
Scotland (in the following Celtic Sea), Bay of Biscay and Atlantic Iberian
Waters (in the following Bay of Biscay), and the rest including Barent Sea,
Icelandic Sea, Norwegian Sea, and East Greenland Sea (in the following Non-
EU waters). Most of the stocks can be assigned to a single ﬁshing area.
Widely distributed and migratory stocks are assigned to all areas in which
they are present. Then, equation (3.6) is estimated for each area over the
whole time period from 1987 to 2013.
Area coef. SE p-value 95% conf. interval
Baltic Sea
logLt−1 α 0.6399 0.0986 0.000 0.4455 0.8343
logADVt β 0.3601 0.0986 0.000 0.1657 0.5545
c 0.3583 0.0036 0.000 0.3513 0.3654
No. of obs. = 210 Prob. > F = 0.000 Root MSE = 0.1954
North Sea
logLt−1 α 0.6248 0.0826 0.000 0.4624 0.7872
13 The corresponding ﬁshing area for each stock is taken from the ICES advice sheets.
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logADVt β 0.3752 0.0826 0.000 0.2128 0.5375
c -0.0166 0.0032 0.000 -0.0229 -0.0103
No. of obs. = 393 Prob. > F = 0.000 Root MSE = 0.1232
Celtic Sea
logLt−1 α 0.5092 0.0932 0.000 0.3259 0.6925
logADVt β 0.4908 0.0932 0.000 0.3075 0.6740
c 0.2558 0.0172 0.000 0.2219 0.2897
No. of obs. = 366 Prob. > F = 0.000 Root MSE = 0.1325
Bay of Biscay
logLt−1 α 0.6408 0.1059 0.000 0.4310 0.8505
logADVt β 0.3592 0.1059 0.001 0.1495 0.5689
c 0.2372 0.0077 0.000 0.2219 0.2525
No. of obs. = 136 Prob. > F = 0.000 Root MSE = 0.1358
Non-EU
logLt−1 α 0.1474 0.1099 0.181 -0.0693 0.3641
logADVt β 0.8526 0.1099 0.000 0.6359 1.0693
c 0.0556 0.0327 0.091 -0.0089 0.1199
No. of obs. = 250 Prob. > F = 0.1814 Root MSE = 0.1297
Tab. 3.3: Estimation results by area according to equation (3.6) under
the constraint α + β = 1. The reference stocks are for the
Baltic Sea Western Baltic Cod (stock id: 5), for the North
Sea Cod in areas IIIa, IV, VIId (stock id: 7), for Celtic
Sea Cod in areas VIIe-k (stock id: 10), for Bay of Biscay
Anchovy in Bay of Biscay (stock id: 1) and for Non-EU
waters Capelin in Barent Sea (stock id: 3).
The results regarding α, β and c are given in table 3.3 (for the whole
estimation output see Appendix 3.6.6). Landings and advice have positive
coeﬃcients throughout all ﬁshing areas. In all European areas player h has
the higher share of bargaining power (α > β). The Bay of Biscay shows the
biggest imbalance of the players' bargaining powers followed by the Baltic
Sea and the North Sea. Here, scientiﬁc recommendation does not seem to
be important in the TAC setting. Interests in proﬁts from catches seem
to dominate the discussion. For the Celtic Sea bargaining powers are more
evenly distributed. That could indicate that the representation of diﬀerent
interests is more balanced. In the Non-EU waters the opposite picture can
be found. Player l has a very strong bargaining position relative to player h
(α < β). The estimated bargaining power of player h is even insigniﬁcant.
Thus, player h does not seem to have an impact on the TAC negotiations.
The stocks in these waters are mainly managed by Non-EU countries. From
their agreed-on TAC a speciﬁc share is going to the European Union. The
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European Common Fishery Policy itself is not aﬀecting the management in
these waters as much as in EU waters. The high coeﬃcient β might indicate
that in the Non-EU countries scientiﬁc recommendations and conservation of
stocks are more taken into account. This may lead to a more eﬀective TAC
management, as it is the case for Iceland (Hilborn, 2007).
The diﬀerences in the bargaining power distribution in the TAC setting
process in the diﬀerent ﬁshing areas might lead to diﬀerences in the perfor-
mance of TAC management. A measure for the eﬀectiveness or bindingness
of TACs is the ratio of landings and TACs. I assume that a ratio between
0.95 and 1.05 indicates binding TACs.14 A ratio below 0.95 implies that
TACs have not been fully ﬁshed. Therefore they are too high and do not
restrict the ﬁshing activity as intended. A ratio greater than 1.05 implies
that landings exceed the TAC. In that case, the TAC is at a restrictive level
but not enforced properly.
Area Baltic Sea North Sea Celtic Sea Bay of Biscay Non-EU
Mean Ratio 0.68 1.01 0.85 0.86 1.09
SD (0.40) (0.53) (0.69) (0.40) (0.51)
Tab. 3.4: Mean ratio of landings and TACs by area from 1987 to 2013
(SD = standard deviation).
The mean ratio of the Baltic Sea is relatively low (0.68) indicating that
TACs are set on too high and hence ineﬀective levels (table 3.4). This could
be a consequence of the strong bargaining position of player h. TACs in the
Celtic Sea and the Bay of Biscay seem to be more eﬀective. For the Celtic
Sea, this could be caused by the relatively stronger bargaining position of
player l. In the North Sea the ratio is close to 1 which indicates eﬀective
TACs. For Non-EU waters the TACs are at eﬀective levels, too. However,
the ratio exceeds 1.05 which means that landings exceed the TACs by more
than 5%. TACs could have been an eﬃcient tool in this area. However, they
have not been successfully enforced.
14 Ideally, the ratio should equal 1. Then the TAC is perfectly binding. However, to ac-
count for uncertainties and inaccuracies a ratio ∈ (0.95; 1.05) is also considered to indicate
binding TACs.
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper conceptualizes the political TAC setting process as a kind
of Nash bargaining. It quantiﬁes the bargaining power of the two players l
and h representing the participating actors preferring low and high TACs,
respectively, in order to examine how interests are represented in the decision-
making process. The analysis has been done for the whole set of observations
and for subsets according to ﬁshing areas in order to capture diﬀerent distri-
butions of interests.
For the whole data set, player h (favoring high TACs) has a stronger
position in the bargaining process than player l (favoring low TACs). The
weak performance of the European TAC management therefore could be a
result of the strong inﬂuence of ﬁshermen, the industry, producer organisa-
tions and ministers who focus on proﬁts from ﬁshing, captured by player
h. Scientiﬁc recommendations and interests in conservation of ﬁsh stocks,
captured by player l, are less important. This is supported by the analysis
by ﬁshing area. In all EU areas, player h has a stronger bargaining position
compared to player l leading to ineﬀective TAC levels. In contrast, in the
Non-EU waters player l clearly dominates the bargaining process which could
be one reason why the TAC management in these waters is more successful.
The analysis also shows that a sound stock assessment based on good data
improves the bargaining position of player l. In cases where only poor data
has been available for the stock assessment player h's bargaining position is
much stronger. If a reliable assessment is available the scientiﬁc recommen-
dation for TACs is taken more into account. It is therefore very important to
strengthen the position of the scientiﬁc input in the TAC bargaining process
and to improve the data base underlying the scientiﬁc advice. Otherwise, it
might be diﬃcult to improve the TAC management's performance. Recog-
nizing that, the Commission addressed this problem in the recent reform of
the European Common Fisheries Policy (European Union, 2013; European
Commission, 2009b).
The estimations performed in this paper have been done under the con-
straint that the bargaining power parameters add up to one, i.e. α + β = 1,
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to ﬁt the assumptions of Nash's bargaining solution. The results of an un-
constrained regression are given in Appendix 3.6.7, 3.6.8 and 3.6.9. In this
setting, player h also has the stronger bargaining position  in the whole
data set as well as for the EU ﬁshing area subsets. In the Non-EU ﬁshing
area player l has the much stronger bargaining position. However, the coef-
ﬁcients of player h and l do not add up to one in any of these estimations
(this option is not even included in the conﬁdence intervals, except for Bay
of Biscay and the Non-EU waters). Hence, it can be argued that the co-
operative two-player-approach might not be suﬃcient to capture all aspects
of this bargaining process. Another approach could be to account for more
diﬀerentiated interests groups and allow for three or more players. Then, the
TAC bargaining could be modeled as a cooperative coalition game (Lindroos
et al., 2007). Even if cooperation is possible between the players it can still be
diﬃcult to reach a cooperative solution. Munro (1979) considered side pay-
ments to overcome these diﬃculties. On the other hand, the contradiction
to Nash's assumption could also suggest that a cooperative approach is not
appropriate to model the TAC bargaining process  no matter how many
players are involved. Hoﬀmann and Quaas (2015) argue that, assuming a
non-cooperative setting, the institutional set-up of the TAC setting process
in the European Union promotes short-term thinking and therefore leads
to high TACs. They propose that binding long-term agreements including
transfer payments solve that problem.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Nash Bargaining Solution
The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) can be derived by solving the min-
imization problem
min
TACt
(log(ADV −δt ) − log(TAC−δt ))α (log(((1 + γ)Lt−1)µ) − log(TACµt ))β
(3.7)
The ﬁrst order condition (FOC) is given by:
α(log(ADV −δt ) − log(TAC−δt ))α−1
δ
TACt
·(log(((1 + γ)Lt−1)µ) − log(TACµt ))β
+ β(log(((1 + γ)Lt−1)µ) − log(TACµt ))β−1
−µ
TACt
·(log(ADV −δt ) − log(TAC−δt ))α = 0 (3.8)
Rearranging yields:
0 = δα(log(TACµt ) − log(((1 + γ)Lt−1)µ)) − µβ(log(TAC−δt )
− log(ADV −δt ))
0 = δαµ log
(
TACt
(1 + γ)Lt−1
)
− δβµ log
(
TACt
ADVt
)
0 = α log
(
(1 + γ)Lt−1
TACt
)
+ β log
(
ADVt
TACt
)
(3.9)
Solving for TACt gives the NBS:
TACt = (1 + γ)
αLαt−1ADV
1−α
t (3.10)
For equation (3.10) to be the minimum the second order condition (SOC)
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derived from (3.9) has to be positive.
min
TACt
α log
(
(1 + γ)Lt−1
TACt
)
+ β log
(
ADVt
TACt
)
0 ≶ (α + β) 1
TACt
(3.11)
Since α + β = 1 the SOC is positive. Hence, equation (3.10) minimizes
equation (3.7).
3.6.2 List of Fish Stocks in Data Set
Tab. 3.5: List of ﬁsh stocks in the data set including ID and ﬁshing
area.
ID Fish species Fishing Area (ICES Division)
1 Anchovy VIII (Bay of Biscay)
2 Anchovy IXa (Portuguese Waters)
3 Capelin I, II (Barent Sea)
4 Capelin V, XIV, IIa (Iceland-East Greenland-Jan Mayen Area)
5 Cod 22-24 (Baltic Sea)
6 Cod 25-32 (Baltic Sea)
7 Cod IIIa, IV, VIId (Skagerrak, North Sea, Eastern Channel)
8 Cod IIIa (Skagerrak)
9 Cod IV (North Sea)
10 Cod VIIe-k (Celtic Sea)
11 Cod I, II (Barent Sea, Norwegian Sea)
12 Cod Norwegian Waters
13 Cod Va (Icelandic Waters)
14 Cod VIIa (Irish Sea)
15 Cod VIa (Celtic Sea and West of Scotland)
16 Haddock IIIa, IV (Skagerrak, North Sea)
17 Haddock IIIa (Skagerrak)
18 Haddock IV (North Sea)
19 Haddock VIa (West of Scotland)
20 Haddock VIIb-k (Celtic Sea and West of Scotland)
21 Haddock Arctic waters
22 Haddock Va (Icelandic Waters)
23 Haddock VIIa (Irish Sea)
24 Haddock VIb (Rockall)
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25 Herring 25 - 29, 32 (Baltic Sea excluding Gulf of Riga)
26 Herring 30 (Baltic Sea, Bothnian Sea)
27 Herring 31 (Baltic Sea, Bothnian Bay)
28 Herring IIIa, 22 - 24 (Western Baltic Sea)
29 Herring IIIa, IV, VIId (Skagerrak, Kattegat, North Sea, Eastern Channel)
30 Herring VIIa, VIIg,h,j,k (Celtic Sea and South of Ireland)
31 Herring VIa, VIIb,c (West of Scotland, Rockall)
32 Herring VIIa (Irish Sea)
33 Herring I, II, V, IVa, XIV (Norwegian Waters)
34 Herring 28.1 (Baltic Sea, Gulf of Riga)
35 Herring Va (Icelandic Waters)
36 Herring VIa (West of Scotland)
37 Hake IIIa, IV, VI, VII, VIIIa,b (Skagerrak, Kattegat, North Sea,
Irish and Celtic Sea, Channel, Bay of Biscay)
38 Hake VIIIc, IXa, (Bay of Biscay, Portuguese Waters)
39 Horse Mackerel IXa (Portuguese Waters)
40 Horse Mackerel IIa, IVa, Vb, VIa, VII a-c, e-k, VIII (Norwegian waters, North Sea,
Icelandic waters, West of Scotland, Irish Sea, Bay of Biscay)
41 Mackerel North-east Atlantic
42 Megrim IVa, VIa (North Sea, West of Scotland)
43 Megrim VIb (Rockall)
44 Megrim VIIIc, IXa (Bay of Biscay, Portuguese Waters)
45 Norway Pout IV, IIIa (Skagerrak, Kattegat, North Sea)
46 Plaice 21 - 23 (Kattegat, Belts, Sounds, Baltic Sea)
47 Plaice VIIh-k (South-west of Ireland)
48 Plaice VIIf,g (Celtic Sea)
49 Plaice VIId,e (Eastern and Western Channel)
50 Plaice VIIa (Irish Sea)
51 Plaice IV (North Sea)
52 Plaice 20 (Skagerrak, Baltic Sea)
53 Saithe IIIa, IV, VI (Skagerrak, North Sea, West of Scotland and Rockall)
54 Saithe IIIa, IV (Skagerrak, Kattegat, North Sea)
55 Saithe VI (West of Scotland)
56 Saithe I, II (North-east Arctic)
57 Sandeel IIIa, IV (Kattegat, Skagerrak, North Sea)
58 Sole VIIh-k (South-west of Ireland)
59 Sole VIIIa, b (Bay of Biscay)
60 Sole VIIf,g (Celtic Sea)
61 Sole VIId (Eastern Channel)
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62 Sole VIIe (Western Channel)
63 Sole VIIa (Irish Sea)
64 Sole IIIa, 22 - 24 (Baltic Sea, Skagerrak, Kattegat, Belts)
65 Sole IV (North Sea)
66 Sprat 22 - 32 (Baltic Sea)
67 Sprat IIIa (Skagerrak, Kattegat)
68 Blue Whiting I-IX, XII, XIV (North-east Atlantic)
69 Whiting IV, VIId (North Sea, Eastern Channel)
70 Whiting IV (North Sea)
71 Whiting VIId (Eastern Channel)
72 Whiting VIIe-k (South-west of Ireland)
73 Whiting VIa (West of Scotland)
3.6.3 Data Summary
Tab. 3.6: Statistical summary by stock including ﬁshing area.
ID Fish species Fishing Area Var. Mean SD No. of Obs.
1 Anchovy Bay of Biscay TAC 30440 3721.47 10
Landings 18000 11402.1 10
Advice 19080 12974.66 10
2 Anchovy Bay of Biscay TAC 8750 1544.79 12
Landings 5341.67 2232.59 12
Advice 4750 100 12
3 Capelin Non-EU waters TAC 457083.3 266189.1 12
Landings 432333.3 272404.9 12
Advice 432333.3 211504.7 12
4 Capelin Non-EU waters TAC 1007500 368266.2 16
Landings 932625 338773.8 16
Advice 740375 207496.8 16
5 Cod Baltic Sea TAC 79573.7 68624.4 19
Landings 23763.2 8337.5 19
Advice 24847.4 11433.25 19
6 Cod Baltic Sea TAC 110665.3 60861.4 15
Landings 84809.8 40407.7 15
Advice 73693.33 47751.63 15
7 Cod North Sea TAC 98500 61419.83 10
Landings 89180 57740.5 10
Advice 104604.1 60344.3 10
8 Cod North Sea TAC 16685.7 6836.3 7
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Landings 13428.6 5858.3 7
Advice 18871.4 4354.9 7
9 Cod North Sea TAC 112133.3 40371.5 9
Landings 96466.7 39007.2 9
Advice 115555.6 41437 9
10 Cod Celtic Sea TAC 13130.1 5892.2 16
Landings 8218.8 3186.9 16
Advice 6037.5 2689.7 16
11 Cod Non-EU waters TAC 520115.4 193850.9 26
Landings 564956.8 165974.3 26
Advice 464480.8 236078.2 26
12 Cod Non-EU waters TAC 40000 0 3
Landings 35333.3 5507.6 3
Advice 14333.3 7094.6 3
13 Cod Non-EU waters TAC 203440 47716.3 25
Landings 221560 52807.9 25
Advice 192960 44941.2 25
14 Cod Celtic Sea TAC 9441.7 3872.6 12
Landings 7309.2 3117.7 12
Advice 7916.7 3801.2 12
15 Cod Celtic Sea TAC 13846.7 4448.1 6
Landings 10450 7276.7 6
Advice 11733.3 4752.9 6
16 Haddock North Sea TAC 88429.1 44778.1 19
Landings 108300 50481.1 19
Advice 67946.6 47731.5 19
17 Haddock North Sea TAC 4912.5 1296.6 8
Landings 3962.5 2640.3 8
Advice 3375 1164.7 8
18 Haddock North Sea TAC 70352.6 38217.7 16
Landings 83562.5 44589.9 16
Advice 67924.1 37047.8 16
19 Haddock North Sea TAC 15410.4 10496.7 15
Landings 12906.7 7171.6 15
Advice 11813.3 6077.6 15
20 Haddock Celtic Sea TAC 10544.3 3170.3 3
Landings 9300 3651.1 3
Advice 8233.3 1167.6 3
21 Haddock Non-EU waters TAC 148291.7 73064.3 24
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Landings 148208.3 69413.1 24
Advice 141083.3 83032.7 24
22 Haddock Non-EU waters TAC 61384.6 22003.8 26
Landings 61923.1 20715.1 26
Advice 59923.1 25768.1 26
23 Haddock Celtic Sea TAC 4965.4 6778.1 7
Landings 2200 1710.8 7
Advice 2541.4 2135.9 7
24 Haddock Celtic Sea TAC 5765.5 1627.1 2
Landings 3750 636.4 2
Advice 8855 2467.8 2
25 Herring Baltic Sea TAC 296739.1 177979.1 23
Landings 158067.5 53739.5 23
Advice 185347.8 115961.4 23
26 Herring Baltic Sea TAC 90714.3 20158.9 21
Landings 62280.9 19028.5 21
Advice 67061.9 25437.5 21
27 Herring Baltic Sea TAC 89133.3 17482.9 15
Landings 4320 1517.1 15
Advice 5980 5402.5 15
28 Herring Baltic Sea TAC 120633.3 66277.1 21
Landings 57666.7 37914.8 21
Advice 112678.6 57484.6 21
29 Herring North Sea TAC 362923.1 126830.9 13
Landings 434538.5 172415 13
Advice 344230.8 118709.1 13
30 Herring Celtic Sea TAC 18147.5 4121.1 20
Landings 17440 5135.4 20
Advice 17297.5 6224.5 20
31 Herring Celtic Sea TAC 21336.8 6669.6 19
Landings 27105.3 9134.2 19
Advice 21289.5 7733.9 19
32 Herring Celtic Sea TAC 6074.7 1492.9 24
Landings 4683.3 1591.5 24
Advice 5339.6 1269.9 24
33 Herring Non-EU waters TAC 856950 480780.2 20
Landings 853450 474349.2 20
Advice 837450 506228.6 20
34 Herring Baltic Sea TAC 36100 3586.4 11
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Landings 32281.8 4314.8 11
Advice 33254.6 5622.3 11
35 Herring Non-EU waters TAC 100403.8 27152.9 26
Landings 98646.2 29640.1 26
Advice 95538.5 22693.1 26
36 Herring Celtic Sea TAC 46316 20607.8 19
Landings 26760 7327.3 19
Advice 38077.1 15802.3 19
37 Hake North Sea, TAC 55822.7 8673.5 22
Celtic Sea and Landings 55113.6 13101.4 22
Bay of Biscay Advice 45836.4 12508.9 22
38 Hake Bay of Biscay TAC 13221.1 5166.4 16
Landings 11840 3528.9 16
Advice 9106.3 4471.9 16
39 Horse Bay of Biscay TAC 58468.9 15230 23
Mackerel Landings 27739.1 8935.2 23
Advice 43578.3 16604.2 23
40 Horse Non-EU waters, TAC 179015 67882.1 20
Mackerel North Sea and Landings 210700 79355.4 20
Celtic Sea Advice 161100 39960.4 20
41 Mackerel all areas TAC 643687.5 180155 16
except Landings 701133.3 130687.1 15
Baltic Sea Advice 529218.8 96153 16
42 Megrim Celtic Sea TAC 5893.7 1518.1 12
Landings 2681.5 676.5 12
Advice 3420 1410.9 12
43 Megrim Celtic Sea TAC 3647.3 855.9 12
Landings 511 280 11
Advice 3041.7 1628.5 12
44 Megrim Bay of Biscay TAC 2590.6 1888.9 16
Landings 1229.4 185.4 16
Advice 1220 281.5 16
45 Norway Pout North Sea TAC 138250 100268.5 6
Landings 55666.7 42935.6 6
Advice 217166.7 184946.9 6
46 Plaice Baltic Sea TAC 2554.7 853.2 13
Landings 2753.8 919.8 13
Advice 10453.9 2645.6 13
47 Plaice Celtic Sea TAC 368.4 138.9 8
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Landings 166.8 37.1 8
Advice 242 107.5 8
48 Plaice Celtic Sea TAC 840.5 472.5 19
Landings 785.8 450.9 19
Advice 714.2 498.9 19
49 Plaice North Sea TAC 7019.2 2157.7 24
Landings 7147.8 2458.6 24
Advice 5813.3 2686.1 24
50 Plaice Celtic Sea TAC 2676.8 1293.9 23
Landings 1810.9 1218.8 23
Advice 3209.6 1600.9 23
51 Plaice North Sea TAC 99152.2 45701.7 23
Landings 87391.3 36230 23
Advice 90260 45892.7 23
52 Plaice Baltic Sea TAC 9176.9 1544.9 13
Landings 7315.4 1104.4 13
Advice 10453.9 2645.6 13
53 Saithe North Sea TAC 135847.4 33920.1 25
Landings 110319.6 13914.3 25
Advice 131333.3 38912.1 25
54 Saithe North Sea TAC 120488.8 28783.2 25
Landings 99593.2 12157.7 25
Advice 119141.6 33097.6 25
55 Saithe North Sea TAC 15543.8 7510.7 22
Landings 10643.6 7432.7 22
Advice 13854.3 7281.5 22
56 Saithe Non-EU waters TAC 159841 39552.2 25
Landings 155160 27417.6 25
Advice 157960 50649.5 25
57 Sandeel North Sea TAC 233666.7 153350.4 3
Landings 261000 168721.7 3
Advice 240686.7 176608.3 3
58 Sole Celtic Sea TAC 541.9 126.8 8
Landings 315.9 111.9 8
Advice 311.5 55.1 8
59 Sole Bay of Biscay TAC 4989.5 910.4 21
Landings 5119.1 893.7 21
Advice 4581.9 1134.6 21
60 Sole Celtic Sea TAC 1043.5 106.9 23
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Landings 1053.9 158.7 23
Advice 965.2 144.1 23
61 Sole North Sea TAC 4735.4 982.4 25
Landings 4332 497.3 25
Advice 4553.6 1132.9 25
62 Sole North Sea TAC 814.8 167.8 23
Landings 974.3 187.7 23
Advice 661.3 273.7 23
63 Sole Celtic Sea TAC 1124.5 326.5 20
Landings 1086.3 402.1 20
Advice 1009 313.7 20
64 Sole Baltic Sea TAC 842.6 328.4 19
Landings 732.6 221.9 19
Advice 727.3 194.9 19
65 Sole North Sea TAC 19652.8 5739.1 25
Landings 20936 7363.6 25
Advice 18156 6031.6 25
66 Sprat Baltic Sea TAC 370295.5 128583 22
Landings 312045.5 115675 22
Advice 297181.8 135078.3 22
67 Sprat Baltic Sea TAC 57800 17183.7 7
Landings 28000 34837.7 7
Advice 320212.4 393073.5 7
68 Blue Whiting all areas TAC 902909.1 628151 11
except Landings 799909.1 564580.1 11
Bay of Biscay Advice 632500 360400.3 11
69 Whiting Celtic Sea TAC 47282.5 17005 13
Landings 19887.5 4212.9 13
Advice 31200 14193.9 13
70 Whiting North Sea TAC 33137.1 29410 14
Landings 37012.4 34021.2 14
Advice 31407.1 32194.1 14
71 Whiting North Sea TAC 21321.1 4905 12
Landings 4812.8 1071.8 12
Advice 7991.7 5258.1 12
72 Whiting Celtic Sea TAC 24906.7 3608.6 15
Landings 15680 4237.3 15
Advice 12540 5663.6 15
73 Whiting Celtic Sea TAC 7410 5601.5 10
56
Landings 4190 3378.2 10
Advice 6400 4867.6 10
3.6.4 Constrained Regression of the whole Data Set
Tab. 3.7: Results of constrained estimation of equation (3.6) for the
whole data set controlling for intra-group correlation and
including stock eﬀects. The reference stock is Anchovy in
the Bay of Biscay (stock id: 1).
Variable Coef. SE P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
logLt−1 .5605129 .073486 0.000 .4163267 .7046991
logADVt .4394871 .073486 0.000 .2953009 .5836733
c .2430826 .0053645 0.000 .232557 .2536082
id
2 -.0175466 .0009553 0.000 -.0194211 -.0156722
3 -.0646633 .0272266 0.018 -.1180843 -.0112423
4 -.2043688 .0034079 0.000 -.2110554 -.1976822
5 .1181409 .0026958 0.000 .1128515 .1234302
6 -.0978685 .0040907 0.000 -.1058949 -.0898422
7 -.2622226 .0082304 0.000 -.2783715 -.2460737
8 -.2568855 .0172272 0.000 -.2906868 -.2230841
9 -.2417379 .0069975 0.000 -.2554676 -.2280082
10 .0032226 .0082304 0.695 -.0129263 .0193714
11 -.2294181 .0030299 0.000 -.235363 -.2234732
12 -.0045067 .0267244 0.866 -.0569425 .047929
13 -.2587185 .0002205 0.000 -.259151 -.2582859
14 -.1645583 .0040785 0.000 -.1725606 -.156556
15 -.144473 .0067117 0.000 -.157642 -.131304
16 -.2071198 .0180737 0.000 -.242582 -.1716576
17 -.074237 .0047215 0.000 -.083501 -.0649731
18 -.2963195 .0034998 0.000 -.3031863 -.2894526
19 -.2092569 .0005144 0.000 -.2102662 -.2082476
20 -.1949937 .0010043 0.000 -.1969642 -.1930231
21 -.2165195 .0024557 0.000 -.2213377 -.2117013
22 -.2400964 .003386 0.000 -.24674 -.2334527
23 -.0650115 .0073591 0.000 -.0794507 -.0505723
24 -.1780492 .0388006 0.000 -.2541796 -.1019189
25 -.05303 .0054284 0.000 -.063681 -.042379
26 -.0654391 .0088638 0.000 -.0828307 -.0480475
27 1.065983 .0090878 0.000 1.048152 1.083815
28 -.0569062 .0279002 0.042 -.1116489 -.0021635
29 -.2918826 .0034538 0.000 -.2986594 -.2851059
30 -.2183533 .0038213 0.000 -.2258509 -.2108556
31 -.3068108 .0039566 0.000 -.3145741 -.2990475
32 -.1525835 .0100186 0.000 -.1722408 -.1329261
33 -.2296718 .0040417 0.000 -.237602 -.2217416
34 -.2074486 .0050304 0.000 -.2173188 -.1975783
35 -.2332565 .0046861 0.000 -.2424512 -.2240619
36 -.0939 .0143298 0.000 -.1220163 -.0657837
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37 -.1883087 .000982 0.000 -.1902356 -.1863818
38 -.1427129 .0097461 0.000 -.1618356 -.1235902
39 -.0129658 .0171222 0.449 -.0465612 .0206296
40 -.2903377 .0025353 0.000 -.2953121 -.2853633
41 -.2304675 .0032242 0.000 -.2367937 -.2241414
42 .0559145 .0097124 0.000 .0368578 .0749711
43 .3313094 .0567434 0.000 .2199736 .4426452
44 -.0047864 .0048133 0.320 -.0142306 .0046578
45 .1037244 .0541102 0.056 -.0024447 .2098935
46 -.5374021 .0477602 0.000 -.631112 -.4436921
47 -.005837 .0118864 0.623 -.0291591 .0174851
48 -.1950574 .0031058 0.000 -.2011512 -.1889637
49 -.1959413 .0054441 0.000 -.2066231 -.1852595
50 -.1772274 .0219787 0.000 -.2203517 -.1341032
51 -.197508 .0042143 0.000 -.2057768 -.1892392
52 -.2120237 .0159917 0.000 -.2434009 -.1806466
53 -.1977779 .0088918 0.000 -.2152244 -.1803313
54 -.2032939 .0094797 0.000 -.2218939 -.1846939
55 -.1208471 .0130471 0.000 -.1464467 -.0952475
56 -.2310699 .0048942 0.000 -.2406727 -.2214671
57 -.3089218 .0098226 0.000 -.3281947 -.289649
58 -.0356544 .0022413 0.000 -.0400521 -.0312567
59 -.2334377 .0008853 0.000 -.2351748 -.2317006
60 -.2312799 .0020097 0.000 -.2352231 -.2273367
61 -.2144048 .0061875 0.000 -.2265453 -.2022644
62 -.2362514 .0100995 0.000 -.2560676 -.2164351
63 -.2276369 .0004409 0.000 -.228502 -.2267718
64 -.1960326 .0049777 0.000 -.2057993 -.1862659
65 -.2365859 .0008671 0.000 -.2382873 -.2348845
66 -.1386936 .0037945 0.000 -.1461388 -.1312484
67 .0695219 .0510308 0.173 -.0306052 .1696489
68 -.2248373 .0011825 0.000 -.2271574 -.2225173
69 .037452 .0158221 0.018 .0064076 .0684964
70 -.2513269 .005081 0.000 -.2612963 -.2413574
71 .3425602 .0162649 0.000 .310647 .3744734
72 .0198172 .0032579 0.000 .0134249 .0262094
73 -.141439 .0116108 0.000 -.1642204 -.1186576
No. of obs. 1190
F(1,1116) 58.18
Prob > F 0.0000
Root MSE 0.1376
3.6.5 Constrained Regression of Data Subsets according to Data Quality
Tab. 3.8: Results of constrained estimation of equation (3.6) for the
data subset `poor data' controlling for intra-group corre-
lation and including stock eﬀects. The reference stock is
Eastern Baltic Cod (stock id: 6).
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Variable Coef. SE P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
logLt−1 .709936 .0908189 0.000 .5304362 .8894359
logADVt .290064 .0908189 0.002 .1105641 .4695638
c .1259883 .0116853 0.000 .1028927 .1490839
id
23 .0561386 .0141504 0.000 .0281708 .0841063
27 1.190649 .0162868 0.000 1.158458 1.222839
43 .5528754 .0751829 0.000 .4042794 .7014713
46 -.3341022 .0640809 0.000 -.4607554 -.2074489
47 .1245186 .0197455 0.000 .0854923 .1635448
48 -.0951861 .0012173 0.000 -.097592 -.0927802
49 -.1008247 .0016726 0.000 -.1041305 -.0975189
50 -.0263505 .0322183 0.415 -.0900287 .0373276
52 -.0733206 .0248192 0.004 -.1223746 -.0242665
58 .0750894 .0078255 0.000 .0596225 .0905563
No. of obs. 157
F(1,186) 61.11
Prob > F 0.0000
Root MSE 0.1549
Tab. 3.9: Results of constrained estimation of equation (3.6) for the
data subsets `good data' controlling for intra-group corre-
lation and including stock eﬀects. The reference stock is
Anchovy in Bay of Biscay (stock id: 1).
Variable Coef. SE P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
logLt−1 .5392302 .0826339 0.000 .3770684 .7013919
logADVt .4607698 .0826339 0.000 .2986081 .6229316
c .2446362 .0060323 0.000 .2327984 .256474
id
2 -.0178233 .0010742 0.000 -.0199314 -.0157152
3 -.0725485 .0306159 0.018 -.1326295 -.0124676
4 -.2033818 .0038321 0.000 -.2109021 -.1958616
5 .1173601 .0030313 0.000 .1114114 .1233089
7 -.2646063 .009255 0.000 -.2827684 -.2464442
8 -.2618748 .0193717 0.000 -.2998901 -.2238594
9 -.2437645 .0078686 0.000 -.2592059 -.2283231
10 .0056063 .009255 0.545 -.0125559 .0237684
11 -.2285406 .0034071 0.000 -.2352266 -.2218545
12 .0032331 .0300512 0.914 -.0557397 .0622059
13 -.2587823 .0002479 0.000 -.2592688 -.2582958
14 -.1657395 .0045862 0.000 -.1747395 -.1567395
15 -.1464169 .0075472 0.000 -.1612276 -.1316061
16 -.2018854 .0203236 0.000 -.2417686 -.1620021
17 -.0756044 .0053092 0.000 -.0860233 -.0651855
18 -.2953059 .0039354 0.000 -.3030288 -.2875829
19 -.209108 .0005784 0.000 -.2102431 -.2079728
20 -.1947028 .0011293 0.000 -.196919 -.1924866
21 -.2172307 .0027614 0.000 -.2226496 -.2118118
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22 -.241077 .0038075 0.000 -.2485489 -.2336051
24 -.1892865 .0436307 0.000 -.2749079 -.1036651
25 -.0546022 .0061041 0.000 -.066581 -.0426233
26 -.0680062 .0099672 0.000 -.087566 -.0484464
28 -.0649865 .0313733 0.039 -.1265539 -.0034191
29 -.2908823 .0038838 0.000 -.2985039 -.2832607
30 -.21946 .004297 0.000 -.2278924 -.2110276
31 -.3056649 .0044492 0.000 -.314396 -.2969338
32 -.155485 .0112657 0.000 -.1775931 -.133377
33 -.2308424 .0045449 0.000 -.2397613 -.2219235
34 -.2089055 .0056567 0.000 -.2200062 -.1978047
35 -.2346137 .0052695 0.000 -.2449546 -.2242728
36 -.0980502 .0161136 0.000 -.1296717 -.0664286
37 -.1880243 .0011043 0.000 -.1901914 -.1858572
38 -.1398903 .0109593 0.000 -.161397 -.1183836
39 -.0179246 .0192537 0.352 -.0557083 .019859
40 -.2896035 .0028509 0.000 -.295198 -.2840089
41 -.2295338 .0036256 0.000 -.2366486 -.2224189
42 .0531016 .0109214 0.000 .0316692 .074534
44 -.0061804 .0054125 0.254 -.016802 .0044412
45 .0880532 .0608461 0.148 -.0313519 .2074584
51 -.1987285 .0047389 0.000 -.2080281 -.1894289
53 -.2003531 .0099987 0.000 -.2199747 -.1807315
54 -.2060394 .0106598 0.000 -.2269582 -.1851205
55 -.1246258 .0146713 0.000 -.1534169 -.0958347
56 -.2324873 .0055034 0.000 -.2432873 -.2216873
57 -.306077 .0110454 0.000 -.3277527 -.2844014
59 -.2336941 .0009955 0.000 -.2356477 -.2317404
60 -.2318619 .0022599 0.000 -.2362967 -.2274272
61 -.2161968 .0069578 0.000 -.2298509 -.2025428
62 -.2333264 .0113568 0.000 -.255613 -.2110397
63 -.2277646 .0004958 0.000 -.2287376 -.2267916
64 -.1974742 .0055974 0.000 -.2084586 -.1864899
65 -.236837 .0009751 0.000 -.2387505 -.2349235
66 -.1397926 .0042669 0.000 -.148166 -.1314191
67 .0547425 .0573833 0.340 -.0578673 .1673523
68 -.2244949 .0013297 0.000 -.2271042 -.2218856
69 .0328696 .0177917 0.065 -.0020451 .0677843
70 -.2498553 .0057135 0.000 -.2610676 -.238643
71 .3378497 .0182896 0.000 .3019579 .3737415
72 .0207607 .0036634 0.000 .0135715 .0279499
73 -.1448016 .0130561 0.000 -.1704232 -.1191801
No. of obs. 1033
F(1,186) 42.58
Prob > F 0.0000
Root MSE 0.1342
3.6.6 Constrained Regression by Fishing Area
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Tab. 3.10: Results of constrained estimation of equation (3.6) for the
Baltic Sea. The reference stock is Western Baltic Cod
(stock id: 5).
Variable Coef. SE P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
logLt−1 .6399144 .0985885 0.000 .445484 .8343448
logADVt .3600856 .0985885 0.000 .1656552 .554516
c .3583399 .0035803 0.000 .351279 .3654008
id
6 -.2233422 .0091047 0.000 -.241298 -.2053864
25 -.1682183 .0036661 0.000 -.1754483 -.1609883
26 -.1769154 .008275 0.000 -.1932349 -.1605959
27 .9547491 .0085755 0.000 .9378371 .9716612
28 -.1478137 .0338141 0.000 -.2145 -.0811275
34 -.3230668 .0031322 0.000 -.329244 -.3168897
46 -.6068509 .0604583 0.000 -.7260832 -.4876186
52 -.3157984 .0178377 0.000 -.3509769 -.2806198
64 -.3117079 .0030614 0.000 -.3177455 -.3056703
66 -.2556473 .0014741 0.000 -.2585544 -.2527401
67 .0036069 .064846 0.956 -.1242786 .1314924
68 -.3471686 .005203 0.000 -.3574297 -.3369076
No. of obs. 210
F(1,196) 42.13
Prob > F 0.0000
Root MSE 0.1954
Tab. 3.11: Results of constrained estimation of equation (3.6) for the
North Sea. The reference stock is Cod in areas IIIa, IV,
VIId (stock id: 7).
Variable Coef. SE P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
logLt−1 .6248115 .0825614 0.000 .4624601 .7871628
logADVt .3751885 6 .0825614 0.000 .2128372 .5375399
c -.0166324 .0032199 0.000 -.0229641 -.0103007
id
8 .0132091 .0101079 0.192 -.0066673 .0330856
9 .0194059 .0013852 0.000 .016682 .0221298
16 .0320873 .0295526 0.278 -.0260259 .0902005
17 .1849153 .0039423 0.000 .1771631 .1926676
18 -.0443605 .0131789 0.001 -.0702758 -.0184452
19 .0453141 .0098248 0.000 .0259943 .0646339
29 -.0398835 .0131273 0.003 -.0656973 -.0140696
37 .0658532 .0103502 0.000 .0455002 .0862062
40 -.0375348 .0120952 0.002 -.0613193 -.0137504
41 .0217325 .0128693 0.092 -.003574 .047039
45 .4060908 .0515458 0.000 .3047294 .5074521
49 .0543164 .0153633 0.000 .0241055 .0845273
51 .0612006 .0045122 0.000 .0523277 .0700734
53 .0650234 .0007431 0.000 .0635622 .0664846
54 .0600218 .0014035 0.000 .0572618 .0627817
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55 .14559 .0054115 0.000 .1349486 .1562314
57 -.0624952 .0202826 0.002 -.1023795 -.022611
61 .0460303 .0022952 0.000 .0415169 .0505436
62 .0099329 .0205937 0.630 -.0305631 .050429
65 .019194 .0082727 0.021 .0029264 .0354616
68 .0291492 .0105754 0.006 .0083535 .0499449
70 -.0007515 .0149554 0.960 -.0301603 .0286573
71 .6118128 .0090267 0.000 .5940624 .6295632
No. of obs. 393
F(1,368) 57.27
Prob > F 0.0000
Root MSE 0.1232
Tab. 3.12: Results of constrained estimation of equation (3.6) for the
Celtic Sea and West of Scotland. The reference stock is
Cod in areas VIIe-k (stock id: 10).
Variable Coef. SE P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
logLt−1 .5092272 .0931563 0.000 .325992 .6924624
logADVt .4907728 .0931563 0.000 .3075376 .674008
c .255793 .0172339 0.000 .2218945 .2896915
id
14 -.1763712 .0156037 0.000 -.2070631 -.1456793
15 -.1581237 .0189418 0.000 -.1953815 -.1208659
20 -.2032593 .0091604 0.000 -.2212774 -.1852412
23 -.079114 .0197624 0.000 -.117986 -.0402419
24 -.2140947 .05962 0.000 -.3313652 -.0968241
30 -.2299867 .0152776 0.000 -.2600373 -.1999361
31 -.3130161 .0054178 0.000 -.3236726 -.3023595
32 -.168542 .0231338 0.000 -.2140454 -.1230386
36 -.1128673 .028599 0.000 -.1691205 -.0566141
37 -.1965899 .0091886 0.000 -.2146635 -.1785163
40 -.2975349 .0072196 0.000 -.3117357 -.2833342
41 -.237184 .0063463 0.000 -.2496668 -.2247011
42 .0401696 .0227457 0.078 -.0045703 .0849095
43 .2827417 .0823657 0.001 .1207313 .4447522
47 -.0230991 .0255015 0.366 -.0732597 .0270616
48 -.2018565 .0064964 0.000 -.2146348 -.1890783
50 -.2015329 .0382953 0.000 -.2768585 -.1262073
58 -.0461852 .0132748 0.001 -.0722962 -.0200742
60 -.241649 .0129811 0.000 -.2671825 -.2161156
63 -.2369112 .0109924 0.000 -.258533 -.2152895
68 -.2329787 .0089345 0.000 -.2505526 -.2154048
69 .0174432 .0304908 0.568 -.0425311 .0774175
72 .0131243 .0063036 0.038 .0007254 .0255232
73 -.1585087 .0251522 0.000 -.2079822 -.1090352
No. of obs. 366
F(1,340) 29.88
Prob > F 0.0000
Root MSE 0.1325
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Tab. 3.13: Results of constrained estimation of equation (3.6) for the
Bay of Biscay and Atlantic Iberian Waters. The reference
stock is Anchovy in Bay of Biscay (stock id: 1).
Variable Coef. SE P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
logLt−1 .6407773 .1059947 0.000 .4310329 .8505216
logADVt .3592227 .1059947 0.001 .1494784 .5689671
c .2372233 .0077376 0.000 .2219119 .2525346
id
2 -.0165032 .0013779 0.000 -.0192299 -.0137765
37 -.1893813 .0014165 0.000 -.1921843 -.1865784
38 -.153358 .0140575 0.000 -.1811754 -.1255407
39 .0057358 .0246968 0.817 -.0431346 .0546063
41 -.2339891 .0046505 0.000 -.2431917 -.2247866
44 .0004709 .0069427 0.946 -.0132674 .0142092
59 -.2324707 .001277 0.000 -.2349976 -.2299437
No. of obs. 136
F(1,127) 36.55
Prob > F 0.0000
Root MSE 0.1358
Tab. 3.14: Results of constrained estimation of equation (3.6) for the
Non-EU waters (Barent Sea, Icelandic Sea, Norwegian Sea
and East Greenland Sea). The reference stock is Capelin
in Barent Sea (stock id: 3).
Variable Coef. SE P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
logLt−1 .1474187 .1099904 0.181 -.0692698 .3641072
logADVt .8525813 .1099904 0.000 .6358928 1.06927
c .0555237 .0327222 0.091 -.0089411 .1199886
id
4 .0325031 .0458523 0.479 -.0578289 .1228352
11 .0053288 .0452865 0.906 -.0838885 .0945462
12 .3634365 .0807513 0.000 .204351 .5225221
13 -.042243 .0404215 0.297 -.1218761 .03739
21 -.0126091 .037076 0.734 -.0856512 .060433
22 -.0414158 .0356834 0.247 -.1117146 .028883
33 -.0346773 .034702 0.319 -.1030425 .033688
35 -.0418845 .0337375 0.216 -.1083496 .0245805
40 -.0583713 .0445461 0.191 -.1461301 .0293876
41 .0053717 .0455773 0.906 -.0844186 .095162
56 -.0408672 .0334261 0.223 -.1067189 .0249845
68 -.0004756 .0425213 0.991 -.0842454 .0832943
No. of obs. 250
F(1,236) 1.80
Prob > F 0.1814
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Root MSE 0.1297
3.6.7 Unconstrained Regression of the whole Data Set
Tab. 3.15: Results of unconstrained estimation of equation (3.6) for
the whole data set controlling for intra-group correlation
and including stock eﬀects. The reference stock is An-
chovy in the Bay of Biscay (stock id: 1)
Variable Coef. SE P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
logLt−1 .4120475 .0681766 0.000 .2761399 .5479552
logADVt .3448198 .0528853 0.000 .2393948 .4502448
c 1.274592 .2292952 0.000 .8174998 1.731683
id
2 -.1466351 .0287426 0.000 -.2039324 -.0893377
3 .2147188 .0608406 0.001 .0934352 .3360023
4 .2044754 .0910978 0.028 .0228752 .3860755
5 .1493948 .0067832 0.000 .1358728 .1629168
6 .0480091 .0330591 0.151 -.0178929 .1139112
7 -.1011207 .0349094 0.005 -.1707113 -.0315301
8 -.2759211 .0139789 0.000 -.3037875 -.2480547
9 -.0579111 .0399496 0.152 -.1375491 .021727
10 -.0971265 .0217592 0.000 -.1405026 -.0537504
11 .1194455 .077754 0.129 -.0355543 .2744453
12 .0297104 .0222123 0.185 -.0145691 .0739899
13 .0024469 .0578057 0.966 -.1127866 .1176804
14 -.2565978 .0212042 0.000 -.2988676 -.2143281
15 -.1992844 .0139947 0.000 -.2271823 -.1713865
16 -.0513677 .0393889 0.196 -.1298882 .0271527
17 -.2528747 .040422 0.000 -.3334546 -.1722949
18 -.1457701 .0339668 0.000 -.2134817 -.0780585
19 -.2536024 .0097492 0.000 -.2730371 -.2341678
20 -.2621764 .0147423 0.000 -.2915646 -.2327882
21 -.0085573 .0457142 0.852 -.0996868 .0825722
22 -.1145047 .0274016 0.000 -.1691287 -.0598807
23 -.298907 .0531801 0.000 -.4049196 -.1928944
24 -.3191672 .0462161 0.000 -.4112974 -.227037
25 .1780362 .0504897 0.001 .0773868 .2786856
26 .0620928 .0276104 0.028 .0070525 .1171332
27 .9171421 .0349487 0.000 .8474731 .986811
28 .0785929 .0324383 0.018 .0139283 .1432575
29 .0335242 .0726355 0.646 -.111272 .1783205
30 -.2236421 .003223 0.000 -.2300671 -.2172171
31 -.2733778 .008484 0.000 -.2902903 -.2564652
32 -.2894469 .032621 0.000 -.3544757 -.224418
33 .1482573 .0831297 0.079 -.0174588 .3139733
34 -.1402071 .0145642 0.000 -.1692402 -.111174
35 -.0563348 .0386084 0.149 -.1332992 .0206296
36 -.0391159 .0141986 0.007 -.0674203 -.0108114
37 -.0794126 .0242768 0.002 -.1278075 -.0310177
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38 -.2010987 .0133574 0.000 -.2277261 -.1744713
39 .0518725 .0168694 0.003 .018244 .085501
40 -.0430555 .0551812 0.438 -.1530572 .0669462
41 .1453345 .0837512 0.087 -.0216204 .3122894
42 -.135643 .0444422 0.003 -.224237 -.047049
43 .0149503 .088377 0.866 -.1612261 .1911268
44 -.2873969 .0634157 0.000 -.4138139 -.1609799
45 .2076318 .0410165 0.000 .1258668 .2893967
46 -.6801632 .0515356 0.000 -.7828975 -.5774289
47 -.4800722 .107174 0.000 -.6937198 -.2664247
48 -.5398152 .0759091 0.000 -.6911373 -.3884932
49 -.3063265 .0239263 0.000 -.3540228 -.2586302
50 -.404129 .0558193 0.000 -.5154027 -.2928553
51 -.0347088 .0355355 0.332 -.1055476 .03613
52 -.2906021 .0228442 0.000 -.3361412 -.2450629
53 .003758 .0437289 0.932 -.0834139 .0909299
54 -.0123793 .041379 0.766 -.0948668 .0701082
55 -.1744594 .016658 0.000 -.2076665 -.1412524
56 -.0032712 .0498219 0.948 -.1025894 .096047
57 -.0414058 .0611431 0.500 -.1632924 .0804808
58 -.4557571 .0933944 0.000 -.6419355 -.2695788
59 -.3692735 .0302248 0.000 -.4295255 -.3090214
60 -.5317928 .0668756 0.000 -.6651069 -.3984787
61 -.3614066 .0337863 0.000 -.4287585 -.2940548
62 -.5612434 .0707923 0.000 -.7023652 -.4201217
63 -.5261221 .0661724 0.000 -.6580343 -.3942099
64 -.5351117 .0759369 0.000 -.6864892 -.3837342
65 -.2287097 .0017245 0.000 -.2321475 -.225272
66 .1508588 .0636026 0.020 .0240694 .2776483
67 .1079265 .0361047 0.004 .0359531 .1798998
68 .1529042 .0838417 0.072 -.0142312 .3200397
69 .0671297 .0119382 0.000 .0433313 .0909281
70 -.2034107 .0119421 0.000 -.2272169 -.1796045
71 .2169853 .0324078 0.000 .1523816 .281589
72 -.0065048 .0058082 0.266 -.0180832 .0050736
73 -.2898667 .0356066 0.000 -.3608471 -.2188862
No. of obs. 1190
R2 0.9784
Root MSE 0.12954
3.6.8 Unconstrained Regression of Data Subsets according to Data Quality
Tab. 3.16: Results of unconstrained estimation of equation (3.6) for
the data subset `poor data' controlling for intra-group cor-
relation and including stock eﬀects. The reference stock is
Eastern Baltic Cod (stock id: 6).
Variable Coef. SE P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
logLt−1 .4023689 .0913958 0.001 .1987265 .6060114
logADVt .1993705 .0819901 0.035 .016685 .3820559
65
c 2.062875 .5183187 0.003 .9079894 3.217761
id
23 -.5759747 .1670137 0.006 -.9481044 -.203845
27 .6963428 .1296742 0.000 .4074108 .9852749
43 -.2575779 .2079068 0.244 -.7208231 .2056673
46 -.8523259 .1331111 0.000 -1.148916 -.5557358
47 -.9052462 .2727175 0.008 -1.512899 -.2975937
48 -.8997285 .2161333 0.002 -1.381304 -.4181535
49 -.5194074 .1130019 0.001 -.7711913 -.2676235
50 -.6598144 .1645257 0.002 -1.0264 -.2932284
52 -.4585806 .0994886 0.001 -.6802551 -.2369062
58 -.857555 .2490907 0.006 -1.412564 -.3025464
No. of obs. 157
R2 0.9731
Root MSE 0.12956
Tab. 3.17: Results of unconstrained estimation of equation (3.6) for
the data subset `good data' controlling for intra-group cor-
relation and including stock eﬀects. The reference stock is
Anchovy in Bay of Biscay (stock id: 1).
Variable Coef. SE P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
logLt−1 .4169367 .0793367 0.000 .2582931 .5755803
logADVt .374944 .0615399 0.000 .2518874 .4980006
c 1.127249 .2554543 0.000 .6164362 1.638061
id
2 -.1282595 .032029 0.000 -.1923054 -.0642136
3 .1683752 .0674873 0.015 .0334261 .3033243
4 .1463628 .1015236 0.155 -.0566461 .3493717
5 .144289 .0075227 0.000 .1292464 .1593315
7 -.1261679 .0387341 0.002 -.2036216 -.0487142
8 -.2770458 .0163786 0.000 -.3097969 -.2442947
9 -.0859542 .0443534 0.057 -.1746443 .0027359
10 -.0808283 .0241307 0.001 -.1290805 -.032576
11 .0698859 .0866558 0.423 -.1033932 .2431649
12 .0307801 .025995 0.241 -.0212 .0827603
13 -.0352128 .0643617 0.586 -.163912 .0934864
14 -.2442586 .0237312 0.000 -.291712 -.1968052
15 -.1928973 .0158288 0.000 -.2245488 -.1612457
16 -.0697415 .0445126 0.122 -.15875 .019267
17 -.2282088 .0451395 0.000 -.3184708 -.1379468
18 -.1666652 .0379168 0.000 -.2424845 -.090846
19 -.2471008 .0108442 0.000 -.2687852 -.2254165
20 -.2522761 .0163935 0.000 -.2850569 -.2194952
21 -.0390569 .0508479 0.445 -.1407335 .0626198
22 -.133351 .0304431 0.000 -.1942256 -.0724763
24 -.3075522 .0531535 0.000 -.4138392 -.2012653
25 .1435423 .0561077 0.013 .031348 .2557366
26 .0417379 .0306212 0.178 -.019493 .1029688
28 .0528186 .036301 0.151 -.0197698 .125407
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29 -.0125623 .0809679 0.877 -.1744676 .149343
30 -.223738 .0037691 0.000 -.2312748 -.2162012
31 -.2773045 .0095906 0.000 -.2964821 -.2581269
32 -.2719856 .0366489 0.000 -.3452696 -.1987016
33 .092925 .0924741 0.319 -.0919884 .2778384
34 -.1510194 .0161515 0.000 -.1833163 -.1187224
35 -.0828648 .0428952 0.058 -.1686391 .0029094
36 -.0502211 .0159979 0.003 -.082211 -.0182312
37 -.0948743 .0270571 0.001 -.1489783 -.0407702
38 -.1905035 .0148843 0.000 -.2202664 -.1607406
39 .0386927 .019013 0.046 .0006738 .0767116
40 -.0780975 .0615089 0.209 -.2010922 .0448973
41 .0919391 .0933386 0.329 -.0947029 .2785811
42 -.1102366 .0497797 0.031 -.2097772 -.010696
44 -.2477786 .0707401 0.001 -.3892322 -.106325
45 .1805251 .0472984 0.000 .085946 .2751042
51 -.0590991 .0394828 0.140 -.1380499 .0198517
53 -.0272605 .0485343 0.576 -.1243108 .0697898
54 -.0420001 .0459151 0.364 -.1338131 .0498129
55 -.1696667 .0191054 0.000 -.2078704 -.131463
56 -.0371746 .0553738 0.505 -.1479014 .0735522
57 -.0777263 .0683642 0.260 -.214429 .0589765
59 -.3499105 .0336775 0.000 -.4172529 -.2825682
60 -.4889672 .0745165 0.000 -.6379721 -.3399623
61 -.3416256 .0378021 0.000 -.4172155 -.2660356
62 -.5121751 .0786286 0.000 -.6694027 -.3549475
63 -.4832364 .073694 0.000 -.6305967 -.3358762
64 -.4873982 .0846854 0.000 -.6567371 -.3180593
65 -.2300386 .0019137 0.000 -.2338653 -.2262118
66 .1083091 .0707374 0.131 -.0331391 .2497572
67 .0909439 .0422706 0.035 .0064186 .1754692
68 .0987713 .0933872 0.294 -.0879679 .2855105
69 .0593051 .0137757 0.000 .0317589 .0868514
70 -.2091708 .0134772 0.000 -.2361202 -.1822214
71 .2314192 .0366895 0.000 .1580539 .3047845
72 -.0019831 .0064499 0.760 -.0148804 .0109142
73 -.2710973 .0400305 0.000 -.3511433 -.1910513
No. of obs. 1033
R2 0.9760
Root MSE 0.12847
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3.6.9 Unconstrained Regression by Fishing Area
Tab. 3.18: Unconstrained estimation of equation (3.6) for the Baltic
Sea. The reference stock is Western Baltic Cod (stock id:
5).
Variable Coef. SE P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
logLt−1 .4556672 .1022309 0.001 .2329252 .6784092
logADVt .297289 .0961721 0.009 .087748 .50683
c 1.439412 .5401503 0.021 .262525 2.616298
id
6 -.1037906 .0579208 0.098 -.2299892 .0224079
25 .0335665 .1019823 0.748 -.1886338 .2557668
26 -.0818915 .0501257 0.128 -.1911059 .0273229
27 .7688521 .0910694 0.000 .5704289 .9672752
28 -.0533451 .062021 0.407 -.1884772 .0817871
34 -.2875613 .0187439 0.000 -.3284006 -.2467219
46 -.8041434 .0957157 0.000 -1.01269 -.5955969
52 -.4334394 .0560413 0.000 -.5555429 -.3113359
64 -.6890351 .1880727 0.003 -1.09881 -.2792599
66 .0063071 .1314935 0.963 -.2801927 .2928068
67 -.0110918 .0518341 0.834 -.1240287 .101845
68 .0066551 .1757869 0.970 -.3763517 .3896619
No. of obs. 210
R2 0.9525
Root MSE 0.1899
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Tab. 3.19: Unconstrained estimation of equation (3.6) for the North
Sea. The reference stock is Cod in areas IIIa, IV, VIId
(stock id: 7).
Variable Coef. SE P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
logLt−1 .5295963 .0699665 0.000 .3848595 .6743332
logADVt .3244541 .0845533 0.001 .1495422 .499366
c .6990396 .250393 0.010 .1810622 1.217017
id
8 -.0956712 .035304 0.012 -.1687031 -.0226393
9 .0331497 .0044415 0.000 .0239618 .0423375
16 .0310569 .0273566 0.268 -.0255345 .0876484
17 -.0187352 .0724208 0.798 -.168549 .1310786
18 -.0497224 .0129844 0.001 -.0765828 -.0228621
19 -.0772883 .0469948 0.114 -.1745045 .0199279
29 .0597156 .031922 0.074 -.0063201 .1257513
37 .0352786 .016854 0.048 .0004134 .0701438
40 .0150908 .0172981 0.392 -.020693 .0508746
41 .1515642 .0419844 0.001 .0647128 .2384156
45 .3679534 .0439685 0.000 .2769977 .4589091
49 -.1075201 .0632732 0.103 -.2384108 .0233706
51 .0625525 .0039933 0.000 .0542918 .0708131
53 .0892406 .0087249 0.000 .0711918 .1072894
54 .0778144 .0068089 0.000 .0637292 .0918996
55 .0163003 .0433032 0.710 -.0732792 .1058798
57 .0028808 .0230746 0.902 -.0448526 .0506141
61 -.1387512 .0652053 0.044 -.2736387 -.0038637
62 -.2803435 .109934 0.018 -.5077593 -.0529276
65 -.072175 .0355118 0.054 -.1456367 .0012867
68 .1599758 .0426737 0.001 .0716985 .2482531
70 -.0675917 .0313636 0.042 -.1324723 -.0027112
71 .4390581 .0573965 0.000 .3203244 .5577917
No. of obs. 393
R2 0.9754
Root MSE 0.1206
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Tab. 3.20: Unconstrained estimation of equation (3.6) for the Celtic
Sea and West of Scotland. The reference stock is Cod in
areas VIIe-k (stock id: 10).
Variable Coef. SE P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
logLt−1 .3874752 .0650176 0.000 .2532854 .521665
logADVt .3927595 .1069183 0.001 .1720909 .6134281
c 1.095157 .2962246 0.001 .4837797 1.706535
id
14 -.1667759 .0160073 0.000 -.1998133 -.1337384
15 -.1144322 .0290851 0.001 -.174461 -.0544035
20 -.1720569 .0174092 0.000 -.2079877 -.136126
23 -.1971853 .0352336 0.000 -.269904 -.1244667
24 -.2429808 .0465471 0.000 -.3390493 -.1469123
30 -.1420218 .0414645 0.002 -.2276002 -.0564433
31 -.1913679 .0472448 0.000 -.2888764 -.0938594
32 -.1984566 .0161557 0.000 -.2318003 -.1651129
36 .0311766 .0703997 0.662 -.1141213 .1764745
37 -.0062277 .074348 0.934 -.1596744 .147219
40 .0176501 .1185099 0.883 -.2269423 .2622425
41 .1940523 .1601874 0.238 -.1365583 .5246629
42 -.0392343 .0230811 0.102 -.0868713 .0084027
43 .0984953 .0618598 0.124 -.0291771 .2261676
47 -.3576445 .1095345 0.003 -.5837125 -.1315765
48 -.4219074 .0766799 0.000 -.5801668 -.2636479
50 -.3108067 .0329663 0.000 -.3788459 -.2427676
58 -.3334341 .0978162 0.002 -.5353169 -.1315513
60 -.4208411 .0589506 0.000 -.5425092 -.299173
63 -.4145361 .0592354 0.000 -.536792 -.2922802
68 .2003564 .1623812 0.229 -.134782 .5354948
69 .1390463 .0639936 0.040 .0069701 .2711226
72 .0808787 .0283145 0.009 .0224404 .139317
73 -.1986065 .0175434 0.000 -.2348142 -.1623988
No. of obs. 366
R2 0.9801
Root MSE 0.1266
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Tab. 3.21: Unconstrained estimation of equation (3.6) for the Bay of
Biscay and Atlantic Iberian Waters. The reference stock
is Anchovy in Bay of Biscay (stock id: 1).
Variable Coef. SE P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
logLt−1 .313134 .1171604 0.032 .0360937 .5901743
logADVt .232833 .0888848 0.034 .0226537 .4430122
c 2.167172 .5921628 0.008 .7669294 3.567414
id
2 -.2582218 .0741306 0.010 -.4335128 -.0829308
37 .0146479 .0625506 0.822 -.1332607 .1625565
38 -.2557057 .0342182 0.000 -.336619 -.1747924
39 .1150747 .0398738 0.023 .0207883 .2093612
41 .4700056 .2158481 0.066 -.040394 .9804052
44 -.530585 .1625536 0.014 -.9149632 -.1462069
59 -.4867415 .077995 0.000 -.6711703 -.3023127
No. of obs. 136
R2 0.9724
Root MSE 0.1259
Tab. 3.22: Unconstrained estimation of equation (3.6) for the Non-
EU waters (Barent Sea, Icelandic Sea, Norwegian Sea and
East Greenland Sea). The reference stock is Capelin in
Barent Sea (stock id: 3).
Variable Coef. SE P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
logLt−1 .1287805 .0817207 0.141 -.0492736 .3068347
logADVt .7563169 .1230159 0.000 .4882883 1.024345
c .6903693 .3755472 0.091 -.1278778 1.508617
id
4 .0722063 .0318008 0.042 .0029182 .1414943
11 .0169507 .0328392 0.615 -.0545998 .0885012
12 .2097453 .1310206 0.135 -.075724 .4952146
13 -.0697877 .0417644 0.121 -.1607845 .021209
21 -.0637299 .0503154 0.229 -.1733578 .0458981
22 -.130812 .0692038 0.083 -.2815942 .0199702
33 -.004361 .0240922 0.859 -.0568533 .0481313
35 -.1061109 .0547475 0.076 -.2253954 .0131735
40 -.0944092 .0485018 0.075 -.2000856 .0112672
41 .0295882 .031435 0.365 -.0389027 .098079
56 -.0809037 .0424165 0.081 -.1733213 .011514
68 .0260891 .0291463 0.388 -.0374152 .0895934
No. of obs. 250
R2 0.9197
Root MSE 0.1277
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4. REGIONAL TRADE-OFFS FROM MULTI-SPECIES
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Abstract. The maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is, theoretically, the
largest yield that can be taken from a single species' stock over an indeﬁnite
period. Formulation of strategic MSY management goals is, however, com-
plicated by the need to move beyond biological single-species considerations.
Interactions among species necessitate multi-species (MMSY) deﬁnitions, in-
corporating ecological, economic and social considerations. We developed an
ecological-economic model of the Baltic Sea, simulating stock dynamics of in-
teracting populations of cod (Gadus morhua), herring (Clupea harengus) and
sprat (Sprattus sprattus). We investigated a set of diﬀerent strategic manage-
ment options. These likely, yet non-formalized experiments evaluate and illu-
minate alternative regional trade-oﬀs. We computed multi-species maximum
economic yield (MMEY) under certain ecological constraints, with proﬁts as
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a performance indicator. An unconstrained proﬁt-maximizing management
strategy would lead to a highly proﬁtable cod ﬁshery in a cod-dominated
ecosystem. Concurrent sprat stock size (and proﬁts) would be low, falling
below ecological precautionary reference points. Consideration of ecological
constraints on minimum stock sizes leaves a range of strategies, including the
change from a cod-dominated to a more clupeid-dominated system. The re-
gional distribution of proﬁts depends on the management. Therefore, adjust-
ment payments or other forms of compensation might be needed to achieve
a concordant agreement on strategic multi-species management goals.
Keywords: equity; Baltic Sea; distribution; relative stability; proﬁts; eco-
nomic optimization; bio-economic model
JEL-Classiﬁcation: Q22; Q57; D78
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4.1 Introduction
Establishing successful and commonly accepted ﬁsheries management rules
is a key issue for the future sustainable use of the world ocean's living re-
sources. Worldwide approximately 500 million people are directly dependent
on ﬁsheries for earning their livelihood (FAO, 2012). A growing world pop-
ulation in combination with an increasing population concentration at the
coasts is likely to further exacerbate problems linked to poor management of
marine resources. Regulations are missing or are limping behind; partly be-
cause basic ecological and economic conditions for the relevant ﬁshery are not
understood. Even in Europe, as a highly developed region, ﬁsheries manage-
ment is still mainly single-species management, based on natural sciences,
but ignoring any species interactions or any social and economic consid-
erations. Consequently, in its latest evaluation of the European Common
Fisheries Policy (CFP) the Commission concluded that the CFP had failed
and needed a substantial revision (European Commission, 2009b). In the
2009 Green Paper on the reform of the CFP the maximum sustainable yield
(MSY) concept was included as a principle, accounting for the global impera-
tive to manage ﬁsh stocks sustainably. Achieving this goal is complicated by
the lack of a common interpretation of `sustainability' and `yield' and by the
fact that achieving a theoretic long term `maximized' yield for one stock may
detrimentally aﬀect other stocks and harm broader ecosystem, economic or
social aspects. Especially in systems with strong predator-prey links, either
top down or bottom up, management decisions taken for one stock will in-
evitably have inﬂuence on the other stock(s), too. Rebuilding stocks of large
predators like cod might take its toll on future proﬁts from the correspond-
ing prey-ﬁsh ﬁshery, as the prey stocks will be depleted by the abundant
predator. Diﬀerent interpretations or prioritizations of `yield' will therefore
result in diﬀerent long-term management goals, e.g. steering a system to-
wards maximum yield in terms of biomass (usually prioritizing forage ﬁsh) is
adverse to maximum yield in terms of proﬁt (usually prioritizing predatory
large ﬁsh). Unconstrained optimization for any given target might result
in unacceptable situations, harm legally binding ecosystem indicators, e.g.
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the Good Environmental Status (GES) within the European Union's Marine
Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD), or stock levels falling below precau-
tionary biomass levels. Therefore, the feasible `space of possible solutions'
might be narrower than originally perceived. However, even in a reduced
decision space, decisions on trade-oﬀs have to be explicitly made. Currently
the reform of the CFP is under way, including a range of new management
measures, more regional structures and a more participatory and open pro-
cess. However, some principles still seem to be carved in stone. One principle
which is not subject to the discussion is the `principle of relative stability'.
According to this principle, the Baltic countries hold ﬁxed shares of cod,
herring and sprat quota. Therefore, the absolute catch amounts may diﬀer
between years depending on the stock status, but the percentage distribution
of TACs to countries does not. In this paper we perform an exploration of
opportunities for strategic management goals in a multi-species set-up and
investigate their regional distributional eﬀects. We use the example of the
Baltic Sea to show that inﬂexibility in the distribution of catch shares to
countries, as constrained by the principle of relative stability, can lead to re-
gional inequity of the distribution of future proﬁts. The central Baltic Sea ﬁsh
community is dominated by three species only, namely cod (Gadus morhua),
herring (Clupea harengus) and sprat (Sprattus sprattus). The ﬁshery mainly
consists of single-species ﬁsheries. However, the ﬁsh stocks are closely con-
nected by strong ecological interconnections between the species (Köster and
Möllmann, 2000), as cod is preying on both herring and sprat (Lewy and
Vinther, 2004). Thus, ﬂuctuations in the size of the cod stock relate to con-
siderable changes in natural mortality rates of sprat and juvenile herring.
Under optimal management the cod ﬁshery would be the most proﬁtable
ﬁshery by far (Nieminen et al., 2012; Quaas et al., 2013). The combination
of high ﬁshing pressure and environment-driven low recruitment success led
to a decrease of the cod spawning stock biomass (SSB) from almost 700,000
to 100,000 tons from 1983 to 1992, increasing shortly after, but reaching a
record low level in 2005 (ICES, 2012). This strong decrease in the cod stock
and a concurrent increase in the sprat stock resulted in a change from a cod-
dominated system to a sprat-dominated system. In recent years the Eastern
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Baltic cod has recovered, like a number of other North-east Atlantic stocks
(Fernandes and Cook, 2013), to a SSB > 200,000 tons in 2011 (ICES, 2012).
The recovery is due to a combination of improved recruitment and better
management, i.e. agreement by all relevant stakeholders on a cod long-term
management plan in 2006 (European Council, 2007). The cod long-term
management plan aimed at rebuilding the full reproductive capacity of the
stock and resulted in a better compliance and substantially reduced ﬁshing
mortality (F = 0.3). A major diﬀerence to the previous management strategy
is that inter-annual changes in the TAC, both in terms of reductions and
increases, are limited to a maximum of 15%.
In June 2011, the Commission and member states agreed that the Baltic
cod plan should be replaced by a Baltic multi-species management plan which
would take account of major species interactions. The Baltic Regional Ad-
visory Council (RAC) also expressed support for such an approach. Accord-
ingly, a number of expert groups were initiated, dealing e.g. with deﬁn-
ing the methods of multi-species stock assessment (see Rindorf et al. (2013)
for overview). The scientiﬁc basis is formed by earlier multi-species works
(Gislason, 1999) showing that single- and multi-species reference points are
diﬀerent, and that it is impossible to deﬁne a `safe' level of biomass with-
out taking changes in species interaction into account. Including ﬁrst-order
interactions is needed for medium-term management purposes (Collie and
Gislason, 2001). In the case of the Baltic Sea this addresses predation mor-
tality induced by the cod stock. Socio-economic considerations are often not
part of the terms of reference, but are treated in sub-sequent analysis. We
believe that this needs to be changed, as useful management targets can only
be achieved including more detailed socio-economic analysis of the involved
ﬁsheries (Gislason, 1999).
Using 2006 as our base year (i.e. the year of adoption of the cod manage-
ment plan), we undertake model experiments to investigate four hypothetical
long-term management goals and their outcome in terms of ecology (stock
sizes), economy (total proﬁts) and social aspects (regional distribution of
proﬁts): (1) an unconstrained economic optimization (maximizing proﬁts) of
the three-species system, (2) optimization of the present value of the cod ﬁsh-
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ery's present value, while respecting a precautionary biomass level of sprat,
(3) optimization of the sprat ﬁshery, while paying regard to a precautionary
biomass level of cod, and (4) a simulation of the current cod management
plan. We show that a change back to a cod-dominated system is economically
highly proﬁtable on aggregate, but not all countries would actually beneﬁt
from this change in an equal way. Therefore, compensation might be needed
to avoid inequity.
We developed and applied a combined three-species, age-structured eco-
logical-economic model, which takes cod predation on two clupeid species into
account. We used four scenarios (table 4.1) to investigate the distribution of
country-speciﬁc future proﬁts.
4.2 Material and Methods
4.2.1 Ecological-Economic Modeling
Our model is an extension of the single-species age-structured ﬁshery
model of Tahvonen (2009) and Tahvonen et al. (2013), similar in scope to
that of Nieminen et al. (2012).
Scenario Objective
1 Unconstrained economic optimization
2 Optimization for proﬁts from cod ﬁshery, while respect-
ing a precautionary SSB (Bpa) of 570,000 tons of sprat
(ICES, 2013)
3 Optimization for proﬁts from sprat ﬁshery, while re-
specting a cod Bpa of 88,000 tons (ICES, 2013)
4 Simulation of the agreed long-term management plan for
cod and subsequent optimization for clupeids
Tab. 4.1: Management scenarios 1 to 4, using diﬀerent sets of input
or optimized ﬁshing mortalities (F ). SSB = spawning stock
biomass.
We use the subscript i ∈ {C, S,H} for the cod (C), sprat (S), and herring
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(H) ﬁsheries. The ﬁshing proﬁt for the cod ﬁshery in year t is:
piC =
8∑
s=1
pC(s)wC(s)(1− exp (−FC(t)))qC(s)xC(s, t)− cCFC(t). (4.1)
Here we use xC(s, t) to denote stock numbers of age s in year t, pC(s) for
age-speciﬁc prices, wC(s) for age-speciﬁc weights, and qC(s) for age-speciﬁc
relative catchabilities. Instantaneous ﬁshing mortality is FC(t), and the cost
function is of the Spence type (Spence, 1974), where cC is a cost parameter
(as in Quaas et al. (2012)). Sprat and herring, i = {S,H}, are modeled as
schooling ﬁsheries (Tahvonen et al., 2013), with proﬁts:
pii = (pi − ci)
8∑
s=1
wi(s)(1 − exp (−Fi(t)))qi(s)xi(s, t) (4.2)
where pi is the market price (which is assumed to be independent of age)
and ci is the constant marginal cost of harvest. For each ﬁshery i = {C, S,H}
we consider a representative ﬁsherman's intertemporal utility from ﬁshing
income,
Vi =
∞∑
t=0
ρt
pi1−ηi
1− η (4.3)
where ρ is the discount factor and η is the representative ﬁsherman's aversion
against inter-annual income ﬂuctuations. The higher η is, the more a constant
income stream over time is preferred. Such a desire for relative constancy is
reﬂected in several management plans for European ﬁsh stocks (e.g. Baltic
cod; European Council (2007)), which have been agreed upon by a broad
range of stakeholders, including ﬁshermen. It is expressed, for example, as a
requirement that TACs shall not change by more than a certain percentage
between two subsequent years (15% in the case of Baltic cod). The objective
is to maximize a weighted sum of the intertemporal utilities (E(t)) of the
representative ﬁshermen of all three ﬁsheries:
max
EC(t),ES(t),EH(t))
{λCVC + λSVS + λHVH}. (4.4)
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This model set-up allows changing the weights λi > 0 to model diﬀerent
strategic management goals or constraints. In the case of unconstrained eco-
nomic optimization we take λC = λH = λS = 1, which means that all three
ﬁsheries have equal weight in the management optimization. Fishing mor-
talities may not be negative, i.e. Fi(t) ≥ 0 in all cases. The age-structured
multi-species population dynamics are described as follows. SSB of species i
in year t is given by:
ssbi(t) =
8∑
s=1
wi(s)γi(s)xi(s, t) (4.5)
where γi(s) is used to denote age-speciﬁc maturities. Population dynamics
of the stock of species i are given by
xi(s = 1, t+ 1) = ϕissbi(t) exp(−βissbi(t)) (4.6)
xi(s, t+ 1) = αi(s− 1)(1− qi(s)(1− exp(−Fi(t))))xi(s− 1, t) (4.7)
for s = 2, ..., 7
xi(s = 8, t+ 1) = αi(7)(1− qi(s)(1− exp(−Fi(t))))xi(7, t)
+ αi(8)(1− qi(8)(1− exp(−Fi(t))))xi(8, t). (4.8)
This formulation implies that ﬁshing and natural mortality are sequential,
and was chosen as it is standard in resource dynamics literature (Tahvonen,
2009). Changing the model to address ﬁshing and natural mortality as com-
petitive causes of death would slightly aﬀect cost and catch, but not popula-
tion dynamics. For cod and herring we assume stock-recruitment functions
of the Ricker type (Ricker, 1954), for sprat we assume a Beverton-Holt type
(Beverton and Holt, 1957). Age-speciﬁc survival rates are
αC(s) = exp(−MC(s)) for cod (4.9)
αS(s, t) = exp(−MS1(s) − MS2(s)ssbC) for sprat (4.10)
αH(s, t) = exp(−MH1(s) − MH2(s)ssbC) for herring (4.11)
which are constant for cod. Residual (Mi1) and predation (Mi2) mortal-
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ity estimates for the diﬀerent age classes of herring and sprat are based on
regression analysis, using stochastic multi-species (SMS) (Lewy and Vinther,
2004) output on mortality for diﬀerent stock sizes of cod. Predation mortal-
ity is almost linearly dependent on the cod stock biomass for a wide range
of stock states (Tahvonen et al., 2013). This shortcut in calculation of Mi2
values was used to reduce model complexity and implies a dependency of
predation mortality on both, predator and prey abundance.
4.2.2 Data and Estimation of Model Parameters
Age-speciﬁc weights wi(s) and maturities γi(s) are taken from the ICES
(2012) assessment reports for the three stocks, using the mean values from
2002 to 2006. Age-speciﬁc catchabilities were estimated based on mean age-
speciﬁc ﬁshing mortalities for the years 2002 to 2006 as reported in ICES
(2012) with qA = 1 for the age class with highest mortality by normalization.
In case of reaching qA = 1 for an age class < 8, it was kept constant for the
older age classes, as it is meant to reﬂect mesh-size selection (table 4.2).
Numbers 2006 (millions) Maturity Weight (g) Catchability
Age class C H S C H S C H S C H S
1 196.555 11597 60816 0 0 0.17 80 11 52 0 0.28 0.27
2 131.041 5123 23884 0.13 0.7 0.93 179 20 84 0.11 0.44 0.49
3 122.411 5519 60692 0.36 0.9 1 511 25 96 0.42 0.66 0.79
4 52.298 5919 19240 0.83 1 1 838 31 105 0.81 0.82 0.85
5 15.187 1713 3179 0.94 1 1 1204 37 111 1 0.97 1
6 3.546 1105 1519 0.96 1 1 1796 43 113 1 0.96 1
7 0.714 830 1510 0.96 1 1 2596 48 111 1 1 1
8 0.383 789 1959 0.98 1 1 4068 53 113 1 1 1
Tab. 4.2: Cod (C), Herring (H), Sprat (S). Parameters used in the
economic-ecologic model. Values for maturity, weight and
catchability are taken from (ICES, 2012) standard assess-
ment, using mean values 2002 to 2006; numbers at age (cor-
rected for spawning time) are taken from (ICES, 2012) for
2006.
Natural mortalities for the herring and sprat age classes are calculated
dependent on the size of the cod stock. Estimates are based on a stochastic
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multi-species model (Lewy and Vinther (2004)) and reported in table 4.3.
Mortality Residual Mortality M1 Predation Mortality (M2)
`no interaction'
Age class C H S C H S C H S
1 0 0.2 0.2 0 0.1702 0.1318 - 3.324 x 10−4 8.740 x 10−4
2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1728 0.1367 - 2.312 x 10−4 7.076 x 10−4
3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1778 0.1318 - 0.448 x 10−4 6.737 x 10−4
4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1878 0.1318 - 0.448 x 10−4 6.737 x 10−4
5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1878 0.1318 - 0.448 x 10−4 6.737 x 10−4
6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1878 0.1318 - 0.448 x 10−4 6.737 x 10−4
7 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1878 0.1318 - 0.448 x 10−4 6.737 x 10−4
8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1878 0.1318 - 0.448 x 10−4 6.737 x 10−4
Tab. 4.3: Cod (C), Herring (H), Sprat (S). Natural mortality es-
timates used in the ecological-economic modeling. Resid-
ual and predation mortality estimates in the multi-species
(interaction) case are based on regression analysis, using
stochastic multi-species (SMS) output on mortality for dif-
ferent stock sizes of cod.
The parameters for the stock-recruitment functions are given in table 4.4.
ψi βi
Cod (Ricker) 1.7 0.00182
Herring (Ricker) 30.33 0.000469
Sprat (Beverton-Holt) 104.2 0.5032
Tab. 4.4: Parameters of the stock-recruitment functions, obtained by
either ﬁtting a model to data from 1974 to 2011 as pro-
vided by ICES (2012) for herring, or functions by Quaas
et al. (2012) for cod and Tahvonen et al. (2013) for sprat.
Functions noted in parentheses.
For cod we use age-speciﬁc European reference prices, which are the lowest
prices at which imports of cod of speciﬁc weight classes, sprat or herring
into the European Union are allowed (European Council, 1999; European
Commission, 2009a), table 4.5.
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Age class 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Price e/kg 0 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.477 0.477 0.636 0.731
Tab. 4.5: Age-speciﬁc European reference prices for cod (European
Council, 1999; European Commission, 2009a).
The cost parameter for cod is cC = 55.2 million e (Quaas et al., 2012).
To estimate prices and cost parameters for sprat, we use price data and
data on variable ﬁshing cost for the Swedish (years 2002 to 2008) and Polish
(years 2005 to 2008) pelagic trawler and seiner ﬂeets from STECF (2011),
which leads to pS = 0.144 ekg for the price and cS = 0.106
e
kg
for the cost
parameter. Similarly, for herring, we use STECF (2011) data for the Danish,
Estonian, Finnish, Polish and Swedish trawl and seiner ﬂeets (years 2002 to
2008), which saves estimates pH = 0.251 ekg for the price and cH = 0.151
e
kg
for the cost parameter. For the representative ﬁsherman's aversion against
inter-annual income ﬂuctuations we assume η = 0.25. The discount rate is
set at 0% and 5%, respectively.
4.2.3 Numerical Optimization
To determine the optimal management, while paying regard to any given
constraints in the management scenarios, we solved the optimization problem
numerically. For this, the dynamic optimization was performed using the
interior-point algorithm of the Knitro (version 8.1) optimization software
with Matlab (R2012b), and AMPL.
4.2.4 Transition Dynamics
The transition path (i.e. short-term eﬀects) towards the long-term man-
agement goal might be crucial for acceptance. Even if the long-term goal
is accepted, the transition dynamics (e.g. ﬁshing restrictions) might con-
front the ﬁsheries with severe problems due to anticipated short-term in-
come losses. In addition to the long-term steady state, we investigate the
short-term (2006 to 2012) transition dynamics under each scenario. Yearly
ﬁshery-speciﬁc and total proﬁts are calculated.
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4.2.5 Regional Distribution of Proﬁts
The distributional eﬀects of the four management scenarios were calcu-
lated by simulating the interacting stock dynamics, associated species-speciﬁc
catch and cost data and ﬁnally country-speciﬁc future proﬁts. Country-
speciﬁc quota allocation followed the relative stability principle. Overall
annual proﬁts were calculated as the sum of proﬁts of all three ﬁsheries. To
illustrate the long-term distributional eﬀect we chose the reference year 2030,
i.e. we chose a year after initial transition dynamics would have stabilized.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Stock Development Scenarios
Historic stock development shows a switch from a system dominated by
cod in the early 1980s to a clupeid-dominated system beginning in the early
1990s (Möllmann et al. (2009) ; ﬁg. 4.1 a). Up to the year 2006 no signs of
a cod recovery could be observed.
In scenario 1, we applied an unconstrained economic optimization of the
multi-species ﬁshery (ﬁg. 4.1 b). This resulted in a fast rebuilding of the cod
stock to ca. 700,000 tons of SSB. The herring stock increases in parallel to
> 1 million tons of SSB, while the sprat stock is reduced to 212,000 tons of
SSB, due to the strong predatory impact of the large cod stock. The level of
sprat SSB is well below the recently deﬁned precautionary biomass limit for
impaired recruitment (570,000 tons; ICES (2013)).
In scenario 2, the precautionary biomass level for sprat (Bpa) was used as
a constraint. Keeping a minimum of 570,000 tons of sprat SSB reduces the
optimal cod SSB to 329,000 tons. Optimal herring stock size reached almost
1.4 million tons (ﬁg. 4.1 c). Optimal ﬁshing mortality is considerably higher
for all three species than in scenario 1 (table 4.6).
Setting a precautionary cod SSB (cod Bpa) of 88,000 tons (ICES, 2013)
as constraint, while otherwise optimizing proﬁts from the clupeid ﬁshery
(scenario 3), increasingly emphasizes the role of herring and sprat (ﬁg. 4.1 d).
The precautionary stock size of cod could be maintained at ﬁshing mortality
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Fig. 4.1: Stock development of Baltic cod, herring and sprat: historic
stock trends and management scenarios (table 4.1). Panel
(b) includes the actual stock development from 2006 to 2011
under the cod management plan (lines with symbols).
as high as F = 0.9; the cod ﬁshery, however, would be unproﬁtable (table
4.6). SSB of herring and sprat peak at 1.5 million tons and 1.2 million
tons, respectively. This illustrates the broad range of strategic management
options, while still accounting for ecological constraints.
The equilibrium stock sizes when simulating the cod management plan
(scenario 4) resemble the solution for the economically optimal solution (ﬁg.
4.1 e). The cod stock increases slightly with corresponding smaller clupeid
stock sizes as a result of intensiﬁed cod predation (table 4.6). The target
ﬁshing mortality under the cod management plan (F = 0.3) is slightly lower
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Scenario 1 2 3 4
Proﬁt
Cod 97.5 (96.3) 43.8 (27) 0 (0) 99.8 (99.8)
Herring 17.7 (17.1) 26.1 (26.9) 32.4 (31.5) 15.7 (15.3)
Sprat 2.6 (2.9) 8.2 (9.6) 15.4 (15) 1.8 (1.8)
Sum 117.8 (116.3) 78.1 (63.5) 47.8 (46.5) 117.3 (116.9)
SSB
Cod 698 (689) 329 (264) 89 (89) 777 (777)
Herring 1146 (878) 1386 (1164) 1540 (1280) 1088 (805)
Sprat 212 (195) 568 (565) 1209 (965) 164 (130)
F
Cod 0.35 (0.36) 0.67 (0.76) 0.9 (0.9) 0.3 (0.3)
Herring 0.18 (0.23) 0.23 (0.29) 0.26 (0.31) 0.17 (0.23)
Sprat 0.45 (0.58) 0.59 (0.74) 0.49 (0.66) 0.4 (0.51)
Tab. 4.6: Projected proﬁts (million e/year), spawning stock biomass
(SSB; '000 tons), and ﬁshing mortality F for the year 2030,
for the four selected long-term management goals (scenarios
1 to 4, table 4.1). Values refer to 0% (5%) interest rate.
than the steady-state ﬁshing mortality under economically optimal manage-
ment (F = 0.35).
The combined proﬁts from all three ﬁsheries are by far the highest if
the cod stock is rebuilt (table 4.6; scenarios 1 and 4). The economically
optimal management is only slightly better in terms of combined proﬁts as
compared to the simulated cod management plan. (The diﬀerence in present
value terms is a bit larger because of the faster transition to the optimal
steady state under optimal management.) According to our model, the cod
ﬁshery would not be proﬁtable (zero proﬁts) in scenario 3, i.e. if the ﬁshing
mortality of cod is not reduced considerably below the 2002 to 2006 level
(F2002−2006 = 0.93). A reduced cod stock would, however, result in higher
proﬁts for the herring and, especially, sprat ﬁshery.
Setting the interest rate to 5% instead of 0% as in our reference case
reduces steady-state biomasses as well as proﬁts by maximal values of 24%
(biomass) and 19% (proﬁts). Fishing mortality is generally slightly higher.
The results are, however, not qualitatively changed.
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4.3.2 Transition Dynamics
According to the economically optimal management (scenario 1), the cod
ﬁshery would have been closed for almost three years (F = 0.04 in third
year). Afterwards a gradual increase to the steady-state value of F = 0.35,
with a concurrent strong increase in proﬁts, would have been allowed (see
ﬁg. 4.2). Cod stock rebuilding under the cod management plan (scenario
4) takes a few years longer, as ﬁshing is kept up at the reduced rate of
F = 0.3. Scenarios 2 and 3 allow for continued cod ﬁshing at moderate
(scenario 2: sprat Bpa) or high levels (scenario 3: cod Bpa). In scenario 3 the
cod ﬁshery stays, however, unproﬁtable. Due to the bad stock status and
the unproﬁtability of the cod ﬁshery in 2006, all scenarios oﬀer monotonically
increasing total proﬁts, even when the cod ﬁshery is closed in the beginning.
Fig. 4.2: Transition dynamics: path of ﬁshery-speciﬁc as well as total
proﬁts (used as a performance indicator) from 2006 to 2012
for the four management scenarios: (1) unconstrained eco-
nomic optimization, (2) optimization for proﬁts of the cod
ﬁshery, while respecting a precautionary sprat SSB (sprat
Bpa) of 570,000 tons, (3) optimization for proﬁts of the sprat
ﬁshery, while respecting a precautionary cod SSB (cod Bpa)
of 88,000 tons, (4) simulation of the cod management plan.
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4.3.3 Regional Distribution of Proﬁts
In 2006, the regional distribution of proﬁts mirrored the country-speciﬁc
catch shares of herring and sprat, as the cod ﬁshery was unproﬁtable, due to
the severely overﬁshed state of the cod stock in that year. The highest proﬁts
were gained in Poland and Sweden (ﬁg. 4.3 a). Under economically optimal
management (scenario 1) all countries would beneﬁt (ﬁg. 4.3 b, Appendix
4.7). However, the amount of increase in beneﬁts is very diﬀerent regionally.
Countries in the East, with a small share of the cod quota, e.g. Finland
and Estonia, only gain little, while countries in the West, e.g. Denmark
and Germany, realize the highest relative increases in proﬁts. Currently
quotas cannot be traded internationally. If such an international quota trade
was introduced, these results would remain the same, as the market value
of quotas corresponds to the (potential) proﬁts that can be gained in the
respective ﬁshery.
The scenarios 2 and 3 respect ecological precautionary points and can
be seen to set the boundaries of feasible management options (ﬁg. 4.3 c,d).
Within these constraints most countries realize the highest proﬁts under the
sprat Bpa scenario (scenario 2); some other countries, however, would beneﬁt
more from a cod Bpa scenario (scenario 3) (i.e. Estonia and Finland). The
diﬀerent management options do not only cause an uneven regional proﬁt in-
crease, but they also imply social consequences within a certain country, as a
re-distribution of proﬁts between the diﬀerent ﬁsheries occurs (Appendix 4.7),
e.g. scenario 1 (economically optimal management) and 4 (cod management
plan) create high total proﬁts, the sprat ﬁshery, however, loses substantially.
4.4 Discussion
We have shown that, in a multi-species set-up, diﬀerent strategic man-
agement goals will result in regionally unequal distribution of future proﬁts.
Rebuilding a large predator (cod) stock will penalize countries holding a
larger share of forage ﬁsh ﬁshing rights. Unconstrained economic optimiza-
tion would lead to a sprat stock size below commonly accepted ecological
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Fig. 4.3: Regional, country-speciﬁc distribution of proﬁts from the
cod (light shading), herring (dark shading) and sprat
(medium shading) ﬁshery; top left: situation at the begin-
ning; remaining panels: distribution of the proﬁts in the
year 2030 according to scenarios. Actual values are given in
Appendix 4.7.
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reference levels. Even when paying regards to precautionary stock size lim-
its, there are many strategic management goals from which to choose. The
inﬂexible system of distribution of catches according to the principle of rel-
ative stability in combination with species interaction might require new
measures of compensation, to secure future acceptance and compliance by
all states  no matter which strategic goal is chosen.
According to the relative stability principle, the Baltic countries hold
ﬁxed shares of cod, herring and sprat quota. Therefore, the absolute catch
amounts may diﬀer between years depending on the stock status, but not
the percentage distribution of TACs to countries. All Baltic countries are
involved in all three ﬁsheries, however, with highly variable distributional
shares to species. Poland holds the largest share of the cod (26.5%) as well
as the sprat quota (29.4%). Sweden owns the largest share of the herring
quota (33.4%). The sum of allowable catches over all three species in 2006
(the start of our simulation) diﬀered between ∼ 164,000 tons (Poland) and ∼
27,000 tons (Lithuania). The composition of each country's catch portfolio
should determine its interest in (or opposition to) the future multi-species
management goals, in particular to change from a clupeid-dominated system
back to a cod-dominated system (Möllmann et al., 2009).
Stock assessment in the Baltic Sea is regularly performed by the Baltic
Fisheries Assessment Working Group. Its work is currently somewhere be-
tween single-species and multi-species assessment, as natural mortality of
the clupeid stocks is calculated depending on the size of the cod stock, but
the group does not explicitly provide multi-species advice (ICES, 2012). In
early 2013, a real multi-species assessment was provided for the ﬁrst time by
the Benchmark Workshop on Baltic Multi-species Assessment (WKBALT)
(ICES, 2013), highlighting the ecological management trade-oﬀ. Species in-
teraction, i.e. cod predation on clupeid species, is generally of high impor-
tance in stock forecast scenarios (Kellner et al., 2011). In such an environ-
ment, single-species projections (e.g. Froese and Proelß (2010)) might be too
optimistic, or even misleading. Even in the multi-species literature, economic
aspects of management, especially regional distribution of proﬁts, are rarely
considered and were not explicitly addressed in the work of WKBALT, as
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they were not part of the terms of reference. As shown here, such economic
considerations might be as critical as ecological constraints, as they will ulti-
mately have inﬂuence on agreements and compliance to future management
decisions.
Stock rebuilding plans can produce trade-oﬀs due to species interactions
(Gröger et al., 2007), which have to be communicated to stakeholders. Stan-
dard management trade-oﬀs include trade-oﬀs between harvest and spawner
abundance (Collie et al., 2012), stock biomass and net ﬁnancial returns (Lit-
tle et al., 2011), or species conservation and size of marine protected areas
(McClanahan, 2011). From a more integrated point of view, trade-oﬀs be-
tween restoration goals might be of interest (North et al., 2010), with the aim
to predict beneﬁts and quantify the associated costs. One of the few existing
studies that take into account the economic impact of species interaction is on
Paciﬁc sardine Sardinops sagax (Chen et al., 2009). Contrary to our study,
Chen et al. (2009) do not use an age-structured framework, and therefore
their results cannot directly be translated to ICES stock assessment. In the
Baltic Sea, management that prioritizes proﬁts will result in relative winners
(cod ﬁshery) but also relative losers (sprat ﬁshery). The system's dynamics
are mainly driven by the cod stock: The range of optimal ﬁshing mortality
F for herring, sprat and cod is relatively narrow between scenarios (herring:
0.17 to 0.26; sprat: 0.4 to 0.59), but for cod optimal F ranges from 0.3 to 0.9
in steady state. In the model, the economically proﬁtable cod stock is rapidly
built up to a SSB of ∼ 700,000 tons. In reality, stock rebuilding is largely
dependent on recruitment success. Under unfavorable environmental condi-
tions stock rebuilding might take longer. A high cod stock causes increased
predation on sprat and herring, thus leaving less scope for improved catches
from the clupeid ﬁsheries. Cod stock recovery in the optimization model is
faster than has been observed in reality after adoption of the management
plan, i.e. from 2006 to 2011. This is due to a sharp reduction in catches
from the cod ﬁshery for three years in the economically optimal solution,
which was not conducted in reality. Instead, the management plan aims at
smoothing variations by including maximum year-to-year variations of 15%
(European Council, 2007). The steady state biomass of cod is lower in the
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economically optimal solution than in the simulation of the cod management
plan. Accordingly, a consequent realization of the long-term management
plan for cod might lead to sprat stock sizes falling below ecological reference
points, and might therefore need to be revised under a multi-species- or even
ecosystem-based (Pikitch et al., 2004) management.
Our model framework has room for improvements, in particular regard-
ing environmental inﬂuences on recruitment (Köster et al., 2009), density-
dependent growth (Casini et al., 2011; Gårdmark et al., 2013) and processes
accounting for changes in the spatio-temporal overlap of cod and sprat (Eero
et al., 2012). Nevertheless, we are conﬁdent in the range of simulated out-
comes. Although future developments will most certainly increase the quan-
titative precision of simulations, the qualitative implications for management
will likely remain robust. The Baltic Sea represents a suitable case study for
demonstrating the principles of trade-oﬀ evaluation in multi-species ﬁsheries.
We are conﬁdent that our approach is readily transferable to more complex
systems, since reliable coupled ecological-economic models are increasingly
becoming available.
Including ecosystem considerations other than commercially exploited
species and quantifying the potential economic impacts might require valuing
of e.g. endangered species (Wallmo and Lew, 2011). Taking all ecosystem
and economic feedbacks into account, might also reveal unforeseen trade-oﬀs
and externalities, like in the case of French Guiana, where the (economically
sub-optimal) oversized trawl ﬁshery for shrimps positively impacts the en-
dangered Frigate birds Fregata spp. (Martinet and Blanchard, 2009). In the
case of the Baltic Sea, we envisage a broadening of the scope to future work
to an ecosystem level. This can be achieved by coupling to ecosystem mod-
els, in the sense of ensemble modeling as recently advocated by the Working
Group on Integrated Assessments in the Baltic (Gårdmark et al., 2013).
Successful management in the future will require stakeholders to explicitly
deﬁne commonly accepted ﬁshery objectives against which trade-oﬀs can be
evaluated (Pilling et al., 2008). If quotas for the three species are not equally
distributed among countries (like in the Baltic), new compensation schemes
may be required to ﬁnd international agreements  ultimately the principle
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of relative stability might need to be abandoned. Additional pressure to
revise the relative stability principle might also arise from the interaction
of economic dynamics of ﬁshing ﬂeets and the European Community's le-
gal framework, e.g. the right of establishment or free movement of workers
(Morin, 2000).
When performing model runs over periods of decades, it might become
important to include climate change aspects, as reproductive success of all
species has been shown to strongly depend on environmental conditions (cod:
Köster et al. (2005), herring: Cardinale et al. (2009), sprat: Voss et al.
(2006)). Our model framework oﬀers the possibility to simulate climate
change scenarios for the most important environmental factors, and signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent results may be obtained when comparing climate change to
non-climate change scenarios (Voss et al., 2011). Besides the modeling of
biological interaction and variability in physical forcing factors, assumptions
on economic variables like cost functions, interest rates and prize elastic-
ity also have a strong impact on the results (Voss et al., 2011; Tahvonen
et al., 2013). Therefore, our data emphasize the need to proceed to inter-
disciplinary multi-species management.
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4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 Country- and Fishery-speciﬁc Proﬁts
Tab. 4.7: Country- and ﬁshery speciﬁc proﬁts (million e/year) in the
year 2006 (base year) as well as in year 2030 for the four
selected long term management goals. Values refer to 0%
interest rate. FI = Finland, SE = Sweden, DK = Den-
mark, GER = Germany, PL = Poland, EE = Estonia, LT
= Latvia, LI = Lithuania.
Scenario FI SE DK GER PL EE LT LI
2006
Cod 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Herring 2.9 4.4 0.3 0.1 3.3 1.5 0.4 0.4
Sprat 0.8 2.8 1.5 0.9 4.3 1.7 2 0.7
Total 3.7 7.2 1.7 1 7.6 3.2 2.4 1.1
1
Cod 1.7 22.7 22.4 8.9 25.8 2.2 8.3 5.5
Herring 3.9 5.9 0.4 0.1 4.4 2 0.5 0.5
Sprat 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.1
Total 5.7 29.1 23 9.2 31 4.5 9.2 6.1
Change 1.5 4 13.5 9.2 4.1 1.4 3.8 5.6
2
Cod 0.8 10.2 10.1 4 11.6 1 3.7 2.5
Herring 5.7 8.7 0.6 0.2 6.5 2.9 0.7 0.8
Sprat 0.4 1.6 0.8 0.5 2.4 0.9 1.1 0.4
Total 6.9 20.5 11.4 4.7 20.5 4.9 5.6 3.6
Change 1.9 2.8 6.7 4.7 2.7 1.5 2.3 3.3
3
Cod 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Herring 7.1 10.8 0.7 0.2 8.1 3.6 0.9 0.9
Sprat 0.8 2.9 1.5 1 4.5 1.8 2.1 0.8
Total 7.9 13.8 2.2 1.1 12.6 5.4 3 1.7
Change 2.1 1.9 1.3 1.1 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.5
4
Cod 1.7 23.2 22.9 9.1 26.4 2.2 8.5 5.6
Herring 3.4 5.3 0.3 0.1 3.9 1.8 0.4 0.5
Sprat 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.1
Total 5.3 28.8 23.5 9.3 30.9 4.2 9.2 6.2
Change 1.4 4 13.8 9.3 4.1 1.3 3.8 5.6
93
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Abstract.
Total allowable catches are distributed between countries according to
the principle of relative stability. Each country then allocates quotas to its
vessels. The trade of these quotas between vessels of diﬀerent countries is
currently not allowed. However, if ﬂeet segments of one country are more
eﬃcient than ﬂeet segments of other countries due to location advantages or
better ﬂeet management it could be beneﬁcial to allow the transfer of quo-
tas on vessel level. This paper examines whether international quota trade
between vessels could improve the overall eﬃciency of a ﬂeet. The distance
function approach is used to derive an equation to estimate the eﬃciencies
of diﬀerent segments of the Baltic demersal trawlers and seiners ﬂeet. The
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analysis reveals signiﬁcant asymmetries in the eﬃciencies of ﬂeet segments
between countries. The asymmetry is bigger for small vessels because they
are not as mobile and depend heavily on the circumstances surrounding them
including the ﬁshing ground quality. Bigger vessels are more mobile and tend
to concentrate their ﬁshing activity in similar areas (most productive ﬁsh-
ing grounds). Therefore, diﬀerences in eﬃciencies do not mainly result from
the choice of ﬁshing ground but rather from diﬀerences in the national ﬂeet
management and the current state of the ﬂeet segment. The asymmetries
in eﬃciencies combined with evaluated location advantages set incentives for
international quota trade. The introduction of such a system could improve
overall eﬃciency of the Baltic ﬂeet.
Keywords: Baltic Cod (Gadhus morhua); Baltic Sea; European Union ﬁsh-
ing ﬂeets; input-eﬃciency
JEL-Classiﬁcation: Q22
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5.1 Introduction
The concept of the European Union is an integrated Europe with com-
mon laws and regulations. This is in particular applicable to common pool
resources such as ﬁsheries. In case of ﬁsh stocks which inhabit and migrate
between Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of multiple countries, common
regulations allow management based on cooperative decisions instead of a
regular `race-to-ﬁsh' situation. In this way, more eﬀective management safe-
guarding the stocks' good biological state can be implemented. However,
there are downsides of common regulations giving equal rights to all coun-
tries using the common pool resource. This is due to asymmetries between
the countries that translate into direct advantages in resource extraction that
cannot be utilized. These include development and restructuring of the ﬂeets
over past years resulting in current states that vary, and spatial relation to
the most productive ﬁshing grounds.
The paper compares the eﬃciency of major Baltic Sea demersal trawling
ﬂeet segments of Denmark, Germany, Poland and Sweden. The focus of this
article is on the Eastern (ICES zones IIID: 25 to 32) and Western (ICES
zones IIID: 22 to 24) Baltic cod stocks, shared by all aforementioned coun-
tries.5 It is preliminary research regarding the potential ﬂow of individual
cod quotas between countries in case the quota market would be open for
free trade. Currently international trade is only available at the national level
and contributes to the ﬁnal Total Allowable Catch (TAC) amount. The na-
tional TAC is then distributed between individual vessels according to local
regulations, in case of cod mostly in form of individual quotas.
Each vessel given a Baltic cod quota is permitted to harvest it with no
restrictions regarding location, in particular it is allowed to ﬁsh in all Baltic
Sea EEZs (except the 12 nautical miles coastal zone, unless otherwise indi-
vidually agreed).6 Thus, the best ﬁshing grounds are shared by all member
countries with limits only with respect to landings amount. In such a sit-
5 However, as the sector is characterized by multi-product production, it is accounted
for the harvest of other species.
6 With the exception of certain grounds during the spawning season, applicable to all
Baltic Sea ﬂeets.
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uation, the harvest of a given quota is conducted mostly in the same areas
as long as it is found proﬁtable.7,8 However, each vessel is harvesting the
quota with its own individual eﬃciency that is expected to vary between
vessels. Those asymmetries could contribute to increased eﬃciency in the
case of more ﬂexibility in quota ﬂow.9 The eﬃciency depends also on the de-
cision regarding location choice implying speciﬁc distance from the country
of origin. Thus, it is expected that some countries may enjoy the advantage
of being situated closer to the most productive ﬁshing ground and beneﬁt
from this fact when considering the trade-oﬀ between better catch per unit of
eﬀort and the distance to the speciﬁc area. This research is a starting point
for eﬃciency comparison and looks into diﬀerences between aggregated ﬂeet
segments. Proven diﬀerences between segments indicate signiﬁcant asymme-
tries and imply that detailed analysis on individual vessel level would result
in the possibility to derive an optimal allocation of quotas in the region.
The paper is structured as follows. The introduction is followed by the
presentation of the case where the current situation of the Baltic cod de-
mersal trawler ﬂeets is explained in the context of restructuring processes
and regulations in place. The section also explains the importance of cod in
the region giving arguments for validity of this study. The article proceeds
with the methodology used to evaluate the asymmetries between investi-
gated ﬂeets, presents data and reveals the results. The model outputs are
evaluated from three diﬀerent perspectives, that is as a comparison of on-site
eﬃciency, eﬃciency changes over time and eﬃciency in context of distance to
the ﬁshing grounds. The article concludes with remarks regarding diﬀerences
in eﬃciency of harvesting cod in the Baltic Sea by the major ﬂeets involved
in this ﬁshery and possible reasons behind it.
7 Small vessels have less mobility and smaller ﬁshing grounds range. Thus, they often
stay in the closer proximity of the home ports.
8 This includes subsidies.
9 Increased eﬃciency within the same gear and length category is expected to be directly
translating into lower fuel use implying lower environmental impact and potentially lower
costs. However, the possibility to lower the costs highly depends on cost diﬀerences. The
cost eﬃciency is a closely related topic that is possible to evaluate with techniques similar
to those presented later in this paper. However due to data limitations, the topic is not
further investigated.
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5.2 The Case Background
5.2.1 The Importance of the Baltic Cod
The Baltic cod (Gadus morhua) is an important species in the Baltic Sea:
it plays an essential ecological role in the ecosystem and it is the commercially
most valuable ﬁsh species in the Baltic Sea (ICES 2013). Thus, the cod stock
variations impact both humans through the productivity of the stock utilized
by commercial and recreational ﬁshing, and environment through overall ﬁsh
productivity and food web dynamics.
In the Baltic Sea, cod has traditionally been divided into two stocks: the
Eastern stock east of Bornholm island and the Western stock from west of
Bornholm to the Sound and Danish Belts (Bagge et al., 1994). The East-
ern and Western stocks diﬀer in morphometric characteristics and genetics
(Bagge et al., 1994; Hüssy et al., 1997; Nielsen et al., 2003). Thus, they
are assessed and managed separately. The Eastern stock is larger in size and
distribution, and contributes more to the total EU harvest (ICES 2013). The
two stocks overlap near Bornholm where some mixing occurs (ICES 2013).
The spawning grounds, where cod migrates after maturation, are located in
the deeper basins of the Baltic Sea (Köster et al., 2001).
Due to its semi-enclosed nature, the Baltic Sea ecosystem is heavily in-
ﬂuenced by environmental conditions. Variations in temperature, salinity,
oxygen and nutrient levels make the Baltic Sea ﬁsheries management dif-
ﬁcult as sustainable exploitation levels vary in response to environmental
conditions (FAO, 2011). Particularly cod has been aﬀected by ecological
stress.
The Eastern cod stock has adapted to the low salinity of the sea by
producing eggs that are buoyant at the halocline and therefore its repro-
ductive success depends on environmental variables, namely suitable hydro-
graphic conditions in the spawning areas (Wieland et al., 1994; Nissling and
Westin, 1997; MacKenzie et al., 2000; Köster et al., 2005). Salinity and oxy-
gen concentration in the Baltic Sea are ﬂuctuating with irregular salt- and
oxygen-rich water inﬂows from the North Sea (Matthäus and Franck, 1992).
Anoxic conditions and low salinity adversely aﬀect fertilization and cause se-
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vere mortality to the cod eggs in the deep-water layers (Wieland et al., 1994;
MacKenzie et al., 2000). Unfavorable hydrographic conditions also decrease
the ﬁnal survival rate by prey limitation for the larvae and juvenile stages
(Hüssy et al., 1997; Hinrichsen et al., 2002; Köster et al., 2005), enhanced
cannibalism (Sparholt, 1994; Neuenfeldt and Köster, 2000) and vertical over-
lap between the eggs and clupeids (herring and sprat), the main predators
(Köster and Möllmann, 2000; Köster et al., 2005).
Changes in recruitment conditions together with anthropogenic factors
have caused the Eastern cod stock to ﬂuctuate signiﬁcantly over the past
decades (ﬁg. 5.1). The cod stock increased to outstanding levels in the late
1970s when the ﬁshing pressure was relatively low and hydrological condi-
tions advantageous for reproduction (ICES, 2013; Eero et al., 2011). The
stock reached its peak in the 1980s (ICES, 2013; Eero et al., 2011), which
was attributed to the high frequency of inﬂows from the North Sea result-
ing in good recruitment years. The rapid decline of the population began
in the mid 1980s. The salinity and oxygen conditions for recruitment de-
teriorated and ﬁshing eﬀort remained high, partly due to improvements in
harvest technology (ICES, 2013; MacKenzie et al., 2002; Eero et al., 2011).
Degraded environmental conditions made the cod stock more vulnerable to
ﬁshing, and vice versa (Köster et al., 2005). The decline continued and the
stock decreased to extremely low levels in the beginning of the 1990s. The
major reasons were continuing ﬁshing pressure, lack of major inﬂows from
the North Sea, eutrophication (hypoxia) and increasing seal predation (ICES,
2013; Eero et al., 2011). A major water inﬂow in 2003 substantially inﬂu-
enced the volume of water suitable for cod recruitment, resulting in a slight
increase in stock size since 2005 (ICES, 2013). However, the recent cod stock
trend is still under study.
The Western cod stock ﬂuctuations (ﬁg. 5.1), reported by (ICES, 2013),
show similarities with the Eastern stock. The Western stock was at high
levels in the early 1980s from when it started to decline to the lowest recorded
levels in early 1990s. Only the mid 1990s brought slight improvement and
partial recovery. The high ﬁshing eﬀort has been in decline from year 2000,
and recently recorded levels are below targets set by the management plan.
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Although the Western stock biomass has been increasing since the early
2000s, the recruitment has been close to the lowest recorded levels, with no
noticeable ﬂuctuations in recruitment success. The recent abundance of the
adult Western stock is likely caused by spill-over eﬀects from the Eastern
stock which is expanding its distribution.
Fig. 5.1: Fluctuation of Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) of the Baltic
cod: Eastern Stock (1966 to 2013) and Western Stock (197
to 2013) (ICES, 2013).
Cod has an important ecological role as a top predator balancing the food
web (Casini et al., 2008), and thus maintaining the ecosystem functionality.
The Baltic food web is relatively simple and the ﬁsh community is domi-
nated by three species: cod, sprat and herring. During the last decades,
major ﬂuctuations in the cod abundance have been part of the large-scale
Baltic Sea ecosystem changes related to climate, ﬁsheries and eutrophication
(Österblom et al., 2007; Casini et al., 2008; Möllmann et al., 2009). The ma-
jor period of ecological stress and anthropogenic impacts such as overﬁshing
of cod (1987 to 1993) pushed the biotic part of the central Baltic Sea into an
altered state of reduced cod productivity. This, in turn, impacted the whole
ecosystem due to the role of cod as the main predator of sprat and herring
(Österblom et al., 2007; Casini et al., 2008; Möllmann et al., 2009). As the
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cod stock decreased, sprat stocks increased its abundance due to reduced
predation supported by favorable environmental conditions at the time; a
shift from a cod-dominated to a sprat-dominated regime took place. Then,
the predator-prey feedback loop stabilized the system, as a high sprat stock
formed an increased predation pressure on cod eggs and juveniles (Möllmann
and Köster, 1999; Köster and Möllmann, 2000; Österblom et al., 2007). A
trophic cascade took place as the shift from cod to clupeids occurred in com-
bination with climate-driven changes in zooplankton composition and altered
regulation of phytoplankton (Möllmann and Köster, 1999; Österblom et al.,
2007; Casini et al., 2008). Changes in zooplankton composition inﬂuenced
prey availability for both cod and sprat, and promoted algal blooms on the
Baltic Sea (Möllmann and Köster, 1999; Österblom et al., 2007; Casini et al.,
2008). Economically, the shift from a cod-dominated to a clupeid-dominated
state in the late 1980s decreased the value of the catch due to the relative
composition of the ﬁsh species. It has been estimated that increasing the cod
stock and reducing sprat abundance would be economically more proﬁtable
than the clupeid-dominated state (Döring and Egelkraut, 2008; Nieminen
et al., 2012; Waldo et al., 2013). The future major threats to cod stock sus-
tainability and reproduction potential include pollution and climate change
(MacKenzie et al., 2007; Niiranen et al., 2013; Lindegren et al., 2010).
The Western stock is mainly ﬁshed by Denmark, Germany and Sweden,
whereas the Eastern stock is ﬁshed by Denmark, Sweden and Poland (ICES,
2013). The proﬁtability depends on the gear segment, as well as the vulner-
ability to the condition of the main target species (Blenckner et al., 2011).
The secondary economic and social impacts include employment, retail, jobs
and income at the dockyards, and work for local craftsmen (Blenckner et al.,
2011). In many Baltic countries, ﬁshermen have long ﬁshing traditions and
few job alternatives, so management actions are constructed to avoid the loss
of jobs (Blenckner et al., 2011).
The latest Annual Economic Report of the EU Fishing Fleet reports the
2012 value of landings generated by the EU Baltic Sea ﬂeet in the amount
of approximately 237 million e, of which Poland (56 million e), Sweden (51
million e), and Denmark (43 million e) collectively accounted for around
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60%.10 Cod generated the highest value of landings (77 million e) followed
by herring (63 million e) and sprat (45 million e), although the total volume
of cod accounted for only 62,000 tons (compared to 220,000 tons of herring
and 177,000 tons of sprat). The total volume landed in 2012 was 510,000
tons (2% decrease from 2011) (STECF, 2013).
The above-described complex links between diﬀerent parts of the ecosys-
tem show the value of cod to the Baltic Sea. It is an economically valuable
ﬁsh and it contributes to the Baltic Sea ecosystem functioning. Cod forms
a link between the social and ecological systems of the Baltic region both
through ecosystem services and anthropogenic stressors.
5.2.2 European Fisheries Management of the Baltic Cod
In order to coordinate the interests of countries participating in the Baltic
ﬁsheries the International Baltic Sea Fisheries Commission (IBSFC) was es-
tablished in 1973 as a result of the Gdansk Convention on Fishing and Con-
servation of the Living Resources in the Baltic Sea and the Belts in 1973
(Gdansk Convention, 1973). The signing countries were Denmark, Germany,
Sweden, Finland, Poland and Russia, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia as part
of the USSR. The IBSFC was dissolved in 2005 when all countries except
Russia had successively joined the European Union. From then on the man-
agement of the Baltic ﬁshery has fallen under the Common Fisheries Policy
(CFP) of the European Union for all member states. In 2006 the European
Union called for a bilateral agreement concerning ﬁshing activities with Rus-
sia (European Commission, 2006) which came into force in 2009 (European
Council, 2009). Prior to this, there have been bilateral agreements between
Russia and the individual member states (Churchill and Owen, 2010).
By the equal access principle deﬁned in 1970 (European Economic Union
(1970), modiﬁed in European Council (2002)) all European Union member
states have the same right to ﬁsh in all Community waters, including all
shared EEZs, except for the 12nm zone. Those terms are then manifested
in bilateral agreements between member countries. In this setting all Baltic
10 Estonia is excluded from the analysis due to failed performance data for 2011. Total
landings weight excludes the German pelagic trawler segment.
102
countries are able to choose the most proﬁtable ﬁshing grounds. Fig. 5.2
shows that for the Baltic cod stock these ﬁshing grounds are located in the
South of the Baltic leading to a high concentration of ﬁshing activity in that
area (maps for the demersal trawlers and seiners sector; 8m to 40m length,
averages over 2004 to 2012).
(a) Denmark (b) Germany
(c) Poland (d) Sweden
Fig. 5.2: Distribution of cod harvest by demersal trawlers and seiners
sector (8m to 40m length) from Denmark, Germany, Poland,
and Sweden (averages from 2004 to 2012).
The IBSFC and the CFP base their management decisions on the scien-
tiﬁc input of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)
and the Scientiﬁc, Technical and Economic Council of Fisheries (STECF) of
the European Union. Since 2006, stakeholders are actively involved in the
decision-making by the Regional Advisory Council for the Baltic Sea (Euro-
pean Council, 2004). In order to take the interests of individual states more
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into account, the CFP encourages the cooperation of member countries with
respect to ﬁsheries management on a regional level (European Union, 2013).
The main instrument in ﬁsheries management used by the IBSFC and
the CFP is the TAC, which deﬁnes the amount of ﬁsh that is allowed to be
caught from a speciﬁc stock in a year. TACs are usually set on an annual
basis. The allocation of TACs between countries is based on the principle
of relative stability which states that each country receives a ﬁxed share of
the TAC (European Council, 2002; Churchill and Owen, 2010). For deﬁning
those shares three criteria are taken into account: (i) historical catch records,
(ii) speciﬁc needs of areas particularly dependent on ﬁshing and its dependent
industries (Resolutions of The Hague) and (iii) the loss of ﬁshing potential in
the waters of third countries (European Council, 1983, 2002; Churchill and
Owen, 2010).11 The TACs can be exchanged between member states (EC
2371/2002), but only on national level. Since 1976 the ICES has given rec-
ommendations for Baltic cod TACs. These have been exceeded regularly by
the TACs set by the IBSFC (Radtke, 2003). From 1982 to 1988 the IBSFC
was even unable to set any TACs such that in this period the conditions
resembled an open access ﬁshery (Kronbak, 2005).12 From 1989 on, catches
exceeded TACs to a lesser extent. However, substantial illegal, unregulated
and unreported (IUU) ﬁshing was a problem in the Baltic cod ﬁshery un-
til 2007 (OCEANA, 2012). From 1993 to 1996 and from 2000 to 2007, the
level of unreported landings has been between 35% and 40% (ICES, 2013).
Poland was to a large extent responsible for that fact which led to a penalty
by the European Union for the Polish cod ﬁshery (ORCA-EU, 2009). As a
consequence, the eﬀort in monitoring and controlling has been increased. In
recent years the level of misreporting has decreased to 6% to 7%. However,
the problem of IUU remains (OCEANA, 2012). Since 2004 there is a sep-
arate assessment including separate TACs for the Eastern and the Western
cod stock (ICES, 2013). Additional management instruments are technical
speciﬁcations regarding eﬀort and gear regulations (i.e. mesh size, minimum
11 With (i) and (ii) being in particular relevant for the Baltic Sea.
12 Some technical measures were present, e.g. regulations regarding mesh size, minimum
landing size, closed season.
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landing size, type of nets, size of vessel, days at sea) (Churchill and Owen,
2010). Such speciﬁcations for the ﬁsheries in the Baltic Sea are given in EC
Regulation 2187/2005 (European Council, 2005).
As a reaction to the poor state of the Baltic cod stock in the beginning
of the 1990s the IBSFC put a lot of eﬀort into the recovery of the stocks in
addition to the TAC management. A new tool was the seasonal ﬁshing ban
from June to August introduced in 1995 (European Council, 1994) which
has been modiﬁed to a minimum duration of two months in 2007 (Kraus
et al., 2009). In 1997 a marine protected area (MPA) to protect spawning
ﬁsh stocks has been implemented east of Bornholm (Suuronen et al., 2010).
This MPA has been increased several times and now covers most of Born-
holm Deep. On top of this, in 2005 MPAs in the Gdansk Deep and in the
Gotland Basin were implemented. There have also been a number of long
term initiatives to support the recovery of the cod stock. In 1999 the IBSFC
implemented a long-term strategy for the Eastern and the Western cod stocks
in the Baltic Sea which had the aims to maintain a minimum spawning stock
biomass (SSB) (greater than 160,000 tons for the Eastern and greater than
9,000 tons for the Western stock) and to implement a long-term manage-
ment plan with TACs reﬂecting a precautionary ﬁshing mortality rate (Aps
and Lassen, 2010). In 2001, a Recovery Plan for the Eastern Baltic cod was
adopted, calling for a management that would reduce the ﬁshing mortality
rate. This plan also included area closures and seasonal ﬁshing bans. How-
ever, the success of these initiatives was limited because of too high TACs,
lacking control and unwillingness of the IBSFC members (Aps and Lassen,
2010). Since 2005 each vessel greater than 8m ﬁshing for cod has had to
hold a special ﬁshing permit for cod (European Council, 2005). The cod
permit is given if the vessel has been active in cod ﬁshing the previous year
and new vessels can only get a cod permit if another vessel with the same
capacity is going to be inactive in exchange. In addition, special permits are
necessary for ﬁshing in the Gulf of Riga (European Council, 2005). In 2007
the European Union implemented a multi-annual recovery plan for both cod
stocks (European Council, 2007). The goals of this plan are the recovery of
the stocks (in terms of biomass) and a reduction of the ﬁshing mortality rate
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by the implementation of a sustainable ﬁshery based on maximum sustain-
able yield (MSY) criteria (target ﬁshing mortality rate is 0.6 and 0.3 for the
Western and the Eastern Baltic cod stock respectively; European Council
(2007)). The instruments used are limited variation of the TAC (maximum
15% deviation from the previous year's TAC) and a 10% reduction in days at
seas as long as the ﬁshing mortality rate is above the target value. Further
limitations are the prohibition of drift-nets in the cod ﬁshery and exclusion
of vessels below 8m. The plan also includes the temporary closure of ﬁshing
areas (mainly Bornholm deep) and seasonal bans (West of Bornholm 1st to
30th April, East of Bornholm 1st to 31st August). Currently both Baltic cod
stocks are managed according to these plans and they are considered to be
quite successful (Bastardie et al., 2010).
The guidelines regarding ﬁsheries of the IBSFC and the CFP respectively
apply to all member countries in the same way. However, there are some dif-
ferences in the national allocation mechanisms of TACs. The main approach
of the member states is an individual quota (IQ) system (Blenckner et al.,
2011) where a governmental institution allocates shares of the TAC (quota)
to either ﬁshermen or vessels. In the following section the focus is on the
national ﬁsheries management of the major trawling ﬂeets for the Baltic cod,
including Denmark, Germany, Poland and Sweden (ICES, 2013).
5.2.3 National Management of the Baltic Cod
Denmark introduced a vessel quota share (VQS) system for demersal
species, including cod, in 2007. The system allows trading of quotas on
national markets. VQS are given and bound to vessels with more than 30,000
e gross earnings per year. The actual quota share is based on the landings of
the reference period 2003 to 2005. Initially, the VQS could only be transferred
with the vessel, but that regulation was abolished in 2009 (Andersen, 2012).
VQS vessels can join the coastal ﬂeet if they are less than 17m and at least
80% of their ﬁshing trips are less than three days long (Andersen et al., 2010).
Then, they have to stay in the coastal ﬂeet for at least three years (Bonzon
et al., 2013). Coastal vessels can buy quota from vessels larger than 17m
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but not the other way round. Small-scale ﬁsheries vessels (less than 30,000
e gross earning per year) are managed by a ration system with a ﬁxed share
of the national quota of 10% (Bonzon et al., 2010). In so called ﬁsh pools
(voluntary cooperatives) ﬁshermen can swap and lease VQS between vessels.
Inactive vessels can lease their shares within these pools for the current year
(Andersen, 2012). Highgrading is not allowed. The Danish system allows
ﬂeet adaptation by VQS transfers even on a daily basis.
Germany, Poland and Sweden use an individual vessel quota (IVQ) sys-
tem where the quotas are non-tradable. In Sweden IVQs are given to vessels
greater than 8m holding a special permit to ﬁsh for cod (Swedish Agency
for Marine and Water Management, personal communication with Hannes
Rasper). The cod permit is given to ﬁshermen who have been active in cod
ﬁshery during 2005 to 2007. The cod permit allows for ﬁshing in ICES zones
22 to 24 (25 to 28) for 147 (146) days and maximum 147 days in ICES zones
22 to 28. The quota share depends on the length and gross tonnage of the
ﬁshing vessel. However, currently the quota shares for Swedish vessels are
unlimited, because it is not anticipated that the national TAC is going to be
fully ﬁshed.
In Germany IVQs are allocated to the vessel owner. A license for ﬁshing is
only given to vessels that were active already in the ﬁshing season 1986/1987
(German Federal Ministry of Justice, 1984). IVQs are allocated based on
previous year's quota. In addition, the relevant vessel has to be active for
the past three years; otherwise it is not entitled to its IVQs (German Federal
Ministry of Justice, 2014). For the Baltic cod stock, individual licenses assign
a speciﬁc amount of ﬁsh to each participating vessel depending on its historic
catch.
In Poland the quota allocation between vessels with cod harvest permit
(as in 2005) is based on vessel length (Polish Ministry of Agriculture and
Rural Development, 2008). Until 2008, IVQs were given to vessels greater
or equal to 10m, whereas units between 8m and 10m were subject to block
quota. Vessels below 8m, according to special European Union exemption,
were allowed unlimited harvest (Polish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development, 2008). Starting with 2009, the group of vessels between 8m
107
and 10m joined the IVQ regulated ﬂeet, whereas units below 8m became sub-
ject to block quotas (Polish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development,
2011). The IVQs are not transferable. Additionally, from 2009 to 2011 the
Polish ﬂeet was subject to a temporarily imposed regulation allowing only
about one third of the vessels with cod harvest permits to receive quotas.
The special three year management plan was a result of overﬁshing the TAC
in 2007, which resulted in this penalty imposed by the European Union.
Each year's group of vessels was selected according to the lottery with the
possibility to win only once (Polish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Devel-
opment, 2008). In order to reduce the overcapacity in the Baltic ﬂeet, a new
ﬂeet policy was introduced after the reform of the CFP in 2002 (European
Council, 2002). This issue is examined in more detail in the following section.
5.2.4 Overcapitalization Tendencies and Reasons Behind
The past regulations regarding Baltic cod resulted in increasing capacity.
Fleet capacity consists of the number, size and type of the vessel and gear,
technical eﬃciency of the vessel for ﬁnding, handling and storing the ﬁsh on-
board, the potential ﬁshing time of each vessel, which is dependent on the
distance to the ﬁshing grounds, and the ﬁshers' ability to catch ﬁsh (Smith
and Hanna, 1990). The ﬂeet becomes overcapitalized if the number of vessels
or capacity in a ﬂeet exceeds the use potential of the ﬁsh stock (Blenckner
et al., 2011). Overcapacity does not only have an adverse impact on the
ﬁsh stocks but it also aﬀects negatively the economic outcome of ﬁshermen,
thus it is important to balance the ﬁshing eﬀort and the existing resource in
order for the ﬁshery to be economically and biologically sustainable in the
long-term.
In the Baltic cod ﬁshery the main reason for the overcapitalization is the
past management system that gave ﬁshermen incentives to invest in larger
vessels and new technologies. The European Union introduced subsidies in
the 1970s in order to help the economic situation of the ﬁshing companies
and to keep ﬁsh prices at a consumer-friendly level (Kirkley and Squires,
1999; Blenckner et al., 2011). Subsidies reduce the costs of ﬁshing and there-
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fore encourage investments that would not occur without subsidies (Arnason
et al., 2009). Once the ﬂeets were highly capitalized, TACs were intentionally
set higher than the scientiﬁc recommendation due to the political pressure
by ﬁshing industries that were troubled by overcapacity (Aps and Lassen,
2010). The decision-makers wanted to guarantee the social and economic
welfare and keep the ﬁshermen employed, but the management was driven
by short-term perspective with conventional discounting which practically
ignored the longer-run conservation goals (Edwards et al., 2004; Sumaila and
Walters, 2005; Aps and Lassen, 2010). The decision-makers believed the
socio-economic beneﬁts were so high compared to the risk of negative eﬀects
on stocks that they justiﬁed exceeding the quotas (Aps et al., 2007). On top
of this, due to technological progress, even stricter capacity reductions were
needed to ensure sustainable harvest (European Commission, 2008).
Since the revision of the CFP in 2002 the member states are responsible
for keeping a balance between their ﬁshing capacity and the existing ﬁsh
stocks. This continues in the most recent revision of the CFP that came into
force in 2014. The members are obligated to keep their capacity (both in ton-
nage and power) under the ﬁxed maximum levels, whereas failing to achieve
the targeted reduction may result in suspension of the ﬁnancial support from
the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund.13 The latest analysis shows
that all member states achieved the initial goal with the help of the long-
term management plan introduced in 2007 by the European Union, which
included eﬀort limitations in addition to quotas. Failing to achieve the bal-
ance requires construction of an additional action plan including adjustment
targets and tools for retrieving the balance (European Commission, 2014).
The most commonly used tool for capacity reduction has been vessel scrap-
ping ﬁnanced by the European Fisheries Fund.14 Between 2007 to 2013 the
fund allocated 1.3 billion e for permanent or temporary cessation in order
to reduce the ﬁshing capacity in European waters (European Commission,
2013). Danish ﬁshing ﬂeet was reduced between 2000 and 2009 by 12% with
13 This is the fund for the European Union's maritime and ﬁsheries policies from 2014
to 2020 (European Union, 2014).
14 This has been the fund for the European Union's ﬁsheries policies from 2007 to 2013
(European Council, 2006).
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the use of scrapping programs. Additional 24% reduction was attributed
to the ITQ system applied in 2007. Reduction programs between 2004 and
2008 succeeded in decreasing the Polish ﬁshery by 45% in tonnage. Swe-
den implemented two national scrapping campaigns in 2008 and 2009 aimed
at demersal cod trawlers, which contributed to a 26% reduction in tonnage
(European Commission, 2013). Germany's ﬂeet has been reduced in number
due to the European Union scrapping program by 33% between 1995 and
2010 (European Commission, 2013). However, a major problem has been
encountered throughout the adopted programs, e.g. a lack of clear rules re-
garding what happens to the ﬁshing rights after the scrapping. Overall, some
progress towards increasing balance between the ﬁshing capacity and the ﬁsh
stocks can be noticed (European Commission, 2014). The regulations aiming
at harvest control and capacity reduction had an important inﬂuence on the
transitions of the ﬂeet targeting cod over past years, including the major cod
ﬂeet, namely the demersal trawlers and seiners.
5.2.5 Demersal Trawlers and Seiners Sector
The demersal trawlers and seiners sector (DTS) accounts for the majority
of the cod catches in the four Baltic Sea national ﬂeets assessed in this study
(table 5.1). Additionally, there has been a growing trend over the years
strengthening its importance in the region.
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Denmark 62.0 65.8 67.3 67.3 69.2
Germany 83.8 91.2 88.5 89.3 89.3
Poland 51.9 49.2 51.7 64.8 64.5
Sweden 60.7 67.1 76.3 79.7 80.9
Tab. 5.1: Demersal trawlers' and seiners' share of the live weight of
the total national cod catches (%) (STECF, 2013).
The DTS sector accounted for the majority of the income in the Baltic Sea
region in 2011 (101 million e), and the sector's economic performance in the
longer vessel groups (12m to 18m, 18m to 24m, and 24m to 40m) have been
110
improving. However, the smaller vessels are still facing problems to generate
economically positive returns in the ﬁshery. A key factor inﬂuencing proﬁts
has been the increased productivity of the ﬂeets, whereas rising fuel prices
are slowing down the development (STECF, 2013). The number of vessels
is the highest in the length group 12m to 18 m, while the length category
24m to 40m accounts for the biggest share of the catch. The Danish ﬂeet is
the biggest within the sector. However, not all the Danish vessels, nor the
German ones, harvest only in the Baltic Sea; a large share is operating also in
the North Sea and North Atlantic. The second biggest ﬂeet within the sector
is owned by Sweden (STECF, 2013). The capacity in number of vessels has
been showing mostly a negative trend in the DTS sector (table 5.2). The
number of Danish demersal vessels was decreasing over past years while the
sector was increasing its proﬁts. This conﬁrms that although the capacity
decreased, the remaining vessels have suﬃcient technology to obtain higher
catches, and thus, attain higher proﬁts. Also, the German ﬂeet capacity has
been decreasing. In Poland, the excess capacity has been reduced especially
among the bigger vessels. In 2012, a part of the Polish demersal ﬂeet returned
to the ﬁshery after a three-year temporary suspension of cod ﬁshing rights
from 2009 to 2011, which shows in the number of smaller vessels. In Sweden
the capacity in vessel number has been decreasing in all but smaller vessels
(STECF, 2013).
The potential overcapacity of the DTS sector is assessed by comparing
vessel utilization ratios provided by STECF (2014) (table 5.3). This technical
indicator illustrates a ratio of the average ﬁshing time spent at sea to the
maximum ﬁshing time at sea in each ﬂeet segment.15 A value below 0.7
indicates under-utilization of the ﬂeet which may be caused by a structural
overcapacity. The values between 0.7 and 1 indicate that the ﬂeet may be
considered in balance with the available resource. The values suggest that
the majority of the DTS sector struggles with overcapacity. The optimal
situation is observed only among bigger vessels, over 18m, in Germany and
Denmark, and among vessels over 24m in Sweden. A recent positive trend is
15 Here 240 days, used to reﬂect the average working days in most economic sectors (365
days less weekends and holidays). The ratio includes potential ﬁshing in other waters.
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Length 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Denmark
0-10m 37 34 12 12 12 10 12 14 -
10-12m - - - - 10 13 8 8 -
12-18m 317 286 271 217 184 177 168 156 -
18-24m - - - - 79 77 68 70 -
24-40m - - - - 51 46 42 39 -
Germany
0-10m 21 14 14 14 2 2 1 1 -
10-12m - - - - 14 13 15 15 10
12-18m 75 76 77 78 41 39 37 33 27
18-24m - - - - 31 28 30 29 20
24-40m 24 27 26 26 12 17 16 13 10
Poland
0-10m 13 - - - - 5 3 1 1
10-12m - - - - - 7 12 15 15
12-18m 141 124 91 93 59 45 46 55 58
18-24m - - - - 34 22 20 16 34
24-40m 74 48 44 32 25 10 10 4 5
Sweden
0-10m 64 65 71 63 10 9 15 21 22
10-12m - - - - 50 53 48 48 49
12-18m 160 149 158 160 105 100 89 80 74
18-24m - - - - 55 58 49 43 46
24-40m 30 30 27 33 32 31 31 31 28
Tab. 5.2: Trends in the DTS sector ﬁshing capacity (2004 to 2012)
(number of vessels) (STECF, 2013). - not available.
shown by Denmark and mid-sized vessels from Poland and Sweden, indicating
a capacity reduction (STECF, 2014).
5.3 Methodology
5.3.1 General Context
The ﬁshing industry can be considered a set of ﬁrms (vessels) clustered
in ﬂeet segments depending on main gear, vessel size, country of origin and
ﬁshing region (STECF, 2013). These homogeneous sub-divisions are often
referred to as métiers (ICES, 2013).16 In each segment, the input-based
16 There is, of course, some degree of heterogeneity within the sector. However, for
the purpose of this research, the diﬀerences within sector deﬁned in this way are not
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Length 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Denmark
10-12m 0.36 0.34 0.48 - 0.45
12-18m 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.59
18-24m 0.60 0.64 0.69 0.64 0.69
24-40m 0.88 0.97 0.91 0.88 0.90
Germany
10-12m 0.44 0.42 0.36 0.37 0.30
12-18m 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.45
18-24m 0.63 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.68
24-40m 0.86 0.72 0.68 0.68 0.84
Poland
10-12m - - 0.23 - -
12-18m 0.26 0.36 0.34 0.45 0.57
18-24m 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.39 0.38
24-40m 0.36 0.40 0.23 - -
Sweden
10-12m 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.26
12-18m 0.38 0.37 0.34 0.37 0.41
18-24m 0.47 0.44 0.49 0.60 0.64
24-40m 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.73 0.67
Tab. 5.3: Vessel utilization ratios for DTS sector from 2008 to 2012
(STECF, 2014). - not available.
technical eﬃciency (TE, referring to the full input based technical eﬃciency
speciﬁcation from herein) is dependent on the production of outputs, i.e.
harvested species, using inputs in form of ﬁshing eﬀort. The TE value gives
information to what extent the production in a segment diﬀers from the best
practice in the industry, i.e. how far it is from the established frontier. Devi-
ation indicates that the accessible technology is not used to its full potential.
The eﬀort required for a certain level of harvest depends on the long-term
strategy and short-term decision of the ﬁshermen. The long-term strategy
is associated mostly with capital investments, its type, size, etc. The short-
term decision is on which species to target, whether to change gear or not,
whether to ﬁsh on a given day, and where to ﬁsh (Eales and Wilen, 1986).
considered.
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The choice of ﬁshing ground is an important aspect of ﬁshing (Pascoe
et al., 2007). Following modern biological studies, the ﬁsh population struc-
ture often exhibits properties like patchiness and heterogeneity, and this eﬀect
should not be disregarded in ﬁsheries modeling (Holland et al., 2004; Smith
et al., 2009). Patch, following Sanchirico and Wilen (1999), is a `location in
space that contains or has the potential to contain an aggregation of biomass.'
A productive patch, abounding in a target species, in general implies higher
catchability, lower on-site costs and higher rents.17 Eﬀort should be increased
in such areas. In contrast, eﬀort should be driven away from less productive
patches (Sanchirico and Wilen, 1999). TEs are considered to diﬀer with the
productivity of diﬀerent ﬁshing grounds. Thus, the spatial dimension and
explicit choice of ﬁshing grounds adds new insight into comparing eﬃciency
between métiers.
The distance between port and ﬁshing ground is an important constraint
in this context. The ﬁsherman will not choose the most productive ﬁsh-
ing ground if the traveling eﬀort is too high. Thus, the ﬁsherman faces the
trade-oﬀ between TE on-site and travel distance. The ﬁsherman's choice of
ﬁshing ground is subject to uncertainties in the stock dynamics, stock mi-
gration and locations of stock abundance (Mangel and Clark, 1983; Schnier
and Anderson, 2006). Searching behavior provides reduction of such uncer-
tainty. However, searching for information about stock abundance implies
an opportunity cost equal to forgone pay-oﬀs which could have been realized
by ﬁshing (Marcoul and Weninger, 2008). Many ﬁsheries require substantial
eﬀort to gather enough information about where to set the net or start the
trawl (Mangel and Clark, 1983; Wilen and Botsford, 2004). Rent dissipation
may occur as a consequence of excess eﬀort involved in search itself, as well
as through ineﬃcient targeting (Eales and Wilen, 1986). Thus, the ﬁshing
behavior can be thought of as a combination of searching activity, location
choice and harvest, or a trade-oﬀ between exploration and exploitation, in
addition to required travel distance.
17 This consideration is of particular relevance for species whose harvest is density de-
pendent. It may be not particularly applicable to schooling ﬁsh types whose aggregations
can be targeted using modern technologies, including acoustic equipment.
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5.3.2 Modeling Approach
Throughout this article, the TE in the ﬁshing industry is evaluated as
input based on-site TE subject to travel distance trade-oﬀs. The on-site TE,
once the investment in capital is made, corresponds to the deviation from
the minimum possible input given the output combination. The output is
a composition of multiple ﬁsh species that are landed after returning to the
port, and it generates revenue. The input is eﬀective eﬀort, measured as
trawling time.
It is impossible to distinguish between eﬀort involved in search and actual
harvest. However, the trawling time in relation to the harvest indicates how
eﬃciently the total on-site eﬀort is utilized, i.e. how well eﬀort is divided
into search and harvest compared to the best practice. It is assumed that
the amount of eﬀort required to harvest a certain ﬁsh composition depends
on multiple factors describing the available technology. The aﬃliation to a
particular ﬂeet segment indicating main gear and size and the speciﬁcation
of long-term strategy is considered a major one. The TE is also dependent
on national factors that include regulations, ﬂeet structural changes, etc.
The role of technical progress in the ﬁshing industry is acknowledged by
accounting for time speciﬁc changes common to all observations (Squires and
Vestergaard, 2013). In this manner, it is assumed that general advancement
in technology is wildly available, but ﬂeet segments do not necessarily have
to take an advantage of it, which is reﬂected in time-speciﬁc eﬃciency levels.
The on-site TEs are also considered to be speciﬁc for particular ﬁshing
grounds as those vary in ﬁsh density. However, the harvest location is asso-
ciated with particular requirement with regard to travel time, here derived
as distance to home country. Therefore, the ﬁshing units face, each time, a
spatial decision which implies certain on-site eﬃciency, but also a distance to
cover. Moreover, the ﬁnal productivity is only realized on-site, thus, adapta-
tion and learning capacity when making the choice matters. Multiple empir-
ical studies suggest that decisions regarding time and location of ﬁshing are
ﬂexible, and can be adjusted relatively quickly (Wilen and Botsford, 2004).
Often, it can be considered a discrete choice made on a daily basis (Smith,
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2000). The eﬃciency of harvest activity depends on experience and skills
(Kirkley et al., 1998). There is also a great deal of heterogeneous responses
to signals and varying learning patterns associated with the search outcomes.
Thus, the spatial decisions, in particular trade-oﬀs between on-site eﬃciency
and distance, are evaluated with respect to their rationality in the second
stage analysis.
The TE is also inﬂuenced by stochastic factors which include any random
processes aﬀecting the ﬁnal outcome, e.g., luck (Kirkley et al., 1995). The
relation between elements determining the TE is depicted in ﬁg. 5.3. The TE
in a short-run decision process can be estimated using a stochastic frontier
analysis for the multi-product distance function.
Fig. 5.3: Elements of on-site technical eﬃciency in short-run decision
process.
5.3.3 Multi-Product Distance Function
The majority of econometric studies model multiple-output technologies
by either aggregating all outputs into a single index (e.g. Paasche, Laspeyres,
Fisher or Tornqvist) or using dual cost and proﬁt functions (Coelli and Perel-
man, 2000). However, it is rarely the case that the whole set of prices required
for creating an index is available. On the other hand, dual functions require
strict assumptions regarding either cost minimization or proﬁt maximization
that are often not met due to sectors under investigation being highly reg-
ulated or strongly inﬂuenced by tradition. The example of such industry is
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the European Union ﬁshery. The remaining approaches include the factor
requirement function (Diewert, 1974) and the distance function. However,
because the focus of the article is on the eﬃciency of the European ﬂeets,
the distance function approach seems most compelling (Färe and Grosskopf,
1990).
The production technology P (Y) represents all input vectors X that can
produce output vectorY. As the ﬁshing industry is considered to have better
control over inputs rather than outputs, the multi-product distance function
with input oriented speciﬁcation is considered more appropriate (Coelli and
Perelman, 2000) and can be deﬁned as (Shepard, 1970):
D(X, Y )I = max {θ : (X/θ) ∈ P (Y )} (5.1)
where D(X, Y )I is the distance from the inner boundary of the input set with
following properties: it is non-decreasing, positively linear homogeneous and
concave in X, and decreasing in Y. The frontier is where the lowest amount
of input X is used to produce given outputY, whereas θ indicates the level of
eﬃciency. The maximum eﬃciency is realized at the frontier, which requires
D(X, Y )I = θ = 1 and therefore the function D(X, Y )I can only take values
≥ 1. Conversely, when D(X, Y )I is approaching inﬁnity, the inﬁnite amount
of input is needed to produce a given output.
A full logarithmic speciﬁcation for i outputs (i ∈ I) and j inputs (j ∈ J)
for métier n at time t is given as:
lnDn,t = α0 +
∑
i∈I
αi ln(yi,n,t) +
∑
j∈J
αj ln(xj,n,t)
+
∑
i∈I
∑
i′∈I
αii′ ln(yi,n,t) ln(yi′,n,t) +
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
αij ln(yi,n,t) ln(xj,n,t)
+
∑
j∈J
∑
j′∈J
αjj′ ln(xj,n,t) ln(xj′,n,t). (5.2)
The choice of logarithmic form is dictated by its ﬂexibility with respect to
determining the structure of the technology (Kirkley et al., 1995). Imposing
homogeneity of degree one in inputs requires:
∑
j∈J αj = 1,
∑
j∈J αjj′ =
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0 ∀ j′ ∈ J , ∑j∈J αij = 0 ∀ i ∈ I, whereas symmetry requires αii′ = αi′i
and αjj′ = αj′j. That, for the case of single input x, implies:18
ln
(
Dn,t
xn,t
)
= α0 +
∑
i∈I
αi ln(yi,n,t) +
∑
i∈I
∑
i′∈I
αii′ ln(yi,n,t) ln(yi′,n,t)
or
ln(xn,t) = −(α0 +
∑
i∈I
αi ln(yi,n,t) +
∑
i∈I
∑
i′∈I
αii′ ln(yi,n,t) ln(yi′,n,t))
+ ln(Dn,t). (5.3)
There are multiple concerns regarding the use of eﬀort as a single in-
put variable (Squires and Vestergaard, 2012). However, it is a traditionally
important measure (Cunningham and Whitmarsh, 1980) which oﬀers a con-
venient framework to examine TE. Moreover, the comprehensive data needs
to be available, which is not the case for e.g. fuel use. This is a crucial issue
with respect to the attempt to compare multiple countries.
5.3.4 Empirical Model
Extending the analysis by a spatial component requires redeﬁning the
panels in equation (5.3) as segment-, location- and time-speciﬁc. Introducing
r as a notation for location and including a linear time trend t indicating
technical progress, the ﬁnal model takes the form of:
ln(xn,r,t) = −(α0 +
∑
i∈I
αi ln(yi,n,r,t)
+
∑
i∈I
∑
i′∈I
αii′ ln(yi,n,r,t ln(yi′,n,r,t)) + αtt)) + un,r,t + vn,r,t.
(5.4)
Fishing sensitivity to random factors is captured in the term ln(Dn,t)
18 For the multi-input case, the following restrictions imply (Coelli and Perel-
man, 2000): ln
(
Dn,t
x1,n,t
)
= α0 +
∑
i∈I αi ln(yi,n,t) +
∑
j∈J 6=1 αj ln(
xj,n,t
x1,n,t
) +∑
i∈I
∑
i′∈I αii′ ln(yi,n,t) ln(yi′,n,t) +
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J 6=1 αij ln(yi,n,t) ln(
xj,n,t
x1,n,t
) +∑
j∈J 6=1
∑
j′∈J 6=1 αjj′ ln(
xj,n,t
x1,n,t
) ln(
xj′,n,t
x1,n,t
).
118
(equation (5.3)) that can be redeﬁned to the composed error (n,t) containing
the normally distributed stochastic variable vn,t (statistical noise) and the
strictly non-negative ineﬃciency un,t.19 After transformation, the un,t term
can be interpreted as eﬃciency (Jondrow et al., 1982):
TEn,t = exp (−E(un,t|n,t)). (5.5)
In this paper we consider the Battese and Coelli (1995) methodology de-
signed for panel data, in which the ineﬃciency term un,r,t is obtained by
truncation at zero of the normal distribution with mean δ, which is an un-
known parameter to be estimated.20 This allows comparability of the TE
scores between observations, whereas it shows no attempt to evaluate nu-
merically the inﬂuence of other factors; rather it gives consistent scores for
further analysis. The advantage of the method is also that the unbalanced
character of the data does not pose an estimation problem (Battese and
Coelli, 1995). The estimates of the multi-product distance function give the
speciﬁc on-site TE of each country at a given time and in a deﬁned location.
This eﬃciency, combined with information on location distance for each seg-
ment, presents a unique base for comparing overall eﬃciency of multiple ﬂeet
segments and the incurred trade-oﬀs.
5.4 Data
The analysis is based on data on harvest (landings) and eﬀective eﬀort
given by administrative rectangles for speciﬁc year, gear, country and length
category, originating from supplementary material for the Annual Economic
Report on the European Union Fishing Fleet (STECF, 2013).21,22 Eﬀective
19 With formally stated properties as follows (Stevenson, 1980): υn,t ∼ N [0, σ2υ] and
un,t ∼ N [δ, σ2u] ⊥ υn,t.
20 The `sfpanel' package for STATA developed by Belotti, F., Daidone, S., Atella, V. and
Ilardi, G. is used.
21 The exact location of each ICES statistical rectangle can be viewed as interactive
map available through ICES Spatial Facility under http://geo.ices.dk/viewer.php?
add_layers=ices_ref:ices_rectangles.
22 The data is available online under http//:stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/data-reports.
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eﬀort is measured as the number of hours trawling. Harvest is divided into
three groups reﬂecting the Baltic Sea species composition and includes: cod
(c), pelagic species (p) with herring and sprat, and group of other species
(o). The groups are formed by linear aggregation of tons of fresh weight.
The data set used is limited to major European ﬂeets ﬁshing in the area of
the Baltic Sea using demersal gear over the period 2004 to 2012. The study
considers DTS sector ﬂeets from Denmark, Germany, Poland and Sweden.
These countries account for over 80% of total cod harvest during the period
under investigation and therefore are the most important ones for the anal-
ysis, and the DTS sector is most important for harvesting cod in the Baltic
Sea. Each demersal ﬂeet is described by country of origin and length range.
The dataset is restricted to ﬁve vessel length categories: (1) 8m to 10m, (2)
10m to 12m, (3) 12m to 18m, (4) 18m to 24m and (5) 24m to 40m. Smaller
vessels are excluded as they are less mobile units and highly restricted to
coastal areas neighbouring the home port. Big trawlers of length over 40m
were excluded as very mobile and performing their ﬁshing activity often out-
side of the Baltic Sea which is our area of focus. The data for length category
1 for 2004 in Germany was not available. Year 2004 was chosen as a starting
period, as since then, all countries under investigation are members of the
European Union and subject to the principle of relative stability in the con-
text of setting TACs. The spatial distribution of cod harvest, the main target
species of the DTS sector, summed over the investigated length categories is
presented in ﬁg. 5.2 (as the average of harvest over the investigated period
2004 to 2012). The observations with exceptionally low reported eﬀort (less
than 12h per year) were excluded as of low importance for the analysis. Dur-
ing the period under investigation, the data was recorded for 102 rectangles
with ﬁshing activity of minimum 12h during the year. In total there are 2705
observations with a summary given in table 5.4.
The distances to the ﬁshing grounds are calculated as the length of a
straight line from the middle of the rectangle's oﬀshore area (polygon's cen-
troid) to the nearest feature of the country of origin mainland or island with
road connection (bridge). The results are derived in nautical miles with a
use of GIS software (QGIS). Within this research framework the possibility
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of landing the harvest on the islands with only a water-based connection was
excluded. However, it is acknowledged that some of the landing occurs on
Bornholm and Gotland.
Whereas Swedish Gotland is situated outside of the major cod ﬁshing
areas, ﬁsh landed on Danish Bornholm, located in the most productive cod
ﬁshing areas, may inﬂuence the results. However, the Danish landing statis-
tics (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries of Denmark, 2014) suggest
decreasing importance of Bornholm ports. The diﬀerence in distance is also
expected to be reﬂected in prices, as Bornholm is not the primary place of the
ﬁnal demand and thus most of the processed product has to be transported
to the mainland.
Length Obs. Rect. Mean Eﬀort Mean Harvest (tons)
ﬁshed (days) cod pelagics other
8-10m 77 17 377.88 7.90 0.00 6.74
(508.41) (17.07) (0.00) (12.15)
10-12m 160 27 1339.96 46.52 0.15 16.25
(1475.21) (80.86) (1.84) (22.88)
Denmark 12-18m 277 43 4379.39 235.29 256.70 78.06
(6366.04) (422.26) (649.99) (144.87)
18-24m 238 42 1611.53 130.64 42.07 28.99
(2399.03) (183.39) (181.59) (72.17)
24-40m 201 51 419.30 69.96 86.89 8.83
(595.17) (142.99) (160.88) (27.63)
8-10m 25 7 335.80 9.99 0.13 3.51
(238.01) (9.09) (0.45) (3.63)
10-12m 112 19 735.46 35.69 60.77 28.38
(828.09) (39.07) (128.77) (39.40)
Germany 12-18m 136 25 1588.05 111.43 148.82 76.60
(2362.02) (181.62) (246.11) (133.20)
18-24m 163 27 991.26 110.85 85.91 45.48
(1665.71) (183.70) (201.23) (85.68)
24-40m 162 44 435.16 68.38 117.17 11.50
(725.19) (102.30) (312.58) (25.29)
8-10m 45 9 1474.47 5.91 30.11 14.66
(3280.58) (10.73) (74.69) (24.51)
10-12m 70 16 667.94 25.62 10.52 40.02
(850.09) (45.51) (33.37) (61.49)
Poland 12-18m 159 23 3538.07 138.05 40.62 162.80
(491.19) (109.56) (489.28) (3.19)
18-24m 152 22 2193.49 95.04 37.45 66.96
(3605.90) (161.10) (105.76) (102.28)
24-40m 159 31 2639.49 110.41 42.55 121.93
(5280.47) (183.69) (101.02) (250.34)
8-10m 21 3 187.48 0.00 4.36 0.01
(106.27) (0.00) (4.82) (0.02)
10-12m 79 18 403.70 0.80 33.55 0.09
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(445.83) (3.58) (49.04) (0.25)
Sweden 12-18m 188 46 345.81 32.87 233.44 0.83
(491.19) (109.56) (489.28) (3.19)
18-24m 167 40 462.16 101.70 329.32 1.43
(616.46) (249.97) (554.70) (4.24)
24-40m 114 36 277.11 69.08 271.91 0.67
(338.19) (149.99) (412.77) (1.99)
Tab. 5.4: Summary statistics for the data used. Standard deviations
in parentheses.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Distance Function Estimates
The estimation is performed over panels with observations for the DTS
sector speciﬁed by country, administrative rectangle and time, separately for
each length category. Due to lack of more detailed data on capital, there is no
possibility to compare directly métiers of diﬀerent sizes. Therefore the com-
parison will be relevant only within each length category and the production
technology that is common for such a group is estimated (Vestergaard et al.,
2002). For the purpose of estimation, data have been scaled through dividing
each parameter by sample mean prior to estimation (Coelli and Perelman,
2000). The results of the distance function estimation, together with robust
standard errors adjusted for clusters on country and area, are presented in
table 5.5.
The majority of coeﬃcients is statistically signiﬁcant indicating good ﬁt
of the proposed model for each length category. Additionally, an alternative
structure of the model in the form of the Cobb-Douglas function was tested
and rejected for each length category. All ﬁrst-order terms have expected
negative signs. The ﬁrst-order output coeﬃcients, with exception of the cat-
egory including the biggest vessels, sum to an absolute value smaller than one,
indicating increasing returns to scale. The opposite, decreasing returns to
scale, are found for vessels between 24m and 40m. The coeﬃcient αt in each
length category is signiﬁcant and indicates a common positive time trend. In
general, it shows increasing production at the same level of input over time.
The ratio of σu to σv exceeded a value of one and was statistically diﬀerent
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from zero at 1% level of signiﬁcance for each length category. This suggests
the existence of a stochastic frontier function and that the deviations from
the frontier are dominated by input ineﬃciencies. The model ineﬃciency
levels suggest a higher degree of heterogeneity between small vessels.
Length 8-10m 10-12m 12-18m 18-24m 24-40m
αc -0.327*** -0.358*** -0.405*** -0.441*** -0.515***
(0.108) (0.097) (0.087) (0.054) (0.077)
αp -0.245** -0.004 -0.196*** -0.185*** -0.259***
(0.115) (0.069) (0.072) (0.043) (0.053)
αo -0.197 -0.281*** -0.299*** -0.198*** -0.353***
(0.170) (0.063) (0.071) (0.037) (0.044)
αcc -0.120*** -0.124*** -0.114*** -0.095*** -0.096***
(0.029) (0.024) (0.024) (0.014) (0.015)
αcp 0.016 0.022* 0.015 0.022 0.016**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007)
αco 0.045** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.029***
(0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.007) (0.009)
αpp -0.035 0.007 -0.051** -0.045*** -0.057***
(0.027) (0.021) (0.023) (0.013) (0.015)
αpo 0.030 0.026*** 0.028** 0.024*** 0.006
(0.022) (0.010) (0.012) (0.004) (0.007)
αoo -0.061** -0.076*** -0.072*** -0.069*** -0.076***
(0.027) (0.030) (0.016) (0.009) (0.011)
αt 0.049** 0.045*** 0.069*** 0.092*** 0.082***
(0.023) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
α0 -0.029 0.455 -0.112 -0.372* -0.305*
(0.268) (0.336) (0.146) (0.138) (0.158)
σu 5.180*** 1.053** 4.257* 2.576*** 3.493***
(1.994) (0.466) (2.023) (4.115) (0.677)
σv 0.467*** 0.497*** 0.686*** 0.566*** 0.585***
(0.098) (0.141) (0.135) (0.046) (0.047)
Estimated ineﬃciencies uˆn,r,t
Mean 0.573 0.915 0.489 0.343 0.404
SD 0.495 0.550 0.326 0.193 0.259
Min 0.119 0.147 0.105 0.097 0.093
Max 3.186 3.081 2.647 1.517 2.461
Log-Likelihood -178.14 -512.99 -939.72 -717.59 -1175.37
Tab. 5.5: Estimated parameters of the distance functions. Standard
error in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and
* 10%.
5.5.2 Eﬃciency On-Site Comparison
The TE estimates in form of mean and standard deviation are reported
at national level for each length category in table 5.6. The overall TE for a
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given ﬂeet segment is formed by weighting site speciﬁc values with associated
eﬀort. Thus, the ﬁnal TE measure incorporates the eﬀect of ﬁshing ground
choice.
Among analyzed countries, Germany is the most eﬃcient, except being
closely behind Poland in length category 2. The least eﬃcient ﬂeet belongs
to Sweden looking at units below 18m, and to Poland considering the ﬂeet
consisting of larger vessels. The biggest diﬀerences are observed among small
vessels (length category 2), where the best score, for Poland, is over 60%
higher compared to Sweden, the last in the group. The diﬀerences between
TEs fade away with increasing size of the vessel. The smallest eﬃciency
asymmetries are observed among the largest vessel group where the most
eﬃcient, Germany, is only about 20% ahead of Poland which is closing the
group. The biggest vessels are also characterized by the smallest variation
of eﬃciency within the group, again suggesting that the small vessels are
considerably more heterogeneous.
Length 8-10m 10-12m 12-18m 18-24m 24-40m
Country M SD EW M SD EW M SD EW M SD EW M SD EW
Denmark 0.60 0.15 0.53 0.34 0.15 0.32 0.62 0.11 0.62 0.70 0.12 0.67 0.67 0.14 0.63
Germany 0.65 0.10 0.62 0.56 0.11 0.50 0.72 0.07 0.71 0.78 0.06 0.77 0.75 0.08 0.71
Poland 0.65 0.23 0.47 0.60 0.15 0.52 0.64 0.11 0.60 0.67 0.13 0.56 0.63 0.14 0.57
Sweden 0.53 0.25 0.44 0.40 0.24 0.19 0.61 0.21 0.53 0.75 0.10 0.75 0.70 0.12 0.65
Tab. 5.6: Eﬃciency estimates: Mean (M), Standard Deviation (SD)
and Eﬃciency Weighted (EW). EW using eﬀort as weight-
ing factor.
5.5.3 Changes over Time
The model results suggest a negative time trend for eﬀort requirement in
the investigated part of the European ﬁshing industry. The most probable
explanation is the combination of technological progress in European ﬁsh-
eries, less competition in the sector, decreasing size of the European Union
ﬂeets and improving cod stock condition (from 2005). The biggest increase
in eﬃciency is observed among vessels over 18m.
Disregarding the common time trend and looking at individual country
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changes over time (ﬁg. 5.4, speciﬁc values in Appendix 5.8), the ﬂeet below
10m presents considerably more variation over years compared to bigger ves-
sels. The simple explanation may be that the small scale ﬂeet lacks capacity
for fast adaptation to variation of external factors. This is in line with con-
clusions of other authors, who have found that mobile ﬂeets adjust faster to
catch per unit of eﬀort compared to small-scale, sedentary ﬂeets ﬁshing in
close proximity to the home port (Hilborn and Ledbetter, 1979).
The biggest diﬀerences between nations can be observed in length cate-
gory 2, in which, in contrast to length category 1, the technical eﬃciencies
stay at similar levels over years. Regarding length category 3 to 5, one inter-
esting feature is a substantial drop of eﬃciency in 2012 within Danish vessels,
which is a big contributor to lower overall eﬃciency of this country. One
probable reason behind is the decrease of total landings in 2012 compared to
2011 by 31% along with an eﬀort drop of only 3%. The major factor causing
it was a decrease by about 80% in the sandeel quota which is an important
species for the Danish industrial ﬁsheries, as well as a signiﬁcant drop in the
harvest of other pelagic species, sprat (64% drop) and herring (20% drop)
(STECF, 2013; ICES, 2013). The harvest of demersal and pelagic species is
interconnected, as they are often targeted by the same vessels, i.e. vessels
in the DTS sector have the option to allocate some of their eﬀort to pelagic
harvest through ﬂexible gear changes (Hutniczak, 2014). It is expected that
this fact contributed to demersal segment performance whereas the available
data is not suﬃcient to predict the future trend with respect to this ﬂeet.
One can also notice a temporary peak for Polish vessels in length category
3 to 5 during the period 2009 to 2011. That could be explained by higher
on average individual vessel quotas and less competition due to restricting
access to the ﬁshery as a consequence of the European Union's punishment
for overﬁshing cod in earlier years (European Council, 2008). Furthermore,
the landing volumes for earlier years are probably underestimated due to
problems with illegal landings and misreporting (ICES, 2013). Moreover,
the visible increasing trend in the eﬃciency of Polish vessels above 12m can
be a result of the major ﬂeet restructuring process that is outrunning other
countries.
125
(a) Length 1: 8  10m (b) Length 2: 10  12m
(c) Length 3: 12  18m (d) Length 4: 18  24m
(e) Length 5: 24  40m
Fig. 5.4: Eﬃciency estimates by year, weighted by eﬀort.
5.5.4 Spatial Consideration
The model presents signiﬁcant diﬀerences in on-site TE depending on the
choice of ﬁshing ground. The speciﬁc results compiled with distances for the
most important cod ﬁshing grounds are presented in the Appendix 5.9. The
eﬃciencies were calculated as weighted with eﬀort average over the period
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2004 to 2012.23
There is a big overlap between countries with respect to ﬁshing ground
choice for the bigger vessels. Considering top rectangles, bigger vessels (over
12m) from all countries share the most productive ﬁshing grounds. In par-
ticular, the largest vessels are observed to be ﬁshing the same few rectangles.
In the case of length category 5, 88% of cod is harvested in merely 12 rectan-
gles. Harvest by small vessels is much more spread, showing the limitations
in location choice. This fact is most visible in length category 1, but also
noticeable for length category 2. This conclusion is in line with ﬁndings
by other authors that suggest vessel size signiﬁcantly inﬂuences trip choice
behavior (Pradhan and Leung, 2004).
The trade-oﬀs between on-site eﬃciency and distance to the ﬁshing ground
is evaluated by comparing weighted TE and distances for the whole ﬁshing
activity with the equivalent parameters for the most eﬃciently utilized eﬀort
and the area with the most eﬀort applied. The results for 2011 are presented
in table 5.7. Year 2011 was chosen as the most recent after eliminating 2012
due to results for Denmark outside of general trend.24 The table shows that
in many cases the trade-oﬀs are well established and the majority of eﬀort is
often utilized in the areas of closer proximity to home country, even despite
the lower on-site eﬃciency. Potential for TE improvement by better location
choice can be observed in the column denoted by `Top 10%'. Here the results
are derived for the 10% of eﬀort utilized at the highest eﬃciency level. Al-
though in a few cases it would require a signiﬁcant increase of distances, there
are many instances in which the potential for improvement, both from the
perspective of on-site TE and distance, is noticeable. In relation to weighted
distance, that includes: Denmark in category 1; whole category 2; Denmark
and Germany in category 3; Poland in category 4; and category 5 with ex-
clusion of Germany. Thus, better management, deﬁned here as more optimal
site choice, gives a potential for higher input eﬃciency.
23 No signiﬁcant diﬀerences over years when it comes to choice of harvest grounds by
each length category were observed, whereas the time trend was excluded.
24 Despite the arguments explaining the low eﬃciency scores for Denmark in 2012, due
to insuﬃcient data it cannot be established whether the situation has a temporary or
permanent character. On contrary, the data for 2011 ﬁts into consistent trend.
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Weighted Average Max Eﬀort Top 10%
TE Distance TE Distance TE Distance
Length category 1: 8-10 m
Denmark 0.63 40.6 0.67 98.5(1) 0.77 11.2
Germany 0.68 4.7 0.67 2.2 0.71 12.4
Poland 0.52 3.2 0.65 1.3 0.70 3.6
Sweden 0.71 6.9 0.71 6.9 0.71 6.9
Length category 2: 10-12 m
Denmark 0.36 45.7 0.46 98.5(2) 0.53 6.1
Germany 0.57 13 0.59 5.7 0.67 12.9
Poland 0.52 17.3 0.29 1.3 0.71 14.7
Sweden 0.20 8.6 0.11 7 0.50 2.9
Length category 3: 12-18 m
Denmark 0.66 47.8 0.70 98.5(3) 0.70 35.6
Germany 0.71 16.4 0.71 9.6 0.76 16.1
Poland 0.69 19.4 0.70 9.9 0.76 24.1
Sweden 0.58 18.5 0.66 13.3 0.89 91
Length category 4: 18-24 m
Denmark 0.66 84.5 0.55 103.3(4) 0.77 103.8
Germany 0.77 27.3 0.76 9.6 0.81 60.6
Poland 0.75 18.5 0.74 3.6 0.81 15.1
Sweden 0.78 34 0.76 13.3 0.82 76
Length category 5: 24-40 m
Denmark 0.64 131.1 0.61 132.1(5) 0.76 73
Germany 0.72 53.5 0.72 5.7 0.79 102.6
Poland 0.66 27.4 0.70 28.6 0.77 21.6
Sweden 0.68 41.7 0.72 13.3 0.76 39.9
Tab. 5.7: Technical eﬃciency and distance trade-oﬀs in 2011. Note:
Distance in nautical miles. Max Eﬀort indicates score for
the area where the most eﬀort was applied. Top 10% in-
dicates 10% share of eﬀort utilized at the highest levels of
eﬃciency. (1) - (4): These are the distances for the Born-
holm rectangle. The scores for the next in line that is not
in the area of Bornholm are as follows: (1) TE=0.66, Dis-
tance=2.2, (2) TE=0.53, Distance=6.1, (3) TE=0.67, Dis-
tance=6.1, (4) TE=0.66, Distance=12.8. (5): The sector
is almost exclusively ﬁshing in the distant to the mainland
waters.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
The article addresses a potential shortcoming of the vast literature on
ﬁshery resource exploitation, namely the assumption about the uniformly
distributed eﬀort (Smith and Wilen, 2003). The modeling system takes ad-
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vantage of a richer data set and incorporates spatial and intertemporal di-
mensions. These exhibited features build into general eﬃciency that can be
compared between countries. The study moves away from the obsolete views
that treat ﬁsh populations as spatially uniform or the state of technology
over time as constant (Smith et al., 2009). The paper compares multiple ﬂeet
segments taking into account diﬀerent accessibility of the most productive
ﬁshing grounds, the state of current technological progress, eﬀorts under-
taken in the ﬂeet restructuring process, and advantages created by applied
management systems.
The major argument for diﬀerent levels of technical eﬃciency that comes
to mind is uneven access to the most productive ﬁshing grounds. However,
the equal access principle in the European Union gives all member states the
same right to ﬁsh in the whole Baltic Sea.25 Hence, there is no legal discrim-
ination of vessels regarding access to ﬁshing grounds. The article shows that
vessels of length over 12m (and partially vessels of length 10m to 12 m) take
full advantage of this fact and conduct their activity in the same areas. The
lack of technical limitations (capital feasibility) cause strong spatial overlap
of ﬁshing grounds. The advantages of ﬁshing in particular areas are shown
by derived area-speciﬁc TEs that present considerable asymmetries. On the
other hand, for smaller vessels it is more risky, costly or even unfeasible, to
go all the way to the main cod ﬁshing areas and thus the harvest activity is
more localized. Thus, trade-oﬀs between on-site eﬃciency and traveled dis-
tance, especially in the case of bigger vessels, are necessary to be considered
when comparing eﬃciencies of European ﬂeets' with respect to utilization of
national TACs.
The paper investigates the traveled distances to the ﬁshing grounds in
comparison with on-site eﬃciencies speciﬁed for given area per length cat-
egory. These can be considered second order frontiers of the industry with
two inputs, eﬀective eﬀort and travel eﬀort. The smallest vessels (length
category 1) travel mostly up to 20nm (on average ﬁve to ten nm, depending
25 Except for the 12 nautical mile zone. In these zones bilateral agreements deﬁne access
rights.
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on country) and are not able to reach the most productive ﬁshing grounds.26
The landings of this length category are also not substantially contributing
to the total Baltic Sea production of cod. Considering TE, the results for the
smallest vessels show high variability which means vulnerability to local vari-
ations of ﬁshing conditions, i.e. changes in the distribution of ﬁsh. Thus, it is
diﬃcult to draw speciﬁc conclusions besides the high sensitivity of this ﬂeet
sector to surrounding circumstances. Considering quota exchanges within
this group, the high responsiveness to surrounding conditions suggests that
short-term quota leases might be eﬃciency improving. They would allow the
more ﬂexible participants to take an advantage of favorable conditions.
Certainly a diﬀerent situation occurs in the case of bigger vessels (length
category 2 only partially). These can travel longer distances (more than
100nm up to 200nm) and are more ﬂexible in their choice of ﬁshing site.
Their ﬁshing activities overlap and are concentrated in the most productive
south part of the Baltic Sea, around the island of Bornholm. Given that
those vessels ﬁsh in the same area, the diﬀerences in TE are expected to be
more likely resulting from diﬀerences in the structure and the utilization of
the national ﬂeets.27 Fisheries management is also an important factor in this
context as national implementation of CFP varies between countries. This
holds especially for the way in which the TAC is allocated between resource
users.
The diﬀerences between estimated TEs among bigger vessels are more
visible and allow comparison as the levels are rather stable. Based on the
model results the following conclusion can be made. The stage of the ﬂeet
restructuring process seems to have the highest impact on the on-site catch
eﬃciencies of the single ﬂeet segments. If the restructuring process is in an
advanced stage (as e.g. in Germany or Denmark) and the capacity utilization
is high, the catch eﬃciencies are higher. On the other hand, a country
still undergoing major structural changes and struggling with overcapacity
26 The exceptionally high distances for Denmark within length category 1 account for
the harvest located in rectangles directly bordering the island of Bornholm. This part of
harvest is most probably locally landed in Bornholm.
27 E.g. the eﬀects of restructuring process, here meaning the adjustment of the ﬂeets to
requirements of the European Union.
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is reﬂected in a low level of catch eﬃciency (as e.g. in Poland), which does
however give the potential of faster improvement. The outstanding result
for Poland (vessels over 12m, especially length category 4) showing faster
improvement than other countries suggests an increase in performance over
the last years. That can be explained again by the big restructuring process
in the Polish ﬂeet  between 2004 and 2011 almost 500 vessels were removed.
The use of tradable quotas seems to improve eﬃciency although it is
expected that its main contribution is in supporting the restructuring process.
A ﬂexible quota system that allows quota swapping (i.e. ITQs) is expected
to have a positive impact on the catch eﬃciency through incentives given to
less eﬃcient vessels to leave the market by selling their quota shares and thus
increasing the catch eﬃciency of the sector. These eﬀects have been shown by
Andersen et al. (2010) for Denmark and its introduction of ITQs for pelagic
and demersal ﬂeets. According to Andersen et al. (2010), the ITQ system
motivated smaller vessels (up to 18m) to sell their catch shares to bigger
vessels and drop out of the market. That increased the overall resource rent
of the remaining ﬂeet. However, the diﬀerences in TE have faded away in
recent years, implying that the ﬂeets in the DTS sector in the Baltic Sea are
becoming more competitive.
Moreover, the article ﬁndings suggest that eﬃciency can be improved by
the optimal choice of ﬁshing grounds. The results show signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in TE between harvest areas which are often not well utilized. In many
instances the overall eﬃciency would increase by changing eﬀort allocation
patterns, not necessarily at the cost of further distances. Moreover, being
situated closer to the productive grounds is shown to be beneﬁcial. Countries
like Poland and Germany take advantage of it. This fact is expected to
inﬂuence the potential direction of international quota ﬂow.
Concluding, the asymmetries in on-site eﬃciencies combined with eval-
uated location advantages are expected to be crucial when evaluating the
beneﬁts of the potential international ﬂow of quotas. Allowing quota trade
between the countries could diminish the discrepancies in eﬃciency and si-
multaneously increase the overall eﬃciency. Following economic principles,
such a system would set incentives for the less eﬃcient vessels to sell their
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shares while the more eﬃcient vessels enlarge their harvest by buying addi-
tional quotas, and contribute to overall eﬃciency by moving it closer to the
established technological frontier. Better spatial management and beneﬁts
associated with optimal ﬁshing ground choice in the context of the advantage
of being located closer to generally more productive grounds could be uti-
lized as well. Such a system would show in practice the true distance versus
on-site capital utilization trade-oﬀ. This kind of trans-border management
is also in line with the current CFP, whose latest reform promotes the idea
of regionalization of the ﬁshing management (European Union, 2013). The
aim is to reallocate responsibility from the European Union level and allow
the member states to freely coordinate their activities as long as the overall
goals of the CFP are taken into account.
Nevertheless, the social concerns associated with applying pure economic
principle (Kjærsgaard, 2010), e.g. lack of fairly distributed beneﬁts from
common pool resource, may be hard to overcome. Such a state also may
not be desirable to individual countries. Thus, the impact of other factors
inﬂuencing national levels of eﬃciency is highlighted here, which can be con-
sidered as guidance for best practices to improve eﬃciency.
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5.7 Appendix
5.7.1 Eﬃciency Estimates
Tab. 5.8: Eﬃciency estimates by year, weighted by eﬀort. - indicates
missing data.
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Length category 1: 8-10m
Denmark 0.345 0.473 0.567 0.543 0.579 0.429 0.485 0.627 0.443
Germany - 0.614 0.655 0.636 0.591 0.545 0.620 0.678 0.622
Poland 0.228 0.491 0.609 0.631 0.648 0.768 0.612 0.523 0.763
Sweden 0.399 0.707 0.492 0.445 0.707 0.564 0.298 0.709 0.203
Length category 2: 10-12m
Denmark 0.333 0.270 0.306 0.360 0.344 0.400 0.360 0.358 0.159
Germany 0.433 0.483 0.537 0.518 0.488 0.478 0.562 0.571 0.447
Poland 0.416 0.454 0.584 0.568 0.541 0.540 0.533 0.518 0.502
Sweden 0.204 0.163 0.191 0.216 0.160 0.224 0.195 0.200 0.182
Length category 3: 12-18m
Denmark 0.643 0.614 0.640 0.661 0.634 0.625 0.641 0.656 0.466
Germany 0.691 0.719 0.751 0.727 0.715 0.715 0.701 0.708 0.653
Poland 0.506 0.560 0.561 0.576 0.640 0.680 0.722 0.688 0.655
Sweden 0.473 0.471 0.501 0.502 0.466 0.461 0.592 0.579 0.561
Length category 4: 18-24m
Denmark 0.703 0.690 0.712 0.732 0.698 0.681 0.688 0.662 0.310
Germany 0.777 0.767 0.806 0.782 0.794 0.770 0.774 0.774 0.689
Poland 0.454 0.546 0.506 0.521 0.653 0.713 0.724 0.747 0.695
Sweden 0.716 0.677 0.695 0.694 0.650 0.674 0.790 0.779 0.781
Length category 5:24-40m
Denmark 0.677 0.675 0.667 0.753 0.722 0.723 0.711 0.643 0.321
Germany 0.752 0.696 0.723 0.696 0.783 0.719 0.673 0.723 0.592
Poland 0.497 0.581 0.561 0.549 0.658 0.763 0.748 0.663 0.635
Sweden 0.599 0.550 0.530 0.615 0.615 0.586 0.734 0.685 0.613
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5.7.2 Eﬃciency Scores and Distances
Tab. 5.9: Eﬃciency scores and distances for the Baltic Sea rectan-
gles with high cod harvest. Note: Rect.: rectangle, harvest:
sum of cod harvest in tons, share: share of harvest within
length category, Dist: distance. The rectangles with high
cod harvest are deﬁned as administrative areas where cod
harvest was over 1,000 tons within length category and min-
imum 100 tons for length category 1 over the investigated
period. - indicate no harvest activity in given rectangle
within the length category. (1): rectangles that are not top
cod harvest locations (less than 10,000 tons in total for all
length categories over the investigated period). (2): rect-
angles surrounding the island of Bornholm.
Denmark Germany Poland Sweden
Rect. harvest share TE Dist. TE Dist. TE Dist. TE Dist.
Length category 1: 8-10m
39G5(2) 182 0.16 0.70 98.5 - - 0.66 55.7 - -
38G0 145 0.13 0.56 6.1 0.86 16.2 - - - -
37G2(1) 125 0.11 - - 0.62 2.2 - - - -
37G1 119 0.11 - - 0.63 9.6 - - - -
37G5(1) 102 0.09 - - - - 0.80 9.9 - -
Length category 2: 10-12m
39G5(2) 2827 0.21 0.41 98.5 0.58 75.4 0.70 55.7 - -
38G5(2) 1591 0.12 0.25 103.3 0.60 64.4 0.69 33.0 - -
39G4(2) 1505 0.11 0.48 66.5 0.55 49.9 0.49 70.8 0.61 14.3
38G4(2) 1193 0.09 0.30 69.1 0.61 30.7 0.63 44.0 - -
38G3 1148 0.09 0.22 35.4 0.40 5.7 0.56 56.3 - -
38G0 1046 0.08 0.36 6.1 0.53 16.2 - - - -
Length category 3: 12-18m
39G5(2) 17029 0.16 0.68 98.5 0.75 75.4 0.68 55.7 0.65 42.4
38G5(2) 13349 0.12 0.60 103.3 0.69 64.4 0.70 33.0 0.65 59.0
39G4(2) 9915 0.09 0.69 66.5 0.66 49.9 0.62 70.8 0.72 14.3
38G0 9767 0.09 0.64 6.1 0.77 16.2 - - - -
38G2 6091 0.06 0.6 12.8 0.73 14.9 - - - -
37G1 5872 0.05 0.66 19.7 0.70 .6 - - - -
38G4(2) 5762 0.05 0.63 69.1 0.69 30.7 0.69 44.0 0.75 39.6
38G3 4817 0.04 0.65 35.4 0.72 5.7 0.66 56.3 0.70 34.7
38G8(1) 4277 0.04 - - - - 0.46 3.6 - -
39G7 4267 0.04 0.51 166.0 - - 0.65 28.6 0.74 68.0
40G4(1) 3065 0.03 0.67 67.0 - - - - 0.68 13.3
39G0(1) 2239 0.02 0.58 5.2 0.71 35.4 - - - -
37G5(1) 2232 0.02 0.70 108.2 0.60 49.8 0.66 9.9 0.80 76.8
41G2(1) 2085 0.02 0.61 10.7 - - - - - -
39G8 1999 0.02 0.64 199.9 - - 0.48 25.7 0.70 90.6
39G2(1) 1789 0.02 0.65 6.0 - - - - - -
39G3(1) 1787 0.02 0.62 35.9 0.74 30.9 0.73 80.2 0.74 10.1
39G6 1345 0.01 0.55 132.1 0.64 106.1 0.54 39.8 0.74 55.0
38G1(1) 1242 0.01 0.65 5.1 0.80 15.6 - - - -
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40G5(1) 1181 0.01 0.64 96.2 0.84 95.0 - - 0.66 22.8
38G9(1) 1060 0.01 0.72 239.2 0.77 191.0 0.47 18.5 - -
Length category 4: 18-24m
39G5(2) 9963 0.12 0.70 98.5 0.79 75.4 0.67 55.7 0.81 42.4
39G7 8160 0.10 0.62 166.0 0.73 138.6 0.63 28.6 0.82 68.0
37G1 6954 0.09 0.71 19.7 0.77 9.6 - - - -
39G8 6507 0.08 0.71 199.9 0.77 169.0 0.42 25.7 0.81 90.6
38G5(2) 5816 0.07 0.62 103.3 0.80 64.4 0.71 33.0 0.81 59.0
38G2 4909 0.06 0.60 12.8 0.79 14.9 - - - -
39G6 4696 0.06 0.64 132.1 0.80 106.1 0.61 39.8 0.81 55.0
38G3 4638 0.06 0.69 35.4 0.77 5.7 - - 0.82 34.7
38G4(2) 3706 0.05 0.68 69.1 0.74 30.7 0.74 44.0 0.78 39.6
39G4(2) 3595 0.04 0.71 66.5 0.75 49.9 0.62 70.8 0.79 14.3
38G8(1) 3009 0.04 0.72 209.6 - - 0.55 3.6 - -
40G5(1) 2489 0.03 0.74 96.2 0.82 95.0 - - 0.78 22.8
38G0 2256 0.03 0.67 6.1 0.79 16.2 - - - -
41G2(1) 1926 0.02 0.72 10.7 - - - - 0.84 2.8
39G3(1) 1825 0.02 0.73 35.9 0.78 30.9 0.79 80.2 0.78 10.1
40G6(1) 1489 0.02 0.65 130.0 0.77 120.5 - - 0.76 27.0
37G2(1) 1307 0.02 0.62 17.2 0.79 2.2 - - - -
40G8(1) 1225 0.02 0.73 197.8 0.81 180.6 0.41 55.4 0.82 74.2
40G4(1) 1188 0.01 0.83 67.0 0.83 76.4 - - 0.76 13.3
Length category 5: 24-40m
39G8 8675 0.17 0.67 199.9 0.78 169.0 0.43 25.7 0.73 90.6
39G5(2) 6185 0.12 0.62 98.5 0.71 75.4 0.64 55.7 0.73 42.4
39G6 6094 0.12 0.58 132.1 0.76 106.1 0.65 39.8 0.73 55.0
39G7 6024 0.12 0.57 166.0 0.77 138.6 0.65 28.6 0.73 68.0
38G5(2) 3953 0.08 0.48 103.3 0.74 64.4 0.75 33.0 0.76 59.0
38G4(2) 3612 0.07 0.69 69.1 0.63 30.7 0.72 44.0 0.69 39.6
38G3 2483 0.05 0.71 35.4 0.74 5.7 0.72 56.3 0.76 34.7
38G8(1) 1963 0.04 0.72 209.6 - - 0.50 3.6 0.85 113.2
40G6(1) 1760 0.03 0.68 130.0 0.72 120.5 0.70 66.5 0.77 27.0
40G8(1) 1646 0.03 0.57 197.8 0.70 180.6 0.30 55.4 0.79 74.2
39G4(2) 1446 0.03 0.71 66.5 0.76 49.9 0.46 70.8 0.73 14.3
39G3(1) 1099 0.02 0.71 35.9 0.75 30.9 0.52 80.2 0.73 10.1
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